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Pension benefits given to low-paid employees as an ab-
straction are taken away in the fine print of the income tax
code.
-Senator Gaylord Nelson'
I'm old, I'm helpless and feeble .... and the days of my
youth have gone by... and it's over the hill to the poor-
house .... I must wander alone there to die .... 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Entitlement is the public policy hot button of the mid-1990s.
The drive to "restrain the growth of entitlements" has taken a cen-
tral role in the budget battles facing Congress each year.3 In the
context of public debate over federal spending, even the word
"entitlement" has taken on unsavory connotations of getting some-
thing for nothing, of rewards based on status rather than merit.4
Nowhere does the issue of public spending on "entitlements"
loom larger than in the area of programs providing retirement in-
come security. Such programs include Social Security, Old Age
Survivors' and Disability Insurance (OASI),5 government 6 and
veterans' pensions,7 and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) aid
to the poor elderly.8 These programs are perhaps the largest pub-
1. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, H.R. REP. No. 93-406, at 829 (1974), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974, at 1716 (1976) (statement of Senator Nelson during debate on proposed
amendments to Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)).
2. L. FLATT & W. LILLY, Over the Hill to the Poorhouse, on HARD TRAVELIN'
(Columbia Records 1963). This song version of a poem was recorded in the 1930s
and later by Southern bluegrass artists, including Flatt and Scruggs. The song tells
the story of an old man whose three children threw him off the farm and forced him
to wander the roads in poverty. See id.
3. A thorough discussion of the public perceptions concerning Social Security
and the federal budget debates can be found in THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL.,
AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING
REALITIES 128-74 (1990).
4. See id. at 13940. Senator Frank Murkowski stated in the Congressional Rec-
ord, "As Robert Samuelson... recently stated, the 'something for nothing' decep-
tion regarding new health care entitlements is an 'exercise in national make-
believe."' 140 CONG. REC. S11,885 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1994) (referring to Robert J.
Samuelson, Unspeakable Runaway Spending, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1994, at A17).
5. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1994).
6. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8401-8479 (1994).
7. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1562 (1994).
8. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383(c). I do not address the separate issue of health
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lic spending programs under which every beneficiary meeting ini-
tial eligibility criteria9 must receive the benefit promised under the
law, regardless of the state of the federal exchequer.10 Public calls
for restraining the growth of these entitlements are now a standard
part of every pundit's analysis of the federal deficit.
Yet entitlement to future income is fundamental to the phe-
nomenon of retirement. The dilemma of old age is how to afford
to live until death. As life spans lengthen and the prospect of liv-
ing to Shakespeare's seventh age of "mere oblivion"' becomes
more real, how do we ensure that we will have adequate shelter,
food, and care to the end of life beyond the time we are able to
provide for ourselves through work? The fear of outliving one's
accumulation of resources for assuring income, paired with the
fear of loss of control over the daily circumstances of life, are the
curses of old age at the end of the twentieth century. The blessing
of long life, as it becomes more the norm than the exception, car-
ries with it the threat of loss of autonomy and control.
Without a legally enforceable expectation of a predictable
level of income-whether from private pensions, savings, or Social
Security-until death, no worker could be expected to leave the
work force voluntarily, which after all is the essence of the twenti-
eth century concept of retirement.12 Expectations of a stable in-
care for the elderly provided through Medicare, Medicaid, and employer-provided
retiree health insurance.
9. See id. §§ 401-403, 1381-1383(c).
10. This definition of public spending entitlement leaves aside the category of tax
expenditures, such as home mortgage interest deductions and failure to tax the
earnings of qualified pension plans. They are not included in the discussion here, as
they are not popularly understood as entitlements by many involved in the budget
debates.
11. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT act 2, sc. 7, 1. 165 (Alan Brissenden
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1564). See generally the speech of Jaques:
All the world's a stage ....
And one man in his time plays many parts,
His acts being seven ages ....
Last scene of all,
That ends this strange, eventful history,
Is second childishness and mere oblivion ....
Id. at 11. 139, 142-43, 163-65.
12. Defining "retirement" is a problematic venture. See, e.g., Buffalo Bills, Inc.
v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 794, 802-03 (1994) (competing definitions of
"retirement" from Oxford English Dictionary and Webster's Third New International
Dictionary offered by petitioner and respondent). I follow in this Article the current
thinking in historical analysis that distinguishes between retirement as a voluntary
cessation of work at a specific age as opposed to cessation of work because of disabil-
ity. See WILLIAM GRAEBNER, A HISTORY OF RETIREMENT 11-17 (1980); discussion
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come are important at most stages of a working life, but older
workers with fewer options and more immediate fears of the loss
of ability to work are likely to place far more importance on en-
forcement of such expectations. In a very real sense, the debate
over entitlements for the elderly is a debate over retirement itself.
There are clear distinctions between the legal relationships
creating private pension entitlement and Social Security benefit
entitlement. Nonetheless, an analysis of the function and context
of retirement income rights reveals that the presumed gulf be-
tween public and private rights in this area is not nearly so wide as
it may at first seem. In this Article I examine the historical roots
and evolution of the American system of entitlement to old-age
income security in order to understand why in one technical
area-the integration of private pension plans with Social Secu-
rity-workers' presumed entitlement to private pensions is less se-
cure than their entitlement to Social Security.
My starting point is a seemingly straightforward question:
Why does the primary direct statutory link between Social Security
and private pensions-pension integration-result in lower private
pension benefits for the portion of the worker population, low-
wage workers, that the 1935 Social Security Act was expressly de-
signed to benefit? To answer that question, it is necessary to go far
beyond the technical structure of the pension nondiscrimination
rules, and examine the historical and political evolution of old-age
entitlements and the modem institution of voluntary old-age re-
tirement. The peculiarly prospective character of retirement enti-
tlements is the key to discovering a consistent set of principles
upon which an appropriate relationship between public and pri-
vate retirement benefits can be based.3
A. Conflict of Integration and Entitlement Principles
Pension integration is the only major area in which the public
entitlement represented by Social Security retirement benefits and
the private entitlement represented by private pension plans are
infra Part III.
13. This Article focuses on voluntary retirement, as opposed to cessation of work
because of disability, although in practice it is sometimes difficult to wholly distin-
guish the two. See DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE (1984) for an excel-
lent discussion of disability entitlements and the difficult judgments involved. See
also Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusions: The Role of Disability in the Social
Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361 (1996) (discussing disability benefits under
social insurance and public assistance paradigms).
[Vol. 30:1063
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explicitly coordinated.1 4 Integration of private pension plans with
Social Security essentially allows an employer to pay lower pro-
portionate pension benefits to low-wage workers than to high-
wage workers, based on the size of the lower-paid worker's Social
Security benefit or payroll taxes paid.1 5 This kind of disparity is
generally forbidden under the pension "nondiscrimination" rules,
which are intended to withhold favorable tax treatment from pen-
sion plans that provide better pension coverage for high-paid than
for low-paid workers.1 6 The integration rules are a statutory ex-
ception to these nondiscrimination requirements. 7
Pension advocates and analysts have criticized integration
since its inception in 1942 as an assault on the retirement benefits
of lower-paid workers. 8 Most critiques focus on the results rather
than on the principles of integration, and have suggested limiting,
but not eliminating, its role in reducing retirement income for low-
wage workers.' 9 But if the analysis begins instead with the nature
of the right to the Social Security benefit-including the redistri-
butive design of the benefit structure-a more compelling critique
of integration emerges, unrelated to questions of whether some
standard of adequacy could be met by an integrated plan.
I argue here that pension integration violates both public and
14. See JAMEs H. SCHULZ & THOMAS D. LEAVITT, PENSION INTEGRATION:
CONCEPTS, ISSUES AND PROPOSALS 1 (1983).
15. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(5)(B) (1994). Social Security benefits are generally
calculated as a percentage of pre-retirement earnings and are therefore higher for
high-wage workers, up to a certain dollar limit, and lower for low-wage workers. See
SCHULZ & LEAviTr, supra note 14, at 1. However, income redistribution from high-
wage workers to beneficiaries who were low-wage workers is a central element of the
Social Security benefit structure. See C. Eugene Steuerle & Jon M. Bakija, How So-
cial Security Redistributes Income, 62 TAx NOTES 1763, 1763 (1994). Social Security
benefits are calculated as a percentage of a worker's lifetime earnings in employment
covered by Social Security, using a three-bracket formula that provides higher pro-
portionate benefits to low-income workers. See 42 U.S.C. § 215 (1994). This formula
results in a modest level of redistribution from high-wage workers and all employers
to low-wage workers. The benefit formula for workers attaining age 62, the age of
initial eligibility for Social Security benefits, in 1997 was 90% of the first $455 of av-
erage indexed monthly earnings, 32% of the next $2741, and 15% of the remaining
earnings, up to the maximum taken into account under the Social Security wage base
each year, which is $65,400 for 1997. Office of the Commissioner, 1996 Cost-of-
Living Increase and Other Determinations, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,346 (1996) (proposed
Oct. 25, 1996).
16. See 26 U.S.C § 401(a)(4).
17. See id. § 401(a)(5).
18. See SCHULZ & LEAVrIT, supra note 14, at 37-40.
19. See discussion infra Parts VI-VII.
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private entitlement rights that are a necessary precondition to re-
tirement. Integration effectively voids the basic public entitlement
principles of prospective redistribution, assured income regardless
of need, and individual opportunity to acquire-principles that are
grounded in almost two centuries of public pension history and re-
flect essential elements of economic and political democracy.2" In-
tegration also violates the private pension entitlement because it
reduces private pension benefits for low-wage employees who
would otherwise receive those benefits in addition to their Social
Security benefits. Because integration at its core cannot be rec-
onciled with either public or private entitlement principles, at-
tempts made inthe 1986 Tax Reform Act21 to rationalize the inte-
gration rules and mitigate their effects on low-income workers
could inevitably have only a marginal impact.
The pension integration rules are a technical response to a
larger policy dilemma: reconciling the roles of public and private
entitlements in ensuring mass retirement. The implications of the
practice of integration, and of the violation of pension rights it rep-
resents, reach beyond the technical parameters of the complex and
abstruse tax qualification rules that govern pension plans. The
persistence of integration in the face of forty years of attempts to
eliminate it22 is based on a critical misunderstanding of the role and
structure of Social Security, and reveals a fundamentally manipu-
lative approach on the part of policymakers to the problem of re-
tirement income security for low-wage workers. Examining inte-
gration is one way to begin to make sense of the larger issues of
whether an aging society can adequately maintain the institution of
mass retirement in the context of liberal democratic capitalism.
B. Integration as a Microcosm
The focus of this Article is on the development of the retire-
ment entitlement principle and the ways in which the rationale and
mechanisms of pension integration, from its inception in the early
1940s up to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, contradict that principle;
the revision of the integration rules in the 1986 Act, including the
rationale for, reaction to, and effects of those changes; and finally,
on alternative models of retirement income security in the absence
20. See discussion infra Part VII.
21. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1106(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2420
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 415).
22. See discussion infra Part VI.
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or presence of integration.
Part II explores the theoretical debate over public income en-
titlements, and suggests that the function of the entitlement con-
cept may be quite different in the retirement setting than in the
general antipoverty context. The American approach to earnings-
based retirement entitlement is based on a deeply held popular,
democratic capitalist ideology of market opportunity and eco-
nomic mobility.23 Income-targeted entitlements are politically in-
supportable, seen by the public and politicians as undemocratic,
intrusive, and destructive of individual responsibility and self-
reliance.24  In contrast, earnings-based entitlements are more
widely supported, and are seen as consistent with American self-
images of worth based on effort and opportunity to accumulate.25
Any provision that imposes income targets on the earnings-based
23. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE
HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994) [hereinafter GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT
ENTITLED]; MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986); DAVID A. Moss, SOCIALIZING SECURITY:
PROGRESSIVE-ERA ECONOMISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY
(1996).
24. See MARMOR ET AL., supra note 3, at 4-16 (noting that American social wel-
fare policy seems to be in conflict with our idea of the "good or legitimate" state).
The belief that poverty is the fault of the poor themselves, and that benefits based on
need promote further dependency, has a long history. For example, Benjamin
Franklin forthrightly expressed his strong belief in individual effort and economy as
the answer to poverty at any age, including extreme old age. See Howell V. Wil-
liams, Benjamin Franklin and the Poor Laws, 18 Soc. SERV. REV. 77 (1994)
(discussing Franklin's opposition to any provision, public or private, for the poor).
Franklin was steadfastly opposed to English Poor Laws that required local govern-
ments to provide some aid to the poor as well as to private charity provision of poor
relief. See id. at 77. In a 1773 letter Franklin expressed the view that English labor-
ers "lacked industry and thrift," whereas German workers had both:
When I consider that the English are the offspring of the Germans ....
when I see nothing in nature that should create this difference ... I have
sometimes doubted whether the laws peculiar to England, which compel the
rich to maintain the poor, have not given the latter a dependence, that very
much lessens the care of providing against the wants of old age.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Franklin's preferred approach to old-age security was the establishment of
private old-age homes, financed by fixed entry fees and run by private volunteers.
Id. at 81. Franklin wrote in 1772 to an English baron who advocated aid to the poor
that these old-age homes
seem calculated to prevent poverty, which is rather a better thing than re-
lieving it; for it keeps always in the public eye a state of comfort and repose,
with freedom from care in old age, held forth as an encouragement to so
much industry and frugality in youth as may at least serve to raise the re-
quired sum [for entry to the old-age home].
Id (emphasis in original).
25. See discussion infra Parts III-IV.
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entitlement-as integration effectively does-is fundamentally in-
consistent with the function and purpose of the entitlement.
Part III provides an overview and analysis of the origins of this
earnings-based entitlement structure in American responses to
poverty, old age, and war. The centrality of both redistribution
and the earned right concept to Social Security's structure and
purpose cannot be understood outside the historical context of the
modern innovation of retirement and the American approach to
poverty in old age that developed out of local poor relief and vet-
erans' pension systems.& The existence of the Civil War pension
system, which provided benefits for a substantial percentage of the
elderly up to the 1920s, served as direct precedent for Social Secu-
rity and prepared the way for a broad service-based, old-age bene-
fit of which the purpose was to prevent rather than ameliorate
poverty.
Part IV explores the dual models of private insurance and
pensions on one hand, and public social entitlements on the other,
that developed simultaneously in the post-Civil War era. As dis-
cussed more fully below, the enactment of Social Security in 1935
was the culmination of a long period of agitation for "industrial
welfare" and social reform, and was an important element in anti-
poverty efforts in the wake of the Great Depression.' However,
the central function and basis of the redistributive features of So-
cial Security were misinterpreted by employers and pension ana-
lysts. The contributory financing structure of Social Security was
taken as the literal basis for entitlement by pension analysts, while
employers viewed the program as a way of relieving the private
sector from the burden of providing retirement pensions for low-
wage workers.29 This fundamental misapprehension of the source
and nature of the Social Security entitlement provided the theo-
retical basis for allowing employers to eliminate or reduce private
pension coverage for their low-wage employees through integra-
30tion.
Part V focuses on the development of the nondiscrimination
rules for employer-provided pensions and integration as the ex-
ception to those rules, from the early 1920s through the Revenue
26. See discussion infra Part III.A.
27. See discussion infra Part III.
28. See discussion infra Part IV.
29. See discussion infra Part IV.
30. See discussion infra Part IV.
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Act of 1942,31 which codified integration. Employers, Congress,
and the IRS, from at least the 1942 Revenue Act3 forward, used
the integration rules as a means of ensuring that workers would re-
ceive no more than what the employer and the government
deemed to be adequate replacement of pre-retirement wages from
the combination of Social Security and pension benefits through
reduction in the private benefit.3 3 The results of integration are
thus quite contrary to the popular conception of Social Security as
providing a basic tier of income to which private pensions would
be added.34 Because employers viewed Social Security as a gov-
ernment-provided pension plan for low-wage workers,35 integra-
tion appeared to be a logical necessity, even though it effectively
eviscerates the redistributive element of the Social Security benefit
structure through elimination or reduction of low-wage workers'
private entitlement to pension benefits.36
Part VI analyzes various attempts to eliminate or reform inte-
gration through revisions to the integration rules made by the 1986
Tax Reform Act.37 Section 401(l) of the Internal Revenue Code
was enacted in the 1986 Tax Reform Act to codify a new approach
to pension integration.38 Nonetheless, because it was based on a
fundamentally flawed understanding of the Social Security enti-
tlement principle, the effort at reform was doomed to failure.
Part VII discusses the standard critiques of integration, its
continued acceptance as a necessary part of the employer-
provided pension system, and the fundamentally flawed view of
retirement entitlements that both critics and supporters of inte-
gration share. In light of the more compelling critique of integra-
tion that emerges from the earnings-based entitlement perspective,
31. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
32. Id
33. See discussion infra Parts V, VI.C.
34. See ROBERT J. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 12 (4th ed. 1993) ("The real reason
for having a social security system in addition to private insurance coverage is not
primarily that of cost, but rather that social benefits on a social adequacy basis can
only in this way be provided to a large sector of the population.").
35. See discussion infra Part IV.B-C; see also COLIN GORDON, NEW DEALS:
BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1920-1935, at 275-76 (1994)
[hereinafter GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS] (noting that business sup-
port was far from uniform).
36. See discussion infra Part V.
37. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
38. See discussion infra Part VI.D.
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I suggest a new approach to retirement income security without
pension integration that is perhaps more consistent with the real
purpose and current reality of both the private pension and Social
Security systems.
II. RETIREMENT ENTITLEMENTS: FROM PRACTICE TO THEORY
The seemingly technical question of whether pension integra-
tion is a necessary or consistent element of the American retire-
ment income security system cannot be answered without address-
ing the larger questions of the function and basis of private and
public income entitlements that make retirement possible. Pen-
sion integration, as described more fully in Part V, is based on the
premise that employers should be allowed to reduce private pen-
sions for their low-wage employees because Social Security bene-
fits replace a higher portion of low-wage salaries than of high-wage
salarie n essence treating the Social Security benefit as part of
the employer's compensation package. The practice of integration
is a logical extension of a particular view of the source and func-
tion of Social Security benefits: that Social Security is simply part
of the employer-provided pension system.4°
Critiques of integration have generally focused on its eco-
nomic consequences in reducing ultimate retirement income for
affected low-wage workers.4' However, such critiques, as discussed
below, cannot wholly counter the argument that integration in
some form is necessary to prevent "overpensioning"-retirement
income from the combination of Social Security and private pen-
sions that might exceed pre-retirement earnings, a result that is as-
sumed to be undesirable from a public policy perspective.42
I begin here, in contrast, with origins rather than conse-
quences. This Article presents an examination of the genesis and
evolution of fundamental principles of non-needs-based entitle-
ment, in an attempt to determine whether the practice of integra-
tion, regardless of results, is intrinsically incompatible with the
earnings-based entitlement character of the American retirement
system. That question, in turn, cannot be adequately answered
without considering whether public income entitlements that are
39. See SCHuLZ & LEAVIT, supra note 14, at 1, 7-19 (discussing the mechanics of
the integration process).
40. See discussion infra Part VII.
41. See discussion infra Part VI.C-D.
42. See discussion infra Part VI.C.
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not based on need are a necessary element of retirement income
security. After all, if a completely needs-based public system
complemented with an earnings-based private system would pro-
vide a better basis for mass retirement, it would hardly matter that
integration might be in conflict with earned-entitlement principles.
While theoretically such a two-tier system could be developed
and implemented, the historical development of old-age assistance
programs in America, as well as Europe and Canada, shows that
the earned-entitlement principle combined with public redistribu-
tive benefit programs were the necessary preconditions to the
practice of retirement as it has developed in the mid-to-late twen-
tieth century.43 Earnings-based entitlement is not only consistent
with economic individualism, it is the essential expression of indi-
vidual economic rights in the American capitalist context.
The American retirement income system, with its mixture of
public and private entitlements that are primarily based on work,
is grounded in the distinction between the right to opportunity,44
which is an essential element of liberal capitalist notions of democ-
racy, and a status-based right to income, which historically has
been seen by Americans as antithetical to an opportunity-based
society.45 Pension integration essentially imposes an indirect needs
test on the private pension entitlement by limiting the possible
combination of private and public benefits to an amount less than
the individual's pre-retirement earnings. 4 Thus, pension integra-
tion, when examined in the historical context of the development
of modern retirement, is in conflict with fundamental retirement
principles. 47 The question then becomes whether preventing
"overpensioning" is so important a goal that it justifies maintaining
integration regardless of the principled conflict. As discussed in
Part VI, I suggest the answer to that question is no.
43. See discussion infra Parts III-IV.
44. See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 353 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (noting that in taking part in society
"no rational Creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to
be worse"); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (setting forth principles of
justice that place free and rational persons in a position of equality).
45. For more examples of American attitudes toward welfare and the "right" to
income see KATZ, supra note 23, at 251-91, and Joel F. Handler, "Constructing the
Political Spectacle" The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations
in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899 (1990).
46. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 14-15
(1982).
47. See id. at 28-29.
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Before examining the historical roots of retirement entitle-
ments, it is necessary to establish a framework within which the es-
sential elements of the retirement income system-entitlement,
worthiness, retirement, and redistribution of income-can be un-
derstood as concepts that have developed in a particular historical
context. The relationship between legal and economic entitlement
in general is too complex to be fully explored in this Article.
Nonetheless, I want to suggest some perspectives from which to at
least begin to answer the question of whether public entitlements
have, in fact, any noneconomic theoretical basis that would pose a
challenge to the practice of pension integration.
A. Entitlement as the Precondition of Retirement
The concept of entitlement has been described as the trans-
formation of a mere private interest into one that society in gen-
eral will give legal force against challenge or interference from the
interests of others.4' Much of the legal analysis of entitlement has
been concerned with exploring the internal structure of the legal
entitlement and determining different forms and types of entitle-
ment. Since Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's initial elucidation of the
entitlement concept early in this century,49 scholars have grappled
with identifying and categorizing the building blocks or essential
elements of the various types of entitlements. These types are
generally separated into either legal, moral, and public entitle-
ments, or property, liability, and inalienability entitlements 0
I propose to narrow the analysis of entitlements in the context
of pension integration from the relatively abstract discussion of the
legal framework and extent of entitlements in general to the age-
48. See Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 822
(1993).
Because any interest to which we would like to give legal force is liable to
come into conflict with other interests to which we would also like to give
legal force, entitlements must be... constructed so that they do more than
simply "give legal force" to certain interests. They must also specify the ex-
tent and type of legal force that a given interest has in any particular con-
text and in relation to any other particular entitlement.
ld. at 823.
49. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
50. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972);
Hohfeld, supra note 49, at 16; Morris, supra note 48, at 824; Joseph William Singer,
The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982
Wis. L. REv. 975.
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specific context of old-age entitlements and the problem they ad-
dress-the modem institution of voluntary retirement in extended
old age. By focusing on the purpose and historic roots of this spe-
cific type of economic entitlement, I hope to reach some conclu-
sions about the appropriate relationship between public and pri-
vate retirement systems and shed some light on why public and
private entitlement, which make retirement possible for most
workers, evolved as earnings-based, rather than needs-based or
citizenship-based rights.
The debates over the concept of public entitlement rights
were given a theoretical legal context with the publication in 1964
of Charles Reich's classic article, The New Property.51 Reich sug-,
gested that the web of antipoverty programs that were established
in the New Deal created a new property right, an "entitlement" in
welfare benefits, that would give recipients a sort of property right
in those benefits.52 The "new property" entitlement would formal-
ize the relationship between government and recipients, to protect
recipients from arbitrary decisions and manipulation by govern-
ment decision makers, while maintaining the antipoverty, redistri-
butive purpose of welfare programs.s
The new property right in welfare benefits has frequently been
contrasted with rights to Social Security entitlements, which are
portrayed as contractual rather than proprietal in character 4 The
contract between worker and government was presumably based
on the contributory financing and earnings-based benefit structure
that was described from the inception of Social Security in the
1930s as an "earned right," assuring payment of benefits.5 The
public perception that some sort of legal right must vest in Social
Security benefits persists despite the Supreme Court's decision in
Flemming v. Nestor56 that Social Security benefits are neither
property nor contract rights, and may be altered or denied by
Congress so long as its action is not "utterly lacking in rational
justification."
I suggest that this public perception is based on more than
51. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
52. See id. at 733.
53. See id.
54. See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38
STAN. L. REv. 1431, 1450-54 (1986).
55. See id. at 1448-54.
56. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
57. Id. at 611.
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simple self-interest. The proposition I wish to explore is whether
the institution of voluntary retirement, in an American context in-
fused with strongly held beliefs in the possibility of individual op-
portunity and mobility, virtually required the development of an
earnings-based entitlement right that is inconsistent with income
targeting, of which integration is a specific technical example.
Prospectivity may be the essence of the classical notion of individ-
ual entitlements and the basis of a legal system designed to maxi-
mize individual independence and autonomy. 8 In the retirement
context, I suggest that the substance of the entitlement is wholly
prospective in that it consists entirely of a right to future con-
sumption that can only be exercised long after it has been estab-
lished. In other words, the right to any retirement entitlement,
whether a private pension, a retirement savings account such as an
individual retirement account (IRA), 9 or the "right" to a Social
Security benefit, represents the right to future rather than current
consumption, a right the fulfillment of which depends on the pro-
ductivity of society as a whole at the time of consumption.
Since a voluntary decision to retire is largely based on the as-
surance of future income from such prospective entitlements, the
circumstances of securing and enforcing the right-in essence, the
legal bases for the economic right-are of extreme importance to
the prospective retiree. It is the need to assure access to prospec-
tive consumption after a working life has ended and retirement has
begun that has shaped the development of both public and private
retirement entitlements and in which the very concept of entitle-
ment is rooted.60
B. Entitlement for the Worthy
Much of the analysis of earnings-based benefits such as Social
Security has centered on contrasting the relatively high status and
political security of earnings-based entitlement programs with the
low status and lack of political security of poverty-based pro-
61grams. Many analysts suggest that the preference given to earn-
58. See Simon, supra note 54, at 1433-35.
59. See 26 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1994).
60. See discussion infra Part III.
61. See, e.g., GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED, supra note 23, at 4-6; see also
Handler, supra note 45, at 905 (giving an example of Aid to Families with Depend-
ent Children (AFDC) as a program that illustrates not only patriarchy and race but
also the importance of the deviant status of poor mothers in the paid labor force).
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ings-based programs and the rejection of needs-testing for such
benefits is a product of progressive and New Deal era liberal ide-
ology that created the illusion of contract in contributory social in-
62
surance.
However, as discussed in Parts III and IV, the fear of and cul-
tural revulsion against dependency in old age, and the establish-
ment of public old-age entitlements based on peculiarly American
assumptions concerning individual economic opportunity and
mobility and rights to accumulate wealth, long predated the Pro-
gressive Era and the New Deal. The development of old-age in-
come support programs, from the English Poor Laws to Civil War
pensions to Social Security, suggests that American earnings-
based old-age entitlements have evolved over the last 200 years for
almost the same purpose proposed for the new property right by
Reich-to protect those elderly viewed as "worthy" of such enti-
tlement from control and degrading treatment by those dispensing
poor relief.
6
American public and political approaches to the problem of
income support for the poor, the disabled, and the elderly rest on
expectations about work and opportunity, and on the assumption
that work is available for those who wish to work and have no ac-
ceptable reason for not doing so.6 The development of American
old-age entitlements was based on the premise that rights belong
to the worthy and that certain conditions create a presumption of
need that should trigger the exercise of those rights in the form of
benefits. 67
The importance of the ideology of opportunity and access to
economic mobility in the institutional structure of American public
aid programs has perhaps been insufficiently considered in cri-
tiques of poverty and social insurance programs. Yet the history of
provisions for the elderly clearly reveals an important link between
entitlement, earnings and worthiness, and assumed economic op-
portunity that has shaped the nature of rights to benefits and ex-
pectations of retirement.6
62. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 54, at 1504-15.
63. See discussion infra Part III.A.
64. See discussion infra Part III.B.
65. See discussion infra Parts III-IV.
66. See Handler, supra note 45, at 902-04.
67. See discussion infra Part III.
68. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the link between "worthiness" and
public aid); see also KATZ, supra note 23, at 13-14 (discussing the impact of social
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C. Mass Retirement and Earned Entitlement
Earnings-based entitlement programs are held in generally
low esteem by policy analysts concerned with adequate income
provision for the poor: entitlements are sloppy, they defy top-
down assessments of need and decisions to induce pay, and they
are not efficient since redistributed funds may end up going to
someone who does not need them at the time of receipt." Yet the
very factors that give rise to these critical assessments of entitle-
ments appear to be essential to induce workers to engage in life-
long productivity and then to retire at sixty-five, even if physically
and mentally capable of continued work.
The old-age entitlement can be distinguished from the general
poverty entitlement because of the condition it addresses-old age
and the presumed loss of the ability and opportunity to earn.
While those who lived long enough to become truly unable to
work have historically been entitled to aid, no expectation of a life
lasting for a substantial period beyond work existed for most
workers until the twentieth century. The disappearance of the ex-
pectation of work for the elderly occurred simultaneously with the
changes industrialization made in the nature of work itself, increas-
ing the risks of dependency because of economic downturns and
creating the perceived need to control and rationalize the labor
force.
7
I suggest, based on a survey of the historical literature con-
cerning the development of the retirement phenomenon, that the
need for mass retirement made necessary earnings-based income
entitlements that preserve the opportunity to accumulate." The
prospect of opportunity to accumulate income and assets as
needed or desired, without the penalty of losing benefits through
means-testing, is implicit in the principle of entitlement, and is es-
sential precisely because of the prospective nature of old-age enti-
tlements.
Social Security benefits represent a claim on society in gen-
eral, rather than on a specific employer, on the grounds of age and
prior service to the society and economy through work. Entitle-
ment to public benefits in the American tradition has always been
precedents in shaping early America's poor relief); Handler, supra note 45, at 906-09
(emphasizing the plight of poor mothers as a mechanism for understanding welfare).
69. See, e.g., Steuerle & Bakija, supra note 15, at 1764.
70. See discussion infra Part IV.
71. See discussion infra Parts III-IV.
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based on a judgment of moral worth resulting from service to the
country or other evidence of good character. The innovation of
the Social Security system was to broaden the, criteria for entitle-
ment from military service towork in general.' In this sense, the
term "earned right" is an accurate description of the relationship
between beneficiaries and benefits.
The public entitlement, the earned right from this perspective,
is the right to the whole benefit to which the worker may add, if
fortunate enough, private rights to pensions and savings. In con-
trast, integration is based on the notion of an "appropriate" re-
placement rate, a targeted income level in retirement that sets a
ceiling on what workers should be allowed to accumulate under
the private pension. In effect, integration grafts an income-based
target onto the earnings-based entitlement that is inconsistent with
its fundamental structure and purpose.
D. Metaphor and Reality of Contributory Entitlements
In the pre-World War II period, American employers estab-
lished pension programs primarily to ward off union organization;
to encourage unproductive older workers to make way for younger
workers, while promoting employment longevity for valued work-
ers; and to accumulate capital while reducing payroll outlays.73 In
this context employers came to view Social Security as a federally
sponsored partner in the task of removing workers from the labor
force through retirement, albeit a partner that came at a cost.74
This view is wholly consistent with the metaphorical portrayal of
Social Security as "contributory insurance," more like the private
pensions that some employers were already providing, rather than
the state/federal old-age poverty programs enacted in the New
Deal that required some demonstration of need.75
Conceptual support for integration is based on this view of
Social Security, and goes beyond the value of integration as a cost-
reduction measure enabling employers to sponsor pension plans
they might not otherwise be willing to provide. 76 If Social Security
72. See discussion infra Part IV.
73. See discussion infra Part III.
74. See discussion infra Parts IV-V.
75. The old-age assistance program was contained in Title I of the 1935 Act and
was financed through federal grants to the states, which administered the needs-
based assistance payments to the elderly. See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L.
No. 74-271,49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-397(f) (1994)).
76. See generally ScHuLz & LEAviTr, supra note 14, at 3 (extending the defini-
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is viewed as a pension plan with benefits based on a return on con-
tributions and designed to provide adequate retirement income for
low-wage workers, the notion of offsetting benefits available under
a private pension against benefits payable under Social Security
seems logical and appropriate.
Supporters of Social Security in its early days actively pro-
moted the public belief that each worker was in effect "saving" for
retirement through Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA)
tax payments and that each worker's benefits in retirement were
essentially a payout of the worker's contributions to the Social Se-
curity trust funds. This view has helped ensure broad political and
popular support for the program for most of its history.7 7 Nonethe-
less, the private pension/contributory plan metaphor, however use-
ful in explaining an intangible relationship between citizen, em-
ployer, and government, has been mistaken for the reality of
Social Security as a social entitlement. The contributory financing
structure of Social Security has been erroneously assumed to be
the basis for entitlement when in fact the entitlement is earnings-
based.78 This confusion is at least partly responsible for the persis-
tence of integration in the face of repeated attempts at repeal.
E. Retirement Entitlements and Redistribution
Social Security has been portrayed as a public contributory in-
surance program, an earned right specifically vesting in each indi-
vidual paying into the system. This view, consistent with Ameri-
can classical jurisprudential norms requiring the vesting of rights in
tion of integration to include the laws, regulations, and goals of the Social Security
system).
77. See generally MARMOR ET AL., supra note 3, at 132-33 (stating that although
the majority pays "substantial taxes" toward the Social Security system, there is re-
markable support for the program).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1994) (stating that individuals who are fully insured,
have attained age 62, and have filed for old-age benefits are entitled to a monthly
benefit); Id. § 413 (defining a quarter of coverage as one in which an individual has
been paid more than the minimum amount-originally $50-in wages); Id. § 414
(defining "fully insured individual" as any individual who has the required number
of quarters covered).
79. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Economic Security, in 50TH ANNI-
VERSARY EDMON REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF 1935 AND
OTHER BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT 25 [hereinafter Report, CES 50TH] (noting that this system benefits
younger workers by allowing them to build up old-age protection); see also Simon,




autonomous individuals, was used from the beginning of Social Se-
curity to build support for the program. It stresses the individual
worker's responsibility for paying into the system and building a
specific individual benefit entitlement through employment cov-
ered by Social Security."° Redistribution of income from high-
wage to low-wage workers is usually seen as inconsistent with this
firmly established but narrow notion of individually earned enti-
tlement.8 '
Clearly, there is a difference between a social entitlement like
Social Security-a claim on public resources based on publicly
recognized criteria and political commitment to pay-and a vested
individual property right, something like a bank account, or even
more concretely, a store of cash in a trunk under the bed. None-
theless, that distinction has never been clearly drawn in the public
mind in discussions about Social Security.2 Certainly the redistri-
butive element of the benefit formula, which results in low-wage
workers getting higher proportionate benefits than high-wage
workers, is neither widely understood nor publicly promoted as a
goal of the program. Notwithstanding, redistribution was an inte-
gral element of the program from the beginning, and is essential to
insuring adequate retirement income for low-wage workers.
3
Social Security's structure is a more or less deliberate attempt
to separate social insurance, which is aimed at prospective needs in
retirement, from needs-based welfare aimed at current needs that
can be measured at the same time benefits are paid. 4 The income
redistribution provided in the Social Security benefit formula
seeks to slow the decline into poverty of elderly persons who can
no longer work and improve their own financial condition. Redis-
80. See J. DOUGLAS BROWN, ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 25-35 (1977). Brown
was chairman of the 1937-1938 Advisory Council on Social Security and subsequent
Advisory Councils.
81. See Simon, supra note 54, at 1452.
82. A graphic demonstration of the widespread popular belief that workers pay-
ing into Social Security are entitled to a specific account balance is the issue of the
Social Security "notch," which was the subject of a congressionally appointed special
commission in 1992. See THE COMMISSION ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY "NOTCH"
ISSUE, FINAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY "NOTCH" ISSUE 1 (1994).
83. See discussion infra Part III.
84. See Wilbur J. Cohen, The Social Security Act of 1935: Reflections Fifty Years
Later, in 50TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC
SECURITY OF 1935 AND OTHER BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 7-8 [hereinafter Cohen, CES 50TH]; see also discussion
infra Part IV (describing the development of the modem retirement system).
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tribution in this context is an essential part of the entitlement
promise for those who have worked even though it may result in
little or no change in the distribution of wealth generally."'
If the essence of entitlement is predictability, Social Security
benefits are the quintessential entitlement-benefits that bear a
direct relationship to the worker's wage history will be paid, re-
gardless of need when received or even when earned. In this con-
text redistribution has only an indirect relationship to providing an
adequate pension for low-income persons in retirement: Social
Security redistribution is prophylactic, not corrective.
Many pension analysts continue to support at least limited
forms of integration because they view Social Security as essen-
tially similar to private pensions. 6 Their focus is on the goals of
both systems, which are similar: providing income in retirement.
But if the focus shifts to the context-the relationship between
beneficiaries and paying workers-the distinction between Social
Security and private pensions is clearer.
Private pension benefits are grounded in the relationship and
promises made between employer and employee. In contrast, So-
cial Security benefits are grounded in the relationship between the
working and the nonworking public and on promises of social sup-
port based on a past history of productive employment. Decisions
as to distribution of resources to the nonworking are made by so-
ciety as a whole, through the Social Security benefit formula, not
by the market or the employer as is the case in private pensions
and investments.
Social Security benefits are based on a worker's employment
history but are not part of the employer-sponsored system. The
system is financed by employer and employee, taxes but pays
benefits based on service represented by covered earnings, not on
contributions. Pension integration, therefore, essentially provides
a refund to employers of a portion of the cost of income redistri-
bution that Social Security otherwise requires them to finance for
85. See Steuerle & Bakija, supra note 15, at 1767-70.
86. See, e.g., MUNNELL, supra note 46, at 89 (describing Social Security and pri-
vate pension systems as alternative vehicles to achieve a targeted level of guaranteed
retirement benefits); Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies:
Nondiscrimination, Integration, and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAx L. Rnv.
435, 485-86 (1987) (stating that payment into Social Security is viewed as a "tax" and
not a "pension contribution"); Daniel I. Halperin, Retirement Security and Tax Eq-
uity: An Evaluation of ERISA, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 739, 762 (1976)
(discussing the impact of a combined Social Security and private pension plan).
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all beneficiaries through payroll taxes. Integration is based on a
mistaken conception of the Social Security entitlement, and is fun-
damentally inconsistent with the redistributive function of Social
Security.
III. THE ROOTS OF ENTITLEMENT: EVOLUTION OF ENTITLEMENT
AND RETIREMENT IN AMERICA
Retirement-the extended period of leisure after the end of a
working life expected by most workers in the late twentieth cen-
tury-is a recent phenomenon." While every human culture has
some experience of supporting older members who live past the
age of productive labor, it was not until widespread industrializa-
tion and the development of industrial-laboring and middle classes
in Europe and the United States in the twentieth century that re-
tirement became a relatively common occurrence."
Industrial capitalism transformed productive and commercial
relationships in Western Europe from the fifteenth century on-
ward, effectively eliminating the threat of generalized famine in
most of Europe by at least the middle of the nineteenth century.8 9
At the same time, advances in medical science and hygiene began
to diminish the threat of infectious plagues, which generally car-
ried off the most vulnerable-children and the elderly." Thus, as
industrialization began to generate surplus wealth, life spans began
to lengthen, and the percentage of the population over age sixty
began to increase. 91 The need for and expectation of pensions and
annuities for the aged is at least in part a product of industrial capi-
87. See GRAEBNER, supra note 12, at 10-17.
88. See id.; see also LESLIE HANNAH, INVENTING RETIREMENT: THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS IN BRITAIN 3-14 (1986) (comparing the de-
velopment of British compensation schemes to those evolving in the United States).
89. See, e.g., 1 FERNAND BRAUDEL, CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM 15TH-18TH
CENTURY: THE STRUCTURES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 73 (Sian Reynolds trans., Harper &
Row 1981) (1979) [hereinafter BRAUDEL, EVERYDAY LIFE] (noting a causal relation-
ship between demand for food and production); see also 3 FERNAND BRAUDEL,
CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD 558-64 (Sian
Reynolds trans., Harper & Row 1984) (1979) [hereinafter BRAUDEL, PERSPECTIVE
OF THE WORLD] (discussing the development of national markets and resulting in-
crease in agricultural production).
90. See generally WILLIAM H. McNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 235-91 (1976)
(stating that epidemics such as smallpox, tuberculosis, and syphilis were combated by
a more systematic approach to medicine).
91. See DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, GROWING OLD IN AMERICA app. (1978)
[hereinafter FISCHER, GROWING OLD] (containing life expectancy tables and general
discussion).
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talism's prosperity and apparent triumph over catastrophic disease
epidemics.92
Social Security was hailed at its enactment as a long overdue
federal undertaking to guarantee direct income support for the
nation's elderly, enabling them to retire without recourse to the
poor house.93 Yet the federal government had previously assumed
responsibility for providing income support in old age for a large
proportion of the northern population in the form of the Civil War
veterans' pensions.94 This pension system was based on earned
entitlement-through military service-and presumed, rather than
demonstrated, need.95 Before that, the Revolutionary War pension
system ' had provided a precedent for federal pensions as an anti-
poverty measure, breaking from the old system of locally con-
trolled poor relief.9
Both of these systems, as well as the Social Security program
that would be enacted in 1935, exemplified an American approach
to dealing with poverty and old age in which the right to income
was created by personal effort, not awarded based on need or
status.9 Long before the enactment of Social Security, the Civil
War pension system developed into the major federal entitlement
program for the elderly just as the more direct sources of income
for aged persons in pre-industrial America-principally control
over income-producing land-were replaced by the uncertainties
of industrial employment and economic cycles. The roots of our
current earnings-based retirement entitlement system can be
found in the history of these nineteenth century precursors. Their
development helps to explain the cultural and political strength of
retirement income entitlements.
A. Old Age and Poverty Before the Retirement Era
The most recent work on the history of retirement and the
92. But see LAURIE GARRETT, THE COMING PLAGUE: NEWLY EMERGING
DISEASES IN A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE 30-52, 192-221 (1994) (analyzing the persis-
tence of human vulnerability to microbial and viral diseases thought to be eradicated
in the Western industrial world by the mid-twentieth century); MCNEILL, supra note
90, at 235-91.
93. See Report, CES 50TH, supra note 79, at 21-23.
94. See discussion infra Part III.B.
95. See discussion infra Part III.B.
96. See discussion infra Part III.B.
97. See discussion infra Part III.B.
98. See discussion infra Parts III.B-C, IV.
99. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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elderly in America, and elsewhere, has yielded a complex portrait
of the development of the concept of retirement as the natural end
of a working life."' It is clear that the current generation of retir-
ees is the first to spend its entire adulthood more or less expecting
to retire at a certain age.'O However, the work and family patterns
of the American colonial experience provided a basis for all later
old-age retirement income programs-entitlement for the worthy,
charity, and grudging government assistance for the unworthy.
1. Old age and poverty in the old world
The notion of retirement necessarily rests on the ability of an
economy to produce enough surplus wealth to support older non-
workers.'02 In agrarian societies generally up until the mid-to-late
nineteenth century, advancing age was not automatically associ-
ated with cessation of work, which occurred only if and when ac-
tual physical incapacity set in.'0' The pattern of frequent famine
100. Among the many excellent studies done in the last two decades are THE
COUNTRYSIDE IN THE AGE OF CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION: ESSAYS IN THE SOCIAL
HISTORY OF RURAL AMERICA (Steven Hahn & Jonathan Prude eds., 1985)
[hereinafter CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION]; DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION'S
SEED (1989) [hereinafter FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED]; FISCHER, GROWING OLD, supra
note 91; GRAEBNER, supra note 12; CAROLE HABER & BRIAN GRATTON, OLD AGE
AND THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY: AN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY (1994)
[hereinafter HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY]; MOSS, supra note 23;
JOHN MYLES, OLD AGE AND THE WELFARE STATE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PUBLIC PENSIONS (1989); ANN SHOLA ORLOFF, THE POLITICS OF PENSIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BRITAIN, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1940
(1993); JILL QUADAGNO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE SECURITY: CLASS AND
POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (1988); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING
SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1992) [hereinafter SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS]; SOCIETAL
IMPACT ON AGING: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (K. Warner Schaie & W. Andrew
Achenbaum eds., 1993) [hereinafter SOCIETAL IMPACT]. In addition, numerous
monographs, articles, and unpublished doctoral dissertations contribute to the schol-
arship in this field, adding to a sometimes internally contradictory picture of the de-
velopment of old-age retirement in America and elsewhere. This Article attempts to
draw from different strains of the historical argument without necessarily completely
agreeing with any one theory.
101. See GRAEBNER, supra note 12, at 215-41.
102. The age at which children begin to be expected to be productive workers
varies widely in both industrialized and nonindustrialized societies. It probably has
as much to do with a society's overall level and equality of distribution of wealth as
with its sophistication in Western terms. See generally PHILIPPE ARIP.S, CENTURIES
OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE (Robert Baldick trans., Vintage
Books 1962) (1960) (presenting an in-depth discussion on the idea of childhood).
103. For the American experience, see FISCHER, GROWING OLD, supra note 91, at
40-49. See generally PHILIP J. GREVEN, JR., FOUR GENERATIONS: POPULATION,
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and plagues that characterized Europe from the thirteenth through
eighteenth centuries probably ensured that few of the poor sur-
vived to great ages; life past age sixty was largely reserved for the
well-off bourgeoisie and the nobility who guaranteed comfort in
old age through continued control of their wealth and families.'
14
In the absence of such accumulated wealth, the incapacity brought
on by advancing age necessitated dependency on family, church, or
local organized poor relief'0 5
Before the late-nineteenth century, poverty in Europe was
treated as a threat to the local social order, not as a curable condi-
tion. The English Poor Laws,0 6 enacted in the Elizabethan era,
were designed to ensure public safety and order as much as to
promote social welfare: "laws against the poor.""' These laws
were in full effect in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, at
the time of the first English settlements in the New World.' They
LAND, AND FAMILY IN COLONIAL ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETrS (1970) (discussing
generational changes in colonial New England).
104. See BRAUDEL, EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 89, at 90-91.
105. See FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED, supra note 100, at 175-77; KATz, supra note 23,
at 15. For a picture of the English approach to a growing poverty problem with
which many American colonists would be familiar see DAVID UNDERDOWN, FIRE
FROM HEAVEN: LIFE IN AN ENGLISH TOwN IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1992).
During the sixteenth century the population of England grew by over fifty
percent... and for the towns most of the increase was concentrated in the
last quarter of the century ... The demographic explosion and theproblems that stemmed from it-inflation, land shortage, unemployment,
decliinng living standards for the ever-increasing numbers of the poor-termined much of the cha act r of the entury. The splend urs of the
age of Gloriana... concealed even more misery and privation than was the
common fate of ordinary English men and women throughout the country'shistory.
Population growth brought problems for Dorchester . .. . One such
problem was poverty and the associated threat of disorder that came with it.A crescendo of anxious voices lamented the proliferation of the poor and
unproductive... . Moralists constantly complained about the swarms of
idle andd youn people who were not being contained within the
system of household discipline-the system on which, most people believed,
social stability depended .... As so often is the case, poverty was blamed
on its victims. They hung about in alehouses, it was said, when they ought
to have been working or worshipping. ...
Id. at 10-12.106. For a full exploration of the development of the English Poor Laws from
their origins in the Catholic Church's canon law requiring aid to the poor, see Larry
Caa Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America: Looking Back To-
wards a General Theory of Modemn American Poor Relief, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
871, 938-65 (1995).107. BRAUDEL, EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 89, at 75.
108. See Backer, supra note 106, at 964.
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were designed to provide local care for the poor of the locality and
to drive away migrant poor with no local connections.' °9 In fact,
the treatment of the poor throughout Europe during this period
was largely designed to eliminate the risk to political stability rep-
resented by large groups of starving peasants invading urban areas
while still providing care for the poor of the town or locality.' °
Age appears not to have been seen as reason in and of itself
for failure to work-all were generally expected to work as long as
they were physically able to-but those elderly who were no
longer able to provide for themselves were generally part of the
"deemed worthy" group, along with the disabled, and thus entitled
to charitable relief."' The poor-relief system, from medieval
canon law to the sixteenth century English laws, assumed that the
elderly who could no longer work would be largely cared for by
their families. In the absence of families or independent assets,
only "town-born" poor elderly could expect to be cared for ade-
quately by the local public."
2
109. See id. at 953-57.
The major characteristics of the Elizabethan system of poor relief in-
cluded primary family responsibility for the maintenance of its members,
public responsibility for the relief of the poor at the local level, encourage-
ment of private charity, and relief tied to residency ....
Every English subject had a settlement roughly corresponding to a per-
son's place of residence. Only those who had a settlement in a community
were entitled to its aid .... Paupers who remained in a community in
which they were not settled were to be excluded or expelled from the com-
munity and returned to the community of settlement.
Id. at 953-56.
110. See id- at 952.
At least in England, the state imposed a secular obligation to work, on pain
of imprisonment. As such, reinforcement of the social order through the
poor relief system found expression... in the tendency of medieval poor
law systems to criminalize vagrancy as a violation of compulsory work laws,
to reduce the incentives of an unemployed adult populace to engage in anti-
social activities .... Thus, the ecclesiastical poor law system tended to rely
on secular criminal law to penalize the able-bodied, who were supposed to
be working for their bread instead of begging for it, for the sin of nonpro-
ductivity.
It is in the context of this fully developed ecclesiastical system that the
English poor law system arose.
Id.; see also BRAUDEL, EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 89, at 74-76 (stating that Euro-
pean attitudes toward the poor hardened in response to the increasing threats of
famine and plague); ROBERT HUGHES, THE FATAL SHORE 19-27 (1987) (describing
rising poverty levels and lack of remedies in eighteenth century England and the re-
sulting crime waves that accompanied increasing population and poverty).
111. See Backer, supra note 106, at 943 n.213.
112. See id at 943.
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2. Colonial American approaches to poverty and aging
In pre-industrial America-the colonial period up until about
the Civil War-the family-based, largely agrarian economy re-
quired and allowed work until disability from extreme old age or
death.13 For those without control of property or income, extreme
old age in the pre-Civil War era was inextricably linked with de-
pendency, either on family or on local charity.114 American colo-
nists took the same geographic approach to poor relief as their
English forebears had: the poor of the town, those known to the
locality, were generally cared for if they were "of good character"
and unable to provide for themselves, but the vagrant poor were a
threat to social stability and were shunned, if not actively driven
away.
11s
113. See HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 89-90.
114. See id at 90.
Not all elderly people in the colonial period, though, had access to prestig-
ious work or a comfortable retirement. These old persons found the last
years to be quite different. Landless aged men spent their final days in-
termittently employed as laborers. Others discovered that their declining
strength made work impossible. Wandering from town to town or begging
alms from neighbors, they received, at best, charity, and at worst, scorn and
neglect.
Id (footnote omitted). The scope of this Article does not permit an extensive dis-
cussion of the debate among historians as to when the elderly became objects of pity
and scorn rather than respect.
115. According to Fischer, social stratification in eastern England where most Pu-
ritan immigrants came from was "marked by inequality in high degree." FISCHER,
ALBION'S SEED, supra note 100, at 175. Land was overwhelmingly held by great
landowners or the Church of England.
At the bottom of this social order were large numbers of desperately poor
people: small leaseholders and landless laborers. Most adult males held
fewer than five acres. A majority possessed no land at all. In the late six-
teenth and early seventeenth century, the poor were increasing more rap-
idly than the population as a whole.
Id
Small landowners and landless workers were not at the lowest rung of the English
social ladder. "At the bottom was a large vagrant population of wandering poor who
overran the larger towns and much of the countryside as well." Id. at 176. Towns
hired "Beadles" to gather up the beggars and drive them out of town limits. See id.
"Chronic unemployment was a major problem throughout the region. In the year
1630, many poor men and women, 'complaining for want of work' were given make-
work jobs by the towns." l Treatment of the elderly poor depended on where they
came from.
Most towns looked after their own; their records show that elderly residents
were often treated with decency, respect and compassion....
But the vagrant poor were treated with great brutality. Pregnant women
were expelled so that their newborn babies would not become a charge
upon the town.... [S]ome of these vagrants were sent to the county gaol..
. Others went to houses of correction and almshouses. The lucky ones
[Vol. 30:1063
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In the context of frontier agrarian and small town center eco-
nomic structure, the presumption appeared to be, as it had been in
England, that persons without means and outside their own
homeplace beyond the reach of their kin were suspect and not
worthy of charity.116  Clearly it would be easier to determine
whether an individual was worthy of assistance if the local
authorities were familiar with that person's background and cur-
rent circumstances. In effect, the geographic approach was one
way of enforcing a moral test of "worthiness." Aid took the form
of "outdoor relief"-aid given to those still living outside of alms-
houses and financed by town revenues and the proceeds of liens
on, or liquidation of, the pauper's property. 7 Local officials also
solved the local poverty problem by placing indigent individuals
with other families, or occasionally, selling the impoverished per-
son, or less drastically the indigent's belongings, at public auc-
tion."'
The poor elderly were not especially differentiated from the
disabled. They were more likely to be considered worthy of assis-
tance if they were unable to work and without resources or family
to look to for food and shelter, so long as they were recognized as
"local.""... In effect, colonial Americans, like their European con-
temporaries, used local identification as a way of separating the
"deserving" from the "undeserving" poor.120
found their way to "hospitals" which were hostels for the poor. In the year
1630 when the ship Arbella sailed for America, these places were filled to
overflowing ....
Id.
116. See id. at 175-80.
117. See KATZ, supra note 23, at 13-21.
118. See id.
119. See HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 117-22.
120. See MARMOR ET AL., supra note 3, at 23-25 (discussing the socially accepted
forms of poor relief). For a picture of actual colonial poor-relief practices in Benja-
min Franklin's Philadelphia, see Gary B. Nash, Poverty and Poor Relief in Pre-
Revolutionary Philadelphia, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1976). As Nash points out, pov-
erty was becoming an endemic and substantial problem for American urban centers
at about the time Franklin was writing of the pernicious effects of poor relief, and
Philadelphia's Quaker traditions of provision for the poor were strained to the
breaking point. See id.
This "modernization" of colonial society... was accompanied by the evo-
lution of poverty from an occasional to a systemic problem. Poverty, in
turn, was but one part of a transformation that involved occupational spe-
cialization, redistribution of wealth, spreading commercialization, decay of





3. Retirement for the propertied
While retirement, in the sense of voluntary cessation of work
in old age, was not unknown before the late-nineteenth century, it
was relatively uncommon and was a prerogative of the proper-
tied. 1  Well into the beginning of the twentieth century, most
American men remained in the paid labor force after age sixty-
five, presumably as long as they were physically able to work and
needed the income.' Indeed, for the minority who survived into
old age, care and comfort beyond the point at which they could no
longer work was largely ensured by control over family property,
and with it, over sons and daughters. ' Thus, the identification of
age with poverty that became part of the "social question" for re-
formers early in the twentieth century had not yet been made in
pre-Civil War America.
Nonetheless, some elderly men and couples in the pre-Civil
War era retired from their farms, usually to small towns or vil-
lages.124 For many small farmers and artisans, retirement may not
121. See HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 88-93.
122. See W. ANDREW ACHENBAUM, SOCIAL SECURITY: VISIONS AND REVISIONS
105 (1986).
Retirement was uncommon until the twentieth century. As late as 1900,
roughly two-thirds of all men over sixty-five were still gainfully employed.
Most were engaged in agriculture.... According to census data, 55.6 per-
cent of all aged men were in the labor force in 1920, 42.2 percent in 1940,
28.9 percent in 1960, 23.9 percent in 1970, and 18.4 percent in 1981. Com-
parable employment patterns exist for aged women.
Id. (footnote omitted).
123. See HABER & GRATrON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 89-91,
104-06. The importance of ownership of property to a worker's ability to stop work
is demonstrated by wide regional and racial differences in rates of retirement. For
example, during the slave period, African Americans held in chattel slavery in the
South were expected to, and largely did, work until death. See id. at 92-93. How-
ever, even after emancipation, the establishment of a sharecropping/plantation re-
gime that in many ways replicated the conditions of servitude meant that retirement
was not an option for most older African Americans until after World War II. See
id at 94-95.
[S]outhern tenancy became permanent for many African Americans. Un-
like prosperous white farm owners, they lacked property that could fund
retirement.... In 1930, when almost all older blacks lived in the South, 75
percent of aged black men reported occupations (nearly all as farmers), in
contrast to fewer than 60 percent of all white men.
Id at 95 (footnote omitted); see also JACQUELINE JONES, THE DISPOSSESSED 110
(1992) (discussing post-Reconstruction conditions of southern African Americans
and the impetus for their northern migration after the turn of the century).
124. See HABER & GRATrON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 93-94.
Many appeared to have left the farm, moving to villages and small towns..
.. Such households were unique for the low and steadily falling labor force
activity of older men; between 1860 and 1910, the percentage of older men
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have meant a radical change but rather simply a gradual decrease
in work activity depending on the adequacy of savings or other ar-
rangements for support in old age. '2 A frequent pattern for the
nineteenth century farmer reaching old age was to lease or give
parts of the family farm to the next generation in exchange for
staying on the farm and continuing to work it, producing family in-
come for both generations.'l Those farmers who controlled prop-
erty and assets could stop working in old age and still be assured of
income from the next generation whose continued support was
guaranteed by the older generation's control'of the farm or busi-
ness.
12 7
The elderly poor without family were treated similarly to
other poor individuals who were unable to work even though ex-
treme old age probably carried with it a presumption of inability to
in villages and small towns who reported occupations fell from 74 to 44, a
much steeper decline than in farm or urban households.
Id. (footnote omitted).
125. See, e.g., Kathleen Neils Conzen, Peasant Pioneers: Generational Succession
Among German Farmers in Frontier Minnesota, in CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION,
supra note 100, at 259, 267-76 (describing the ways in which the parent farmer and
spouse would bargain with an adult child to take over the bulk of the farming as the
older generation gradually reduced their work activity).
126. See id.; see also HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100,
at 89-90 (discussing how the "aging landholder managed the business of the farm,
controlling the careers, marriages, and wealth of... heirs"). According to the latter,
elderly widows of means also can be found in census data from this period as having
"retired" from their children's households to set up independent homes, again usu-
ally in small villages or towns. See id. at 91. Nonetheless, single women and widows
faced considerable economic uncertainty if they survived to old age and were largely
dependent on provisions for control of income made by deceased husbands or fa-
thers in order to avoid dependence on family or local charity. See id. at 90-91.
Other husbands provided for wives through maintenance contracts, a
form of annual pension.... These wills detailed both the widow's rightful
assets and the obligations her heirs owed her so long as she remained un-
married. For the most part, they compelled women to retire from active
management of the farm, giving over authority to the next generation.
Id. at 90. As for poor women, "[p]ublic relief records, the charity dispensed by min-
isters, and the early private organizations directed toward needy aged women
showed that many ended their lives as members of the 'deserving poor.' Id. at 91.
127. See HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 89-90.
Older property owners remained closely involved in farming and with the
family that provided a labor supply; they continued to be active participants
in the preindustrial enterprises that combined land and labor.... Based in
the family farm economy, such authority provided the majority of older
men and women with a setting for vigorous economic activity and high so-
cial standing. Since the farm was the central productive unit and age led to
ownership, older men and their wives possessed impressive resources and
often worked or managed a work force until late in life.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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work. Still, there were comparatively few such elderly poor to
start with before the late-nineteenth century, and certainly those
few had a claim on parish or local relief institutions such as the
almshouse.'2
In summary, throughout the pre-industrial period aged
Americans apparently placed a high value on independence and
control over their living arrangements; where multigenerational
households existed, more often than not the older generation kept
control of property and therefore income. 129 The sentimental
popular picture of respected elders living with their children in
harmony was not complete mythology, but it certainly was not the
rule. 30 Even in the Puritan culture, which David Hackett Fischer
and others describe as especially deferential to elders, deference
was apparently based in substantial part on the older generation
holding onto family land long into the adulthood of the next gen-
eration.1 31 Entitlement to comfort in old age, in this era, was based
quite literally on holding the deed to the family farm.
B. The Federal Pension Model: Veterans' Entitlements
The Social Security system that emerged in the late 1930s ech-
oed in important aspects the principles and categories of coverage
provided under the Civil War pension program. 132 A comparison
of the Revolutionary War and Civil War pension systems with the
benefits provided under the Social Security Act after 1939 reveals
strong similarities between the programs in goals, assumptions,
and themes, which have persisted for 175 years of federal income
support programs.
First, it appears that aid to the elderly, veterans or not, had a
strong poverty-prevention element whether or not poverty was a
128. See generally id. at 20-47 (discussing the role of families in the lives of the
elderly).
129. See id. at 22-27. Roughly the same pattern could be seen in England during
the same period. See HANNAH, supra note 88, at 3-5.
130. See HABER & GRATrON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 29-40.
131. See FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED, supra note 100, at 109-10.
Respect for age rested upon a solid material base. The system of land-
holding in New England was purposely used to maintain a proper attitude
of subordination in the young. Puritan elders tended to retain land for an
unusually prolonged period. Sons who married at twenty-five or twenty-six
sometimes did not receive land of their own until well into their thirties,
and continued in a state of dependency upon their aged parents.
Id (footnote omitted).
132. See generally SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 102-30
(discussing the development of the Civil War pension program and its legacy).
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requirement for receipt of aid; presumptive, rather than demon-
strated, need was the trigger for benefit payment. Second, we can
conclude from the structure of these programs that only those who
matched a consensus view of worthiness-war service, inability to
work because of age or disability, or both-were viewed as entitled
to public support. Citizenship or residency alone was an insuffi-
cient basis for the right to adult income support."'
Finally, although there is substantial evidence of late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century patterns of individual sav-
ing for the possibility of retirement in old age, individual efforts
alone were not likely to provide sufficient economic security in old
age to induce retirement. Those older men who did leave the
work force up until the 1920s were most likely to have based their
retirement security on publicly provided pensions.'
4
1. Revolutionary War pensions: welfare for the deserving
The first American federal antipoverty program was the
Revolutionary War Pension Act, enacted in 1818 and expanded in
1820.135 The program provided annual lifetime benefits for Revo-
lutionary War veterans who could demonstrate lack of income or
assets at the time of initial application for benefits.13 6 While en-
actment of the program was probably a response to nationalism
aroused by the War of 1812 and sympathy for the plight of Revo-
lutionary War veterans in dire economic circumstances, the pen-
sions paid under the 1820 Act had many of the characteristics of
old-age pensions designed to prevent poverty in old age resulting
from inability to work.37
Unlike the later Civil War system, the Revolutionary War
pension program required an initial demonstration that the vet-
133. See id.; see also HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100,
at 71-87 (describing aid to the elderly during the industrial and Social Security eras).
134. See HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 104-06.
135. See John P. Resch, Federal Welfare for Revolutionary War Veterans, 56 Soc.
SERV. REV. 171,172 (1982).
136. See id. ("Recipients and an estimated 60,000 members of their households
received aid for an average of nine years at a total cost of $22,000,000.").
137. See id. at 171-72.
Congress rejected the traditional argument that republican principles were
incompatible with the creation of a military pension establishment or with
federal charity to a "rank of society." The new attitude stressed that the
Republic's heritage would be dishonored and its principles tarnished unless
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eran was in need to establish eligibility for benefits. In a sense, this
program was based on a double test of worthiness, as service to the
Republic in war as well as demonstrated poverty were required for
receipt of benefits.'38 However, once sufficient poverty was ini-
tially established, veterans received pension benefits for the rest of
their lives without further inquiry into their economic status.
139
We can see in the Revolutionary War pension program the
beginning of the prophylactic approach to poverty for those
deemed socially worthy that is epitomized today by the Social Se-
curity program. The first veterans of an American war were
deemed worthy by virtue of their war service, and thus, once they
demonstrated need, were given a fixed pension amount, enough
for a "comfortable and frugal existence," without being required
to demonstrate specific needs again later in life.' As a result,
these pension recipients were independent of local authority su-
pervision or control and were not subject to the degradation of
being placed with families or of having their belongings sold at
public auction. Because their entitlement was based as much on
their service as veterans as on their poverty, receipt of the pension
meant independence and insulation from the control over daily life
that awaited recipients of town poor relief.
2. The Civil War pension system: precursor to social insurance
The Civil War was the first American "modem" war with
participation by a large proportion of the military-age adult male
138. See id at 172. ("Pensions were awarded to veterans ... who swore that 'they
were in need of assistance from their country."').
139. Under the 1820 program, the Attorney General and the War Department
allowed only the poorest veterans to qualify and established a "poverty line" as a
test of sufficient poverty. See id
In 1820, because of a flood of applicants, Congress tightened the poor-law
provisions of the act by adding a means test. Veterans wishing to continue'
on the pension rolls as well as new applicants had to report their residence,
occupation, health, income, debts, and an inventory of real and personal
property to the War Department. Also, they were to provide the age, gen-
der, physical condition, and relationship of all others in their household and
any sources of aid rendered the applicant. Furthermore, the War Depart-
ment required a codicil containing a court's assessment of the value of the
veteran's property. Finally, the War Department established an unofficial
poverty line to help separate deserving from undeserving applicants. The
attorney general ruled that only applicants "in the lowest grade of poverty"
deserved the benefit. Over 18,000 of the 20,000 applicants passed the
means test.
Id. (footnote omitted). At least half of these pensioners were over age 65, and about
3% were over age 80. See id. at 173.
140. Id. at 173 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 30:1063
EVOLUTION OF ENTITLEMENT
population rather than primarily professional soldiers, a phenome-
non that led directly to the formation of the United States' first
mass-scale federal social welfare program, the Civil War pension
system.14' By 1910 the Civil War pension system was paying bene-
fits in some areas for up to 20% of all persons age sixty-five and
over, a rate comparable to the coverage provided by German and
Danish old-age social insurance programs at that time. 42 Since as
late as 1900 two-thirds of men over age sixty-five were still gain-
fully employed,1 43 it is likely that Civil War pensions provided a
source of income for a large portion of elderly men who were no
longer working or at least not working at the level of self-
support.144
The Civil War democratized military participation. The entire
adult male population was subject to conscription, in both the
North and the Confederacy, even though most soldiers volun-
teered for duty until late in the conflict.14 It was a conflict of un-
precedented scale and ferocity. Over the four years spanning 1861
to 1865, over 2.2 million men-about 37% of northern men be-
tween the ages of fifteen and forty-four in 1860-served in the
Union forces.1"4 Of those, almost 365,000 died from combat, ill-
ness, or war-related misadventure. 147 By way of comparison, only
about one-third of British men-also largely nonprofessional sol-
141. For a general discussion of the Civil War pension system, see SKOCPOL,
PROTECTING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 102-30. See also Megan McClintock,
Binding up the Nation's Wounds: Nationalism, Civil War Pensions and American
Families, 1861-1890 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on
file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (analyzing the Civil War pension
system as a family support program expressing a new sense of nationalism and patri-
otism). Similar although less extensive pension programs were set up by the various
Confederate states for Confederate veterans and their families. See SKOCPOL,.
PROTECTING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 139-43.
142. See SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 132.
143. See ACHENBAUM, supra note 122, at 105.
144. See, e.g., SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 129 ("Over
time, Civil War pensions became more and more obviously old-age and survivors'
benefits for the veterans.").
145. See McClintock, supra note 141, at 52-64, 124; see also 1 SHELBY FOOTE, THE
CIVIL WAR: A NARRATIVE 394, 406 (1958) (discussing the Confederacy's proposal
to institute conscription).
146. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 at 1140 (1975);
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 103 (Skocpol calculated the
37% figure using these census numbers.).
147. See SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 103.
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diers-served in World War I.14 As for casualties, by the end of
the Civil War, eighteen out of every one thousand northern citi-
zens had been killed in connection with the conflict.149 By com-
parison, 3.14 soldiers per thousand Americans died in World War
II.15° Equally important is the number of men who returned home
wounded-a total of almost 300,000 soldiers-constituting about
fourteen of every one thousand Northerners.'
From the beginning, the Civil War pension system provided
benefits for those injured or harmed as a result of military service
during the war and to the widows, orphans, and certain other de-
pendents of soldiers who died "for causes traceable to their Union
military service." 52 While benefits initially were distributed based
on the severity of the disability and on military rank, eligibility was
not based on demonstrated need, and pensions, once granted, were
paid for life.1 Federal protection against a decline into poverty for
families of Civil War soldiers was not extended out of detached al-
truism. Once it became clear that the war was going to be both
lengthy and extremely bloody, it became more difficult to fill the
ranks with volunteer soldiers without some assurance that families
left behind would be cared for. 154
Nonetheless, the fact that family benefits were initially in-
cluded as part of the Civil War pension scheme is evidence of their
underlying purpose: to compensate soldiers and their families for
losses suffered during the war, inevitably including lost or dimin-
ished capacity to earn and support those families.'55 The para-
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 103-04.
151. See id. at 104.
152. Id at 107.
153. See id. at 107-12.
154. See McClintock, supra note 141, at 78-98.
While bounties and pay advances provided some relief to families of volun-
teers, Northerners continued to blame family obligations for the slow pace
of enlistment in the summer of 1862.... [Liocal relief and federal recruit-
ment measures failed to reach relatives of soldiers who never returned
home. All forms of public aid went only to families whose breadwinners
were in the military; payment stopped with a soldier's discharge or death.
Thus the specter of destitute widows and orphans continued to deter many
able-bodied men from enlisting.
Id. at 82 (footnotes omitted).
155. See SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 107 ("Under the
1862 law, widows, orphans, and other dependents of those who died for causes trace-
able to their Union military service also received at the rates their relatives would
have gotten for total disabilities."); see also McClintock, supra note 141, at 96-109.
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mount goals of the original legislation were prevention of destitu-
tion, avoidance of local almshouses, and aid to the poor for this
class of Americans viewed as worthy of assistance but "too good"
for ordinary poor relief.'56 This goal was reiterated in the legisla-
tion's repeated expansions from 1862 through the end of the cen-
tury. 1
The Federal Civil War pension system was initially a response
to the inadequacy of local poor relief and volunteer charity to
provide for dependents of current and deceased Civil War soldiers
during the war.5' Both the scale and length of the war meant that
local and voluntary efforts would prove insufficient. Even though
states overrode the limits of strictly local poor relief and passed
tariffs, excise taxes, and other measures to finance aid to military
families, ultimately federal aid was required.5 9 The most signifi-
cant aspect of this system, from the perspective of the later devel-
opment of retirement entitlements, was the absence of any re-
quirement for demonstration of need.1  Payment of benefits was
based on a presumption of need arising from the inability to work
because of injuries received in the war or, in the case of family
benefits, absence of the male breadwinner.'
After the war ended a series of congressional expansions of
the program-both in the amount of pensions and in the categories
of soldiers and dependents eligible for benefits-effectively trans-
formed a military disability pension system into a broad-scale old-
age and disability family benefit system.62
"The war, as a domestic crisis, shaped notions of state responsibility for military de-
pendents; to diminish the disruptive impact of the war, the federal government as-
sumed the breadwinning roles of deceased soldiers." Id. at 109.
156. See SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 148-51.
157. See id at 106-10; see also McClintock, supra note 141, at 96-109 (commenting
that the government's largesse was not confined to widows and orphans but ex-
tended to mothers and sisters of soldiers).
158. See McClintock, supra note 141, at 96-109.
159. See id. at 80-81.
Military families received assistance from a variety of sources in mid-1862.
Despite attempts to place volunteers' families in the hands of private be-
nevolence, the need exceeded the resources of charitable associations.
Municipalities continued to levy funds for the relief of dependents during
the first half of 1862, but the strain of meeting the growing need began to
show after Shiloh.... States broke with the tradition of local relief and ex-
panded their welfare activities to meet the rising demand for aid to families.
Id.





Between 1880 and 1910, the U.S. federal government de-
voted over a quarter of its expenditures to pensions dis-
tributed among the populace; aside from interest pay-
ments on the national debt in the early 1880s, such
expenditures exceeded or nearly equaled other major
categories of federal spending. By 1910, about 28 percent
of all American men aged 65 or more, more than half a
million of them, received federal benefits averaging $189
a year.1
Liberalization of benefits, along with the dual impact of grad-
ual aging and lingering minor wounds on the ability of aging veter-
ans to support themselves, resulted in increasingly higher numbers
of beneficiaries and expenditures under the program, peaking in
the mid-1890s. 164 Congress ultimately severed the direct connec-
tion between injury and benefit eligibility and repeatedly raised
benefits throughout this period.1 65 Thus, as Civil War veterans
aged and their earning capacity diminished regardless of any inju-
ries they may have received in the war, the basis for the presump-
tion of inability to earn was broadened from physical disability to
simply old age, and benefits became a more significant part of total
income.
Theda Skocpol estimates that by 1910, about 18% of all
United States residents aged sixty-five and over were receiving
benefits. This number included 28.5% of all elderly men, plus ap-
proximately 8% of all elderly women who were receiving survi-
vors' benefits.'6 These percentages were comparable to northern
European old-age pension systems in effect at the time.'67 Moreo-
ver, benefits were available at younger ages-at least at age sixty-
two and frequently earlier-in more substantial amounts, and for
more dependent family members, than under most European sys-
tems at the turn of the century. 63 In 1910 German old-age benefits
163. Id. at 65 (footnote omitted).
164. See id. at 110 fig. 1.
165. See id. at 110-11. The 1890 Dependent Pension Act provided benefits for
any veteran who had served for at least 90 days during the war if he became unable
to do manual labor at any point. See id at 111. "In practice, old age alone soon be-
came a sufficient disability, and in 1906 the law was amended to state this explicitly.
After the turn of the century, moreover, Congress several times significantly raised
the general benefit levels for both veterans and surviving dependents." Id. at 111.
166. See id. at 132.
167. See id. at 132-34.
168. See id. at 131-34.
German old-age and disability insurance failed to cover surviving depend-
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averaged about 18% of the typical worker's income, and British
pensions averaged about 22%. In contrast, the average United
States Civil War pension benefit in 1910 equaled about 30% of the
average annual income of all employed Americans."9
Thus, during the period in which the United States became an
industrial nation-as millions left the farms and joined the ranks of
industrial workers, disrupting the property-based family and vil-
lage network of support for the elderly-a federal support system
developed to provide for at least a large minority, and perhaps a
majority, of older workers who could not support themselves in
old age. Given the high labor force participation rates of men over
sixty-five well into the twentieth century-at least 60-70% by most
estimates until after 1930' 7 --it seems likely that most older men
who could not or did not wish to work past age sixty-five had a
federal or state veterans' pension to fall back on.'7' Widows and
orphans of those who died during the war or of war-related causes
were also supported by the federal system so that a substantial
support network lasted into the twentieth century, even after the
war generation was gone.'72
The Civil War pension system was contributory only in the
sense that its beneficiaries sacrificed their health, youth, and the
financial security of their families in service to the Union.' 73 But in
most other respects, the hallmarks of eligibility under this system
resemble those of the Social Security system enacted in 1935 and
1939.'74 The characteristics that distinguished the American ap-
proach to social welfare from that of the rest of the industrialized
world were fully developed in the Civil War pension system and
ents until 1912, when widows became eligible for 47 percent of the average
disablement pension. In sharp contrast, dependents of U.S. Civil War
casualties (or of veterans who died later) could receive payments that be-
came increasingly generous over time, averaging a remarkable 80 percent
of the amounts given to invalid pensioners in 1910.
Id. at 132-34 (footnotes omitted).
169. See id. at 134-35.
170. See generally Roger L. Ransom et al., Inventing Pensions: The Origins of the
Company-Provided Pensions in the United States, 1900-1940, in SOCIETAL IMPACT,
supra note 99, at 1, 5-6 (commenting on the importance and prevalence of healthy
savings accounts of these older workers).
171. See generally Brian Gratton, The Creation of Retirement: Families, Individu-
als, & the Social Security Movement, in SOCIETAL IMPACT, supra notel00, at 63-68
(noting that benefits of Old Age Assistance spurred an almost immediate drop in
labor force participation of aged men).
172. See id. at 134.
173. See id. at 148-50.
174. See id. at 103-04,149-51.
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represent a continuum from the Revolutionary War system.7 '
Benefits to those unable to provide for themselves would only be
given to those who had "earned" them-either through public or
military service or later through sufficient time in the industrial
work force. 176
The common thread running from Revolutionary War veter-
ans' benefits through Civil War veterans' benefits to Social Secu-
rity retiree benefits is the need perceived by the public and the
Congress for a pension entitlement based on presumed rather than
demonstrated need. Entitlement was viewed as essential in order
to preserve the independence of those who had, in one way or an-
other, earned their benefits, to insulate them from intrusive pov-
erty programs and their overseers-whether village elders or wel-
fare office bureaucrats. This insurance against falling from one's
place, both economically and socially, became more critical as in-
dustrialization broke up older patterns of aging and family care
and as industry and government considered the popularization and
democratization of old-age retirement.
C. Industrialization and the Beginning of "Voluntary" Retirement
Historians differ as to the exact effects of industrialization on
older workers and on the extent to which employers purposely
used age and seniority to exacerbate unemployment among the
old.177 Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that by the early-
twentieth century, the nature and organization of work for most
Americans and Europeans had shifted from the agrarian family
175. See id. at 105.
176. See SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 149-50.
[Tmhe Civil War pension system, like subsequent provision for "deserving"
Americans, was also defined in opposition to charty or public programs for
paupers at state and local levels.
The justifications offered for pensions, soldiers' relief, and veterans'
homes invoked the need, as the 1888 Republican platform put it, "to pro-
vide against the possibility that any man who honorably wore the Federal
uniform shall become the inmate of an almshouse, or dependent upon pri-
vate charity." . . . In short, honorable and generous public provision for
Civil War veterans was openly defined in opposition to demeaning provi-
sion for paupers.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
177. See, e.g., FISCHER, GROWING OLD, supra note 91, at 20-24; GRAEBNER, supra
note 12, at 12-13; Moss, supra note 23, at 41-44; ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 95-104,
152-61; QUADAGNO, supra note 100, at 25-40; Susan B. Carter & Richard Sutch,
Myth of the Industrial Scrap Heap: A Revisionist View of Turn-of-the-Century




economy to an urban industrial economy in which the family and
the elderly had different roles than in the pre-industrial world.
178
While most older workers were capable of continuing to work past
age sixty-five, and did so at least up to the 1930s,179 they had to de-
178. All of the studies cited above address the issue of industrialization and the
change in working patterns to one degree or another. For a detailed study of the
change in rural economies early in the nineteenth century with the coming of indus-
trialization, see Jonathan Prude, Town-Factory Conflicts in Antebellum Rural Massa-
chusetts, in CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION, supra note 100, 71-102.
179. Whether one views the labor force participation of older American men as a
sign of continued employment in old age, or of the beginning of widespread retire-
ment seems to be a matter of perspective. For example, Orloff appears to see re-
tirement in reality as involuntary unemployment, resulting from the pressures of
speedy and innovative production that increased after the turn of the century.
[I]n the United States, analyst Murray Latimer found that the decline in
labor force participation for males aged sixty-five or over (as well as that
for males aged between forty-five and sixty-four) between 1890 and 1920
was accounted for entirely by the decline in nonindustrial employment.
There was almost no decline in the participation rates of older American
men in industry or in agriculture over the period 1890-1930; total rates did
drop off, for rates in the industrial sector were lower than in the agricul-
tural, and the occupational distribution was shifting away from agriculture.
In his study of the elderly in Boston, historian Brian Gratton reports that in
urban areas like Boston, older men's labor force participation-almost en-
tirely within nonagricultural sectors-was quite stable over the forty years
between 1890 and 1930; indeed, in the fifty largest American cities, the rate
fell only eight percentage points, from 61 percent to 53 percent. Gratton
argues that a new equilibrium level of participation in the labor force may
have been reached within industrial occupations, and that there was no in-
herent reason why healthy aged workers could not have 
gone on working.
Gratton and others stress that it was after the introduction of old age assis-
tance and insurance measures that overall participation rates droppedsharply in [the Unit d States, Britain, and Canad ].
... The aged were disproportionately represented in traditional jobs and
underrepresented in newer occupations, so that as the composition of the
labor force changed, there was less room for older workers .... What wasproblematic for older workers was not the introduction and use of new in-
dustrial technology per se, but the speed with which the machinery had to
be operated .... As the concern with rationalization and efficiency grew, sotoo did the notion that the aged were by definition "superannuated" and
unfit for participation in the labor force.
ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 100-01 (citations omitted).
In contrast, Carter and Sutch look at approximately the same data on labor force
participation and conclude, based on their research into labor patterns of self-
employed workers who apparently ceased work voluntarily, that
many men planned their retirement by saving; investing in assets such as
land, tools, shops, and inventory; becoming self-employed; and eventually
ceasing productiveactivity and presumably living off the stream of earnings
generated by their assets. In their economic independence from both paid
taor and the support of grown children, these were "modern" retirees.
O.. We develop evidence to suggest that voluntary retirement was not
uncommon in the past. Individuals saved in order to be able to retire ....
Many men voluntarily left the wage sector long before retirement age to
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velop different strategies for survival in the industrial world when
economic adversity struck, whether because of economic downturn
or technological advances that made skills obsolete.
However, far from severing the ties between generations, the
industrialization of work may have made the older generation
more directly dependent on the younger generation, resulting in a
new "family strategy" that relied on household income from wage
earnings.180 What made this strategy different from that of earlier
generations was that the older generation was less likely to hold
the economic power-the deed to the farm for example-that ear-
lier in the century provided some assurance that the younger gen-
eration would support aged parents until death.' In addition,
medical advances made it increasingly likely that the older gen-
eration would live well beyond the point of capacity for full-time,
self-sustaining employment, particularly in the increasingly
"rationalized," efficient, and time-conscious factory settings that
began to dominate the workplace at the beginning of the twentieth
century.'8
For social reformers in the 1920s such as Abraham Epstein, 18
one of the early agitators for social welfare and old-age programs
in the United States, it seemed that industrialization had brought
unmitigated horrors upon the elderly who in an earlier time would
have found shelter and care on the family farm:
Modem industry finds little use for [older] workers. It
replaces and discards these aged wage-earners as it is in
the habit of replacing and discarding the worn-out and in-
efficient machinery.... Modem machine industry [has]
less need for expertness and experience and greater use
for speed and rapid production. As a result, the younger
generation, though less experienced, is continuously
crowding out the older and less efficient workers."8
work for themselves. Self-employment thus facilitated rather than post-
poned retirement.
Carter & Sutch, supra note 177, at 6-7. These differing views are not necessarily con-
tradictory, although Carter and Sutch may be underestimating the importance of
Civil War pensions in supporting both self-employment and retirement among the
approximately one-third of men over age 65 who were not working in the 1890-1920
period.
180. See Gratton, supra note 171, at 51-63.
181. See id
182. See HABER & GRATrON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 95-110.
183. See id. at 27.
184. Id. at 96.
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In fact, the picture was a good deal more complex than that.
For one thing, industrialization and its twentieth century expan-
sion of production methods and mass consumption of manufac-
tured products contributed to the creation and dissemination of
the great wealth that was necessary for any economy to be able to
support substantial numbers of the nonworking. 8 '
Nonetheless, while industrialization did not create old-age
poverty, the transition from farm to urban wage work, combined
with lengthening life spans, undoubtedly made the threat of pov-
erty in old age more real. This appears to have been particularly
true as rapid technological advances made successive sets of skills
obsolete. For older workers such changes required either acquisi-
tion of new skills, or if the means were available, retirement or a
shift into self-employment of one sort or another."8 6 Industrializa-
tion brought with it an inherent insecurity of wage employment in
an economy marked by periods of severe economic downturn that
was substantially different from the experience of most earlier
generations.
This increased insecurity of employment, which accompanied
industrialization, may have led to increased identification of pov-
erty with old age even though the majority of the elderly were nei-
ther in poverty nor in the poorhouse. Although most of those over
sixty continued to work and maintain households alone or with
their children, the possibility of poverty and the threat of the
poorhouse were the fears, if not the reality, of the majority of older
workers in the early part of the century) 87
Even though there seems to have been, from the latter part of
the nineteenth century up to the 1930s, a sizable retired population
of one-quarter to one-third of men over age sixty-five, leaving
work for leisure upon reaching age sixty-five or earlier was still not
the mainstream expectation for most Americans until after World
War 11 ."8 It seems most likely that the retirement decisions were
influenced, as is frequently the case today, by the expectation of a
steady income stream in the absence of work and by opportunities
to work, improved health, and other factors. Given the payment
185. See ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 277-78.
186. See HABER & GRArrON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 99-101.
187. See ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 3-6, 91-92; see also Carole Haber, Over the
Hill to the Poorhouse, in SOCIETAL IMPAcT, supra note 100, at 90-129 [hereinafter
Haber, Over the Hill] (discussing use of the threat of institutionalization in the
movement to pass national welfare measures such as Social Security).
188. See Ransom et al., supra note 170, at 5-6.
1105April 1997]
1106 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1063
of Civil War pensions to almost 30% of men over sixty-five
through at least 1910, the retirement option for many of those
listed as retired in the census data of 1900 and 1910 must have
been supported by the federal benefit.
Industrialization alone did not automatically make older
workers superfluous, particularly those with education or skills
that could be adapted to changing technologies. Despite evidence
of life-cycle savings patterns in the early years of the century, per-
haps to finance retirement,189 the possibility of retirement still
seems to have been reserved for the minority with incomes high
enough to allow such savings or with access to a stream of income
from property or from Civil War or other government pensions. 190
Retirement was not yet the norm for workers who reached age
sixty-five or even seventy.
IV. EXPANSION OF ENTITLEMENT: THE MODERN RETIREMENT
SYSTEM
The U.S. retirement income system developed slowly from the
mid-nineteenth century through the enactment and expansion of
the Social Security system and later of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).'9' Indeed, it is difficult to tell
which came first-the practice of and desire for retirement or the
pensions necessary to support retired workers. Clearly, the vague
popular picture of industrialization pushing older workers out of
the work force and into poverty, from which they would eventually
189. See Carter & Sutch, supra note 177, at 9. While I disagree with many of the
conclusions drawn in their article, and with the authors' oversimplification and mis-
statement of a "traditional view" of the origins of retirement-one that does not ap-
pear to be held by most historians currently working in the field-this is nonetheless
an interesting and useful analysis on the employment patterns of older male Ameri-
cans in this period. See also HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note
100, at 77-79 (discussing individual savings through "tontine" insurance policies);
Roger L. Ransom & Richard Sutch, Tontine Insurance and the Armstrong Investiga-
tion: A Case of Stifled Innovation, 1868-1905, 47 J. ECON. HIST. 379 (1987) (arguing
that the prohibition on tontine insurance policies was probably unnecessary).
190. By 1950 the labor force participation rate of men age 65 and older had
dropped to only 46%, from the 65% to 70% typical for the pre-Social Security pe-
riod. It was the period of greatly expanding Social Security and pension benefits in
the post-War era that saw the greatest drop in labor force participation by older
Americans, so that by 1990, the labor force participation rate for men age 65 and
older had dropped to 16%. See JAMES H. ScHuLz, THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 64-65
(6th ed. 1995).
191. Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 4002, 88
Stat. 829, 1004-06 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994)).
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be rescued by the Social Security system, is too simplistic. 2
The innovation of advanced industrial society that began with
Social Security was more likely the presumption of retirement for
all workers upon attainment of a specific age without any demon-
strated diminution in ability to work. ' Industrialization created
both the social wealth that made retirement possible and the risk
of extreme levels of unemployment and poverty in old age that
prompted enactment of Social Security. ' 9 - The redistributive as-
pect of the Social Security entitlement played a key role in the
democratization of retirement in the wake of cyclical economic
downturns.
The major underlying principle and purpose of social insur-
ance in the United States was very similar to the purpose of the
Civil War pension system as it evolved: to prevent, rather than to
relieve, poverty in old age for those elderly men and their families
who were deemed worthy of public protection. These included
veterans and their families under the Civil War system and long-
time industrial workers and their families under Social Security.1
95
In this evolving American entitlement structure, the provision of
old-age benefits was intended as a prophylactic for poverty-not a
remedy for those already in need but a way of preventing the de-
scent into poverty that might, although not necessarily would, ac-
company old age without work.
The innovative feature of the Social Security program was the
redistributive benefit in the context of a mandatory program fi-
nanced with worker contributions. In essence, Social Security was
structured to eventually eliminate the need for explicit needs-
based poverty programs by providing weighted benefits to low-
wage workers as a matter of earned right.196 Within the framework
of an expansive democratic capitalist ideal, the authors of Social
Security based their approach to income security on the assump-
tion-to which they firmly adhered even in the depths of the Great
Depression-that economic rights based on earnings would even-
tually accrue to all members of society who would either be work-
ers or dependents of workers in a family relationship.
The entire structure of retirement income sources in the
192. See Carter & Sutch, supra note 177, at 6-11.
193. See id. at 8-9.
194. See id. at 7.
195. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
196. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
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United States is based on individually-earned entitlements, pro-
portional to earnings during a worker's life, that ensure the expec-
tation of income in old age and encourage retirement. Since a
strictly proportional structure would provide little assurance of
adequate income for moderate- and low-wage workers into a
lengthy old age, redistribution was an inevitable and necessary
part of a system of prospective public entitlement, intended to
both encourage and support retirement without reliance on poor
relief for the vast majority.
The combination of private entitlements to future income in
old age-such as individual annuities and insurance as well as em-
ployer-provided pensions-with the public entitlement of Social
Security resulted in a system of individual rights to accumulate as
much or as little retirement income as fortune or choice would al-
low. The earned entitlement, under the American system, was the
opportunity to accumulate. The guarantees were not to any level
of income but rather to payments from specific sources, which
might amount to adequate, inadequate, or even excessive income,
but which were designed to avoid imposition of adequacy meas-
ures from external authority.
Employers, intensely cost conscious and generally suspicious
of centrally imposed payroll burdens, saw the Social Security pro-
gram as simply another type of emnployer-provided pension with an
employee contributory element. The few business leaders who
originally supported Social Security viewed it as a vehicle for re-
lieving employers of pension liabilities they would otherwise be
required to shoulder individually in order to make retirement a vi-
able means of easing older employees out the door. 98 The exi-
gencies of the Depression era may have required a collective fed-
eral response to destitution-threatened or current-among the
elderly; from the perspective of the employer, however, the social
insurance portion of the Social Security Act seems to have repre-
sented more of a government-managed contributory pension than
a broadly based social entitlement.
While it may not have been the primary focus of those design-
ing the legislation, Social Security represents in part a social engi-
neering effort to free up jobs for younger workers by inducing
older workers to retire.9 Clearly such an inducement could not be
197. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.3., IV.C.2.
198. See GRAEBNER, supra note 12, at 201-13.
199. See generally id. at 181-214 (questioning the motives of those implementing
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widely successful for the low-wage workers most in need of em-
ployment without some redistribution of income through the re-
tirement benefit promised under Social Security. Nonetheless, the
conservative structure of Social Security ensured that benefits
would not provide a complete retirement income and that workers
would still need to provide for themselves in retirement through
savings and pensions.2 '0 The role of private pensions and savings in
capital formation, an issue that has taken on primary importance
in the debates of the 1990s, was always an important consideration
for employers, if not for employees.20
It is hardly surprising, then, that any attempts to regulate the
Social Security and suggesting the motives were not completely humanitarian, but
rather, utilitarian in nature); see also MYLES, supra note 100, at 11-13 (asserting that
managers attempted to institutionalize retirement in order to control the flow of the
labor force).
Retirement would open up promotion opportunities for younger workers,
thereby enhancing morale; skilled workers could be replaced more readily
by the unskilled or by those with the new skills required by changing tech-
nology; and, where wages were linked to seniority, highly paid older work-
ers could be replaced by less expensive younger workers.
MYLES, supra note 100, at 13. But see ACHENBAUM, supra note 122, at 106-08. Ach-
enbaum argues that Congress and many advocates of the elderly rejected proposals
to require recipients to cease work in order to receive benefits.
The bill submitted by the Committee on Economic Security included a
provision drafted by its general counsel, Thomas Eliot, stating that "no per-
son shall receive such old-age annuity until... not employed by another in
a gainful occupation." Middleton Beaman, legislative counsel to the House
of Representatives, objected to this requirement because he thought it
would be too difficult to administer. As a result, the House Ways and
Means Committee did not stipulate that one retire in order to qualify for an
annuity. After hearing additional testimony, members of both houses con-
curred that Title II of the 1935 Social Security Act should not serve as a
compulsory retirement mechanism. Because old-age insurance was to re-
place income "lost" because of retirement, however, the Social Security
oard was authorized to regulate the withholding of pensions from those
who "received wages with respect to regular employment."
Id. at 107 (footnote omitted). This regulatory permission was transformed into the
still applicable Social Security "retirement test". See id. "The... 1939 amendments
... set a limit on how much a person could make each month and still receive a pen-
sion." Id. While Achenbaum sees this debate as evidence that Social Security's
stated purpose was not to induce older workers to retire, the fact that the original
version of the 1935 Act went beyond encouragement to coercion seems to support
Graebner's view that encouraging retirement to free up jobs for younger workers
was at least a subtext for the New Deal support for old-age pensions.
200. See MYERS, supra note 34, at 26. The original benefit structure set replace-
ment rates for average workers at around 40% of pre-retirement earnings, clearly
insufficient to maintain a pre-retirement standard of living without supplements from
private pensions or savings. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L.
No. 76-379, 53 Stat. 1360, 1362-63 (codified as amended in scattered section of 42
U.S.C.).
201. See MUNNELL, supra note 46, at 93, 169.
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tax benefits, which eventually began to accrue to sponsors of pen-
sion plans, should credit employers with "paying" for their work-
ers' Social Security benefits, however inconsistent integration
might have been with Social Security's redistributive purpose. The
roots of the Social Security benefit entitlement, including its in-
come redistribution, are more deeply embedded in the history of
American treatment of the poor and elderly than is the relatively
recent recognition of a "right to vested private pension benefits."
2 2
Nonetheless, an examination of the origins of Social Security re-
veals a lack of public and employer understanding of the redistri-
bution that was buried in the benefit formula and that would be
abrogated by integration of private pensions with Social Security.
A. The "Social Problem" of Aging
The question of poverty and old age as "twinned" phenomena
appears to have surfaced first in Europe from at least the period of
establishment of compulsory workingmen's insurance programs in
Germany in the 1880s. 2°3 Many of the early American and Euro-
pean social welfare theorists and activists portrayed industrializa-
tion as a cruel process that forced older workers into inactivity and
poverty. 0' Certainly in contrast to the largely agrarian work set-
ting that dominated American life until after the Civil War, indus-
trial workers were more likely to grow old without recourse to a
family farm or homestead, which could provide support and hous-
ing, and more likely to rely on continuing family wage income in
case of unemployment or disability-whether from old age or mis-
adventure.205
Yet the enactment of workingmen's insurance programs in
Germany, and elsewhere in Europe, in the 1880s and 1890s ap-
pears to have had as much to do with management of an industrial
work force as with alleviation of poverty in old age. 205 When
202- See McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98 (1898), aff'd per curiam, 60
N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901) (discussing the principal nineteenth century formulation of
the "gratuity theory" of pension rights).
203. See E. P. HENNOCK, BRITISH SOCIAL REFORM AND GERMAN PRECEDENTS:
THE CASE OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 1880-1914, at 1-9 (1987); see also Detler Z6llner,
Germany, in THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 1881-1981: STUDIES OF
GERMANY, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND (Peter Kohler &
Hans F. Zacher eds., 1982) (comparing the origins and development of social secu-
rity systems in five European countries).
204. See Haber, Over the Hill, supra note 187, at 96-100.
205. See Gratton, supra note 171, at 46.
206. See GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 120-49;
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European nations, as well as Australia and New Zealand, consid-
ered the "problem" of old age in the wake of early-twentieth-
century industrialization, the solutions were primarily variations
on a "top-down" social engineering approach, with the aim of
guaranteeing a level of income for the aged through needs-based,
citizenship-based, or work-based pension programs.'
From the 1880s through the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, Germany, Britain, Denmark, and other western nations es-
tablished a variety of social spending programs, some based strictly
on need, others on the insurance model for wage workers." The
European systems followed two models with complementary but
not identical purposes-(1) contributory workingmen's insurance
and (2) noncontributory old-age pensions.0 9 Contributory pro-
grams were based on the concept of forced savings that would fund
life annuities, a centuries-old private insurance concept now
adapted to a public context; they were not based on need and were
seen as more or less pure insurance against loss of earning capacity
due to old age or disability.1 Contributory programs were also
limited in scope, with compulsory contributions levied on wages up
to a certain level and coverage of only certain categories of work-
ers.
21
European noncontributory old-age pensions, such as the pro-
grams adopted in Denmark in 1891 and in Britain in 1908, were
more explicitly designed to relieve poverty of the current elderly
population. These pensions were not tied to work histories and
are more properly viewed, especially the British program, as uni-
versal old-age income maintenance that would replace the old
GRAEBNER, supra note 12, at 120-49; HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY,
supra note 100, at 88-115; Ransom et al., supra note 170, at 77.
207. See HENNOCK, supra note 203, at 109-215; see also ORLOFF, supra note 100, at
13-16 (discussing the "late" adoption of welfare programs by Canada and the United
States).
208. See ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 14; see also HANNAH, supra note 88, at 15-17
(describing the formation of national pension and insurance programs in Great
Britain during the early part of the twentieth century).
209. See ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 13.
210. See HENNOCK, supra note 203, at 117-19.
211. According to Skocpol, even by 1910, over 20 years after the imposition of
mandatory wage contributions in Germany, only 52% of working Germans were
covered by the program with either current or prospective pensions, and most of the
pensions then being paid were for disability, not old age. See SKOCPOL, PROTECTING
SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 131-32.
212. See id
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English Poor Laws for the elderly.
In contrast to the European pattern, the American experience
saw the development of individual annuities and employer-
provided pensions to at least a limited extent well before the gen-
eral employment-based system of Social Security was put in place
in 1935. 14 Perhaps in part because the Civil War pension system
continued to pay benefits well into the second decade of the twen-
tieth century, demand for social insurance was not strong enough
to induce passage of Social Security until the economic crisis of the
1930s.
B. Private Pensions: Labor Management, Industrial Social Welfare
Private pensions have never been the principal or even major
source of income in old age for United States workers.215 Nonethe-
less, limited pension and profit sharing plans existed in the United
States long before the federal retirement program was pushed
through the New Deal Congress in 1935.26 Employer-sponsored
group savings plans, and eventually pension plans, seem to have
been an outgrowth of the "private social welfare" efforts begun in
the late-nineteenth century by American businesses as employers
began to perceive the advantages of pension trusts and stock pur-
chase plans, first as a source of capital and later as a way of easing
their older and more highly paid employees off the payroll. 217
While there were a few American business leaders who sup-
ported the transformation of employer-provided "industrial wel-
fare" into a broader public program for which the federal govern-
ment would be responsible,2 8 employers generally preferred
private employer-provided pensions to government-imposed
213. See HANNAH, supra note 88, at 15-17; see also HENNOCK, supra note 203, at
118-20 (discussing how large a proportion of the population was forced to turn to the
Poor Law in old age and how this proportion affected the political arena); MYLES,
supra note 100, at 16 (describing the origins of the modern welfare state and illustrat-
ing how pre-war public pensions were a form of social assistance for the indigent
rather than a retirement wage for the elderly).
214. See discussion infra Part JV.B.
215. See ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 98.
216. See WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND,
PUBLIC POLICY 27-59 (1976).
217. See Ransom et al., supra note 170, at 11-19.
218. Marion Folsom, an executive at Kodak who was instrumental in setting up
Kodak's employee benefits programs in the early part of the century, is an example
of this not very widespread support. See Sanford M. Jacoby, Employers and the Wel-
fare State: The Role of Marion B. Folsom, 80 J. AM. HiST. 525, 526-27 (1993).
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plans.2'9 Employer-provided pensions were a valuable tool for
employee management while still not committing the employer to
promises the company might not be comfortably able to fulfill
when workers actually began to retire. Employers appear to have
focused on immediate cost, not on long-term retirement behavior,
in establishing pension plans, and the history of private employer-
provided pensions through the 1930s gives abundant evidence that
a private system alone would not give enough workers advance as-
surance of income in old age to make retirement a mass phenome-
non.
220
1. Extent of pension plan coverage prior to the 1930s
Private employers in the United States began establishing an-
nuity pension plans for their employees late in the nineteenth cen-
tury, years before the enactment of the federal income tax and the
possibility of sheltering income from tax through deferring com-
pensation.22' The first United States pension plan appears to have
been established by the American Express Company in 1875 when
American Express was principally associated with the railroad in-
dustry.m The plan was not a true retirement plan, but rather paid
benefits to disabled employees who had twenty years of service
with the company, had reached age sixty, and were recommended
for the pension by company management.
This type of plan was put into place by many United States
and Canadian railroads in the years following 1875, but those plans
seem to have been more a response to the occupational hazards
presented by railroad employment than an anticipation of retire-
ment pensions.224 However, most developed into straight retire-
ment plans during the 1900 to 1930 period when the greatest num-
ber of industrial pension plans were established. The most
widely accepted estimate of pension plans and participation is that
between 1875 and 1929 around 400 industrial pension plans were
established, with about that number still in operation on the eve of
219. See ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 179-80; Ransom et al., supra note 170, at 16-
17.
220. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
221. See DAN M. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 16-17 (3d ed.
1975).
222. See GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 216, at 27.
223. See id. at 27-28.
224. See id. at 30.
225. See id.
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the Depression.226
The companies establishing these plans employed about 10%
of the industrial labor force-a force substantially less than the
entire work force including agricultural and casual labor. It is not
clear, however, how many of those employees were eligible to
participate in the plan or would eventually qualify for benefits.227
According to a recent estimate, although industrial pensions were
not uncommon by 1935, no more than 4% of male workers and
3% of female workers met the requirements for receipt of pen-
sions at that time.m
2. Nature of the private pension "right"
Most early pension plans were noncontributory. That is, the
plans were financed completely by the employer who generally in-
terpreted the obligation to pay benefits as voluntary.229 Perhaps
the earliest case exploring the nature of the promise made to the
employee in an industrial pension plan was McNevin v. Solvay
Process Company, 3° in which the court analyzed pensions on the
theory that they were a gift from employer to employee. 31 In that
case the ruling turned on the authority of the company's directors
to refuse to pay a pension claim under the plan. 32 Since the pen-
sion payment itself was viewed as a gratuity, there was no auto-
matic obligation to pay even though an amount was "credited"
under the employee's name in the bookkeeping for the plan. 3
The "gratuity" theory of pensions matched employer views of
their obligations under pension plans at least until after the incep-
tion of the income tax -the plans were written to be strictly dis-
cretionary, with payments made out of current income and usually
no advance funding for future obligations. Another early case de-
cided a year or two after Solvay Process reinforced the gratuity
theory by holding that the employer had created no implication of
226. See MURRAY W. LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA 42-48 (1932).
227. See id.
228. See GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITIcS, supra note 35, at 247.
229. See GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 216, at 34-35; see also QUADAGNO, SU-
pra note 100, at 86 (discussing the voluntary nature of noncontributory pensions and
employers' disclaimer of any binding obligation to provide benefits).
230. 53 N.Y.S. 98 (1898), affd per curiam, 60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901).
231. See id.
232. See id. at 100.




employee vesting in amounts credited under employee names and
that upon the bankruptcy of the employer, the employees had no
fights as creditors.235 Even though these cases found no legal enti-
tlement and no employee vesting in the absence of a plan provi-
sion specifically providing for it, employers nevertheless stopped
the practice of crediting amounts to employee bookkeeping ac-
counts for fear of creating any possible admission of liability under
the pension plan. 36
While the gratuity theory was cited by the courts well into the
1950s,237 in the 1920s some courts apparently began to uphold em-
ployee claims on noncontributory funds on the grounds that the
pension was part of a contractual agreement between employer
and employee, not simply a gift."' Perhaps as a result, employers
began to cut back on noncontributory plans: "After 1923, new
pension plans were overwhelmingly contributory and insured, and
many employers pared back their programs or simply stoged no-
tifying workers or their dependents of pension eligibility."
3. Growth and retrenchment of the private retirement solution
The modest expansion of employer-sponsored pension plans
from 1900 into the 1920s coincided with increasing use of labor
management practices designed to limit employee turnover and
fend off union organization.24 Unions in general opposed estab-
lishment of employer-provided plans. They viewed the plans as an
interference with bargaining rights although they occasionally set
up their own benefit plans, frequently covering sickness, disability,
and unemployment, and less frequently old age, payable only if
sufficient funds were available.24'
235. See Dolge v. Dolge, 75 N.Y.S. 386,387-88 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
236. See GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 216, at 38.
237. See W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Rights and Liabilities as Between Employers
and Employee with Respect to General Pension or Retirement Plan, 42 A.L.R.2d 461,
464-67 (1955).
238. See QUADAGNO, supra note 100, at 92.
239. GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 254; see also
QUADAGNO, supra note 100, at 91-95 (discussing the major shift to contributory
plans in 1925).
240. See QUADAGNO, supra note 100, at 80-91; see also GORDON, BUSINESS,
LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 248-50 (discussing the tendency for compa-
nies to view pensions as weapons against turnover and unionization).
241. See GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED, supra note 23, at 248 (referring to
"if and maybe" pensions); see also GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 216, at 40-41
(stating the earliest aid activities of trade unions focused on more immediate needs
and not old age).
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Employers saw pension plans as a means to an end: workers
would trade a pay increase or right to strike for the promise of a
pension.242 Moreover, pensions could be used to "purge the pay-
roll" of older workers who were probably more highly paid and
had begun to be perceived as less productive.24 Since the pension
promise itself was so tenuous and required no current funding or
payment of benefits except to those who retired immediately after
a plan was established with benefits substantially lower than their
salaries had been, current employment costs theoretically could be
reduced along with turnover of valued employees.2 " Stock pur-
chase plans were even more narrowly focused to accomplish spe-
cific business goals-to raise capital and reinforce employee iden-
tity with the aims of the company as opposed to with unions-and
appear to have had little to do with providing for employee re-
241tirement income.
The very modest use of employer-provided pensions coincided
with other labor management practices such as seniority, a fact
that both aided and impeded older workers.246 Workers who
"caught on" with a company when they were relatively young
could benefit from seniority practices that gave preference in sal-
242. See GRAEBNER, supra note 12, at 131-32. Graebner cites Frank Vanderlip, of
the National City Bank of New York, in an article published in 1905 as promoting
noncontributory private pension plans as valuable in controlling a work force. See
id at 131. "For the sake of a pension an employee would, he believed, 'sacrifice
much of his personal liberty, including his right to strike for better wages or shorter
hours."' Id at 131-32; see also QUADAGNO, supra note 100, at 81-85 (giving examples
of "misconduct rules" that employers could use to revoke pension rights).
243. See GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 248;
GRAEBNER, supra note 12, at 121-29 (discussing the function of retirement as a way
to rid the workplace of older people).
244. See GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 248-49.
Retirement of older employees, at least in the first years of a plan, reduced
payrolls because replacement wages were substantially lower or positions
were not filled. At Kodak, pensions were introduced as a means of flushing
out the "privileged senility" and "deadweight" of older workers, and half of
pensioned employees were not replaced. At the Pennsylvania Railroad,
redundancy ran at about one-third, "showing a distinct saving to the com-
pany." In a detailed survey of 302 workers pensioned at DuPont between
1923 and 1930, 39 positions were scrapped, 89 were divided among existing
employees, and 180 were filled by new hires; for those years at least, savings
ran at $200 per pensioner. Such economies were far from universal and be-
came difficult to sustain as pension rolls grew. Indeed, the payroll-savings
argument was often simply a board-room rationale for a plan aimed at
turnover and the retention of skilled workers ....
It at 248 (footnote omitted).
245. See id at 248.
246. See HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 108-09.
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ary and job protection to longer-service workers.247 Henry Ford's
innovation of the wage ladder, an artificial hierarchy of pay based
on length of service that encouraged workers to stay with the com-
pany, was just one example of the many kinds of employee bene-
fits, including pensions, that were increasingly tied to longevity af-
ter 1900.24 The seniority system probably worked to the
disadvantage of those older workers attempting to find new em-
ployment in middle age, since they could not offer a long period of
service and high youthful productivity, characteristics that senior-
ity and benefit plans were developed to encourage.249
The concept of mandatory retirement took hold in American
business during this period as well, particularly in industries such
as the railroads, which had already established employer-provided
pensions and organized their compensation and benefits around
longevity of employment.5' In 1900 the Pennsylvania Railroad es-
tablished a maximum hiring age of thirty-five and retirement age
of seventy, with a company pension, as a way of controlling the
costs of expensive older workers while at the same time reducing
employee turnover.2'
Of course, pension promises that appear quite inexpensive
when made often turn out to be much more expensive when they
actually have to be fulfilled. While employers limited the likeli-
hood of eligibility for pensions with long service requirements and
requirements that the worker be employed at the time of disability
or retirement, pension liabilities still became a major cost issue for
employers in the late 1920s:
Firms found welfare costs, although averaging only 2 per-
cent of payroll, increasingly burdensome. Pension liabili-
ties ballooned with each year's retirement, unanticipated
expenses and legal awards continued to rankle, and ad-
ministrative and benefit costs grew steadily.... Welfare
capitalists had anticipated neither spiraling costs and li-
abilities nor the advantages reaped by competitors with-
out welfare obligations.... The [National Industrial Con-
ference Board] noted that "many companies found
247. See id. at 106-09.
248. See id.; GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 242-49.
249. See HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 195
(discussing the likelihood of retirement for older workers in the industrial era).
250. See LATIMER, supra note 226, at 22-26, 99-100.
251. See id. at 24-25.
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themselves seriously embarrassed by their pension obli-
gations," and the [Special Conference Committee]
thought it "unlikely that the ill-considered liberality of
some of the older pension plans will ever be repeated."
From 1928 to 1931, aggregate pension costs increased by
50 percent and liabilities swelled to over $2 billion.z2
Many employers in the 1920s attempted to mitigate the impact
of these rising costs by insuring their pension liabilities, but even
the insurers began to be alarmed by the size of future costs.23 An
employer group conference in 1925, held to discuss the "funding
crisis" of private pension plans, proved to be a forum for large in-
surance companies to lambaste employers for making ill-
considered and costly pension promises that they would not be
able to fulfill.2 Yet the cost of insurance premiums to cover those
pension promises appeared to be equally expensive, and many
employers resisted the insurance option-"a resigned majority
hoped to spread the costs.., by 'making [pension] plans compul-
sory throughout industry as rapidly as it was practicable."'
' ' 55
Thus, even before the advent of the deep economic crisis in
the 1930s, companies were attempting to retrench on retirement
commitments they had already made. Some larger employers,
perhaps recognizing the link between seniority, employee man-
agement, and retirement income, be gan to support calls for fed-
eralization of retirement programs." Most businesses, however,
resisted any suggestion of federal intervention and instead contin-
ued to cut back on plan promises.2
This brief history reveals the limited aspirations of employer-
sponsored private pension plans in the pre-World War II era. The
goal of most employers was control of their labor forces, not re-
tirement income security. Funded plans were seen as vehicles for
capital formation, not income replacement in old age. The con-
252. GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 253-54. The
National Industrial Conference Board and the Special Conference Committee were
organizations of large employers founded in 1916 and 1919, respectively. See id. at
147-59.
253. See id. at 255.
254. See id.
255. Id. (quoting John Raskob).
256. See GRAEBNER, supra note 12, at 184-87 (discussing support from an advisory
counsel consisting of representatives from Eastman Kodak, Standard Oil, and Gen-
eral Electric); Jacoby, supra note 218, at 538-40.
257. See GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 253-57.
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tinuing pressure from workers for pension plans, and their willing-
ness to accept an extremely insecure pension promise as a tradeoff
for current wages, reflects the general insecurity created by indus-
trialization and dislocation of traditional trade occupations. None-
theless, private pension plans, which were almost always unfunded
and benefited almost exclusively long-term-thirty years or more
in many cases-high-wage workers, could not be expected to, and
did not, underwrite mass retirement as shown by the continued
high labor force participation rates of both male and female work-
ers over age sixty-five up until the inception of Social Security.5'
C. The Federal Response: Social Insurance-Redistribution for the
Worthy
The United States did not put in place a federal working per-
son's insurance or old-age pension program of a scope comparable
to European systems until the Social Security Act of 1935.2" Part
of the need for government response to the possibility of poverty
among elderly workers was met, as discussed above, by the Civil
War pension program, which paid out benefits that were similar in
percentage of the number of elderly paid, and higher in amounts
paid, to the European systems at least until the decade following
1910.20 But the establishment of a federal public old-age-pension
program, whether contributory or noncontributory, had to wait
until the Great Depression created both a very real spectre of
widespread poverty among the elderly-and future poverty in old
age for younger workers-and a perceived need to encourage re-
tirement and free up jobs for younger workers.
Even though private pensions failed to prevent old-age pov-
erty for workers in the wake of the widespread economic disaster
of the 1930s, it was natural at the inception of public social insur-
ance in the United States to think of the Social Security program
as essentially similar to the European model of prepaid worker's
annuities, a type of forced savings for the working and middle
classes. The fact that private pensions and annuities were the pre-
cursors of public social insurance aimed specifically at the elderly
had a formative effect on the way Social Security was perceived by
both workers and employers and on the provisions of the statutes
258. See supra note 179 (discussing labor force participation rates).
259. See GRAEBNER, supra note 12, at 15 (stating that burdens of old-age assis-
tance were first transferred to the federal government in 1935).
260. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
1119April 1997]
1120 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW
enacted in 1935 and 1939.
Yet the federal program was never intended to be the sole or
major support for retired workers even as the Social Security pro-
gram matured-benefits were designed to replace on average only
about 45% of the pre-retirement earnings of a worker with aver-
age earnings over a lifetime of one-half the maximum wage base.
26
'
One question then is how, if at all, the framers of the Social Secu-
rity Acts of 1935 and 1939 intended private pensions to be coordi-
nated with Social Security retirement benefits.
While there is no direct discussion of coordination in the legis-
lative history of Social Security, the possibility of covering under
Social Security only those workers without private pensions was
specifically rejected by the drafters of the original and subsequent
Social Security acts.2 2 Compulsory coverage was a cornerstone of
the legislation, and universal coverage of all workers was the goal
of most of the original designers.263
Since the enactment of Social Security preceded the tax regu-
lation of employer-provided pensions inaugurated in 1942, there
was apparently no contemplation of the inverse possibility, created
by the integration provisions, that workers covered by Social Se-
curity might be deprived of their private pensions. The rejection
of partial or voluntary coverage under Social Security, along with
the rejection of means-testing and the emphasis on earned enti-
tlement, was consistent with the structure of entitlement devel-
oped in the Civil War pension system-pensions based on worthi-
ness were a source of income to be augmented, not replaced, by
private means.
1. The Great Depression and the threat of old-age insecurity
As the economy began to spiral downward in the late 1920s
and early 1930s, American workers relied on a patchwork of re-
sources to provide for income should they no longer be able to
work in old age. A few, certainly no more than 5%, had private
pension plans on which they might rely; many had savings of at
least modest amounts; and some, mostly the middle-and upper-
middle-class professionals, had private annuities. 2 4 The various
railroad company pension plans developed into a nationwide co-
261. See MYERS, supra note 34, at 361-65.
262. See BROWN, supra note 80, at 57-59.
263. See iL at 57-70.
264. See Ransom et al.,-supra" note 170, at 4-5.
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ordinated system for all railroad workers, and most government
employees had civil service pensions, state or federal, that were
designed to provide fairly complete retirement income.2 Proba-
bly as or more important than formal pension arrangements was
the network of family resources that provided assurance to older
workers who lost their jobs or were involuntarily "retired" that
their children could help out with income and housing if neces-266
sary.
All of these resources came under severe attack and many
simply collapsed as the economy contracted after the stock market
crash. Between 1929 and 1932, forty-five private plans covering
one hundred thousand workers were terminated, and many em-
ployers used accumulated pension trusts to cover other obliga-
tions, never paying benefits owed to their employees.267 The rail-
road plan was close to bankruptcy even before the Depression
because of the increasing numbers of retirees and declining rail-
road revenues to support the system through payroll withholding,
necessitating a federal rescue plan that presaged enactment of So-
cial Security.28
But the threat to formal pension arrangements paled in com-
parison to the simple, overwhelming facts of massive unemploy-
ment and plummeting asset values.
The scale of the downturn defies easy description. From
the crash of late 1929 to the trough of 1932 .... [n]ational
income plummeted 40 percent, wages fell over 60 percent,
and real weekly earnings (despite deflation) dropped
from $25.00 to barely $20.00 .... National unemploy-
ment, which reached 25 percent by 1933, paled beside
joblessness in core industry centers: 50 percent in Cleve-
land, 60 percent in Akron, 80 percent in Toledo. In the
West and South .... [a]verage annual farm incomes fell
from a pre-1929 average of $1,000 to barely $300 by 1932,
265. See GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 216, at 38-40,49-52. The railroad plans,
in fact, failed at the onset of the Depression, and a federal rescue plan resulted in the
current Railroad Retirement System, in effect "a quasi-public system for the em-
ployees of the industry." Id at 39.
266. See ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 103-20; see also HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH
FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 34-42 (discussing both the extent of multigenera-
tional households in industrial America and the preference for independent house-
holds for the elderly).
267. See SOCIETAL IMPACT, supra note 100, at 15-17.
268. See GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 216, at 38-39.
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and banks foreclosed nearly 1,000,000 farms between
1930 and 1934.29
Even those who had saved for possible retirement or as a
hedge against unemployment were not secure in the face of the
Depression, as one-fifth of the nation's banks failed, taking the
savings of nine million families with them.2°
A complete discussion of the impact of the Great Depression
on income and retirement is beyond the scope of this Article, and
the competing theories as to the economic and political roots of
Social Security are laid out in a variety of recent studies.2 It is
possible, however, to identify selected aspects of the Depression as
pivotal influences on the development of public and private re-
tirement income entitlements from 1935 onward.
First, unemployment, bank failures, and declining property
values probably disproportionately affected the accumulated capi-
tal or property intended as sources of future income security for
both young and middle-aged workers in old age. Moreover, as un-
employment deepened and reached more middle-class workers,
even those older workers who had held onto their jobs through
seniority systems began to be laid off. 2 Their options for return-
ing to work were very limited in 1935, and the unemployment of
the children of older workers meant that whole families were no
longer able to provide sufficient household income to support eld-
erly dependents.273
Thus, the possibility of insecurity and poverty in old age, even
for those who had worked their whole lifetimes, was as important
as the reality. Younger workers saw grim prospects for themselves
as declining wages made even limited savings impossible and pri-
vate retirement arrangements failed. Into the mid-1930s, unem-
ployment for older workers climbed dramatically, and they faced
permanent unemployment with few alternative income sources. 4
269. GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 160.
270. See HABER & GRATrON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 42.
271. See id. at 95-110,122-42; Gratton, supra note 171, at 416; see also EDWARD D.
BERKOWITZ & KIM MCQUAID, CREATING THE WELFARE STATE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF 20TH CENTURY REFORM 1-2, 7 (1992) (discussing the impact of the pri-
vate sector on the creation of the American welfare state); GRAEBNER, supra note
12, at 162-63 (discussing the ideology of social security evolving from concern for the
needs of older workers); ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 7 (discussing the imposition of
old-age pensions throughout Britain, Canada, and the United States).
272. See HABER & GRATrON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 165.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 110.
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The severity and longevity of economic disaster in the 1930s closed
off both work and self-sufficient retirement options for older
workers, presenting an example of the economic insecurity
younger workers had to look forward to when they themselves
reached old age.
Second, the collapse of private pensions and the disappear-
ance of personal savings in bank failures must have aptly conveyed
to ordinary people the fragility of private entitlements. Even pen-
sion plans, which gave workers a vested right to benefits, were un-
able to fulfill their obligations as companies went bankrupt, and it
seems unlikely that even advance funding would have made a dif-
ference in light of the stock market collapse. The combination of
mass unemployment with the loss of accumulated savings and
pensions meant that individual effort could very well prove insuf-
ficient to maintain one's economic position or to stave off poverty
when old age brought increasingly likely unemployment.
It is frequently observed that the scale of economic disaster
during the Depression prompted a national, federal poor-relief ef-
fort, of which the Social Security Act, with both its social insurance
and direct poor-relief assistance features, was the final expres-
sion.2 5 The reorganization of the work force is less frequently
cited as a major effect of the Depression, but clearly the modem
institution of age sixty-five retirement began with the initiation of
Social Security old-age benefits in the 1935 Act.276
2. The Social Security Acts of 1935 and 1939
The Social Security program was enacted in two major legis-
lative efforts of the New Deal: the Social Security Act of 1 9 3 5 277
and the substantial revision enacted by the Social Security
Amendments of 1939 (1939 Act),278 which expanded coverage and
benefits and accelerated the first payment of Social Security bene-
fits from 1942 to 1940. The stated purpose of both the 1935 Act
and the 1939 Act was "preventing dependency in old-age"; the
goal of the contributory Social Security program was to "enable
275. See, e.g., GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 268-69;
HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 81-87; KATZ, supra
note 23, at 206-34.
276. See HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 88-89,
110-11.
277. See BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note 271, at 106.
278. Social Security Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat. 1360
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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younger workers, with matching contributions from their employ-
ers, to build up a more adequate old-age protection than it is pos-
sible to achieve with noncontributory pensions based on a means
test."2 9 At the time, the Committee on Economic Security esti-
mated that out of 6.5 million people over age sixty-five in the
United States, only 150,000 aged people were receiving "industrial
and trade-union pensions," with possibly an equal number receiv-
ing veterans' or public retirement system pensions."'
While these purposes are widely accepted as accurately re-
flecting at least part of the impetus for Social Security, historians
disagree as to how much the process of formulating and passing
the Social Security Act was influenced by private employers wish-
ing to shift their pension liabilities onto the federal government." '
It is also unclear how deliberate New Deal reformers were in de-
signing programs to pull older workers out of the labor market in
order to free up employment for younger workers.m However,
whether or not the drafters of the Social Security Acts intended to
create the expectation of retirement at age sixty-five, it is clear that
the existence and later expansion of Social Security had that effect.
The basic features of Social Security were all part of the origi-
nal 1935 Act: compulsory coverage with no ability to "opt out" for
those covered by private pensions-despite considerable discus-
sion of that alternative; no means-testing of benefits; a benefit
formula based on past earnings and weighted in favor of lower-
paid workers; and a financing scheme that assessed equal percent-
ages of tax-called "contributions"-on employers and employees
279. Report, CES 50TH, supra note 79, at 25.
280. See id. at 44.
281. See, e.g., GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 279
("[T]he Social Security Act passed in 1935 was largely the work of a motley coalition
of business interests grasping for solutions to the ravages of economic competition
and federated economic regulation."); QUADAGNO, supra note 100, at 99 (Social Se-
curity represents a tool of industrial capitalism for controlling and rationalizing its
labor force). But see ACHENBAUM, supra note 122, at 18-37 (arguing that the New
Deal reformers did intend to establish a form of welfare state but had to adopt con-
servative "insurance" terminology and provisions for political reasons); Theda
Skocpol & John G. Ikenberry, The Road to Social Security, in THEDA SKOCPOL,
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 147-56 (1995) (emphasizing the role of a fractured political structure in
the United States which allowed Wisconsin social theorists to have an influential role
in formulating the federal Social Security program in a country which otherwise re-
sisted European-style welfare state programs, leading to a patchwork of programs
for the deserving elderly-Social Security-and unsupported programs for the poor).
282. See HABER & GRATrON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 111.
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up to the taxable wage base set at $3000 per year where it re-
mained until 195 1.m  Expansions in coverage of workers and in
categories of beneficiaries-for example, dependent spouses and
children-were made in 1939 and after World War II, but the es-
sential old-age pension entitlement was intact from the beginning.
All of these features were of critical importance in creating a
program intended to prevent future dependence in old age for
those attached to the work force for all or most of their adult lives.
The continuity with Civil War pensions, as well as the distinctions
from the older program, were clear: the group deemed worthy of
public entitlement was expanded from former soldiers to all those
working in paid employment, while the condition triggering pay-
ment of benefits was attainment of old age-essentially the point
to which the Civil War pension system had evolved by 19p0.2s
s
The Depression created the conditions necessary for broad
public support for an age-based public entitlement, but the key
elements of that entitlement were all designed to underwrite mass
voluntary retirement in the future, not to address the massive pov-
erty created by the economic dislocation of the 1930s. The essen-
tial characteristics of Social Security have not significantly
changed: prospective redistribution built into the benefit formula
based on the past working lifetime rather than on current poverty;
coverage of workers regardless of their participation in employer-
sponsored pension plans; financing by both employers and em-
ployees that, despite the annuity-financing rhetoric of the time,
was not related to specific levels of individual benefits; and benefit
entitlement based on earnings history, not need at the time of re-
tirement.
Even though the dual contribution structure was portrayed at
the time as being similar to an annuity-financing structure,S the
benefit structure from the beginning belied that interpretation-
benefit amounts were and continue to be unrelated to the amount
of taxes paid. The Social Security benefit has always been a public
283. Robert M. Ball, The 1939 Amendments to the Social Security Act and What
Followed, in 50TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC SECURITY OF 1935 AND OTHER BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 162-67 (1985) [hereinafter Ball, CES
50TH]; see also MYERS, supra note 34, at 229-371 (discussing development of the old-
age, survivors, and disability insurance systems).
284. See MYERS, supra note 34, at 232,238.
285. See discussion supra Part III.B.
286. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.b.
April 1997] 1125
1126 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1063
entitlement based on earnings; even though the financing structure
for those benefits was always based on employer and employee
FICA contributions and accumulated interest thereon, entitlement
to benefits is earned independently of whether taxes are actually
paid.m Nonetheless, the contributory financing scheme undoubt-
edly helped to convince employers and IRS staff in later years that
it was perfectly consistent to allow employers to effectively
"count" their FICA payments as part of their contribution for
pensions for low-wage employees.
a. social insurance and labor force management
The problem set for the Committee on Economic Security
(CES), established by Executive Order on June 29, 1934, "was to
study methods of providing 'security against the hazards and vicis-
situdes of life,' with the primary purpose of developing a workable
social insurance system." m The CES was headed by Labor Secre-
tary Frances Perkins, and the final report was sent with recom-
mendations to Congress on January 15, 19 3 5 .29
The CES viewed the situation of older workers in 1934 from
the perspective of both the currently old and impoverished who
needed immediate assistance and the current worker who required
some assurance of security in future old age in light of high and in-
creasing unemployment among workers age sixty-five and older.2"
287. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402,413-414 (1994).
288. Exec. Order No. 6757, issued by President Roosevelt, June 29, 1934, re-
printed in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 321
(1938).
289. See Cohen, CES 50TH, supra note 84, at 5-7.
290. See Report, CES 50TH, supra note 79, at 44-45.
The number of the aged without means of self-support is much larger
than the number receiving pensions or public assistance in any form.... At
this time a conservative estimate is that at least one-half of the approxi-
mately 7,500,000 people over age 65 years now living are dependent.
Children, friends, and relatives have borne and still carry the major cost
of supporting the aged. Several of the State surveys have disclosed that
from 30 percent to 50 percent of the people over 65 years of age were being
supported in this way. During the present depression, this burden has be-
come unbearable for many of the children, with the result that the number
of old people dependent upon public or private charity has greatly in-
creased.
... The depression has largely wiped out wage earners' savings and hasdeprived millions of workers past middle life of their jobs, with but uncer-
tain prospects of ever again returning to steady employment.... Employ-
ment difficulties for middle-aged and older workers have been increasing,
and there is little possibility that there will be a reversal of this trend in the
near future.
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The CES's recommendations were based on an assumption that
men and women reaching age sixty-five would likely live ten to fif-
teen years longer and that most, if not all of them, would not want
to live dependent on charity or family for support as many were at
that point forced to do.291
There is no consensus among historians concerning the role of
so-called "welfare capitalists"-employers who maintained private
pensions and other employee benefits-in the passage of the New
Deal in general and of Social Security in particular.2 2 It seems
likely that no unified message was delivered to Congress and the
administration from businesses demanding a publicly supported
retirement program that would relieve them of private obliga-
tions.293 Nonetheless, some employers saw the advantages of the
federal government taking on some responsibility for relief in the
face of high and persistent levels of unemployment, particularly as
more radical alternatives began to be popularized through the294 • 295
Townsend movement for old-age pensions.
At the same time, policymakers in the New Deal administra-
tion saw social insurance-along the European model but without
open-ended financing-as the answer to several problems. The
battles over the details of Social Security are described in detail in
several accounts by both the original players themselves and later
historians,2 96 but it seems safe to say that earnings-related old-age
Id.
291. See id.
292. See GORDON, BuSINEss, LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 269;
SKOCPOL, PROTECrING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 26-28; Jacoby, supra note 218, at
526.
293. See GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at 268-69.
294. See Jacoby, supra note 218, at 528.
295. Marion Bayard Folsom of Kodak appears to be one example, as discussed in
Jacoby, supra note 218, at 526-27; see also GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLI-
TICS, supra note 35, at 241-42 (discussing the importance of standardizing of welfare
costs to employers struggling for market dominance).
Federal welfare law was the logical culmination of a quarter-century
battle over the scope and costs of industrial welfare plans and a direct de-
scendant of the anticompetitive business strategies of the 1920s.
[E]mployers, pressed by the costs and inconsistencies of private wel-
fae, looked to the states to socialize the resultant financial burden; in turn,
inconsistent state legislation compounded the inequities of that burden and
encouraged welfare capitalists to look to the federal government.
Id.
296. See Report, CES 50TH, supra note 79 (containing several accounts). J.
Douglas Brown gives another account. See BROWN, supra note 80, at 25-83; see gen-
erally MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 5-9 (1979)
(discussing the effect of policy "insiders" and professional government staff in for-
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pensions were seen only partly as a solution to current old-age
poverty and more as a solution to future work force stabilization.
The Old-Age Assistance program,297 the state-run needs-based
program for the elderly, paid out more in benefits to more older
people from 1936 to 1950 than the social insurance portion of the
Social Security Act, and may have had more effect on employment
rates among elderly men in that period.28
Nonetheless, many New Deal policy specialists specifically
foresaw social insurance as the most effective way to induce older
workers to retire over the long run, shrinking the labor force to re-
duce unemployment among younger workers, while providing in-
come transfers to maintain consumption levels into old age.29 The
key features of the social insurance program reflect a desire to en-
sure younger workers that their working life could be ended based
on a guarantee of retirement income, regardless of their financial
circumstances when they reached old age. Again, prospective se-
curity was the most critical characteristic of the Social Security en-
titlement if the ultimate purpose was to encourage retirement and
social stability in old age. The prophylactic antipoverty function of
Social Security was intimately connected to the structure of bene-
fits and financing and was clearly based on an underlying optimism
that the economy would eventually provide jobs for all who
needed to work up until retirement.
While some alleviation of current need among the elderly be-
came possible as payment of benefits was accelerated to 1940 from
the original date of 1942, the entire program was structured in a
way designed to assure each generation of workers future security
against falling into poverty, not to provide the current generation
of elderly relief from poverty. Because of this advance assurance
of income once work was no longer possible, available, or desired,
retirement became an accepted and expected phase of life, not
simply the privilege of the propertied or the feared period of desti-
tution at the end of life for the working poor."' The redistributive
mulating the original and later versions of the Social Security programs).
297. See HABER & GRATrON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 111-12.
298. See id.
299. See GRAEBNER, supra note 12, at 201-14.
300. Most recent historians have come to this conclusion, with varying emphases
on the timing and desirability of mass retirement. See GRAEBNER, supra note 12, at
227-31; HABER & GRATTON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 110-12;
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 525-35. However, the direct
connection of earned entitlement, redistribution, and retirement specifically has
been little discussed in debates over the best way to alleviate poverty among both
[Vol. 30:1063
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entitlement to Social Security benefits was a necessary precondi-
tion for the democratization of retirement.
b. contributory financing and redistributive benefits in the 1935 Act
While New Deal reformers emulated the European models of
workers' insurance in many aspects of Social Security, they were
wary of open-ended spending on old-age pensions such as had oc-
curred with the many expansions of the Civil War pension system.
Many thought that contributory financing, which would provide a
limited funding source, would be the best mechanism for insuring
that program spending would not repeat the Civil War pension
pattern.3 1' But limiting total program spending was not the only
purpose for the contributory financing scheme-employee contri-
butions were viewed as a key element in creation of the benefit
entitlement:
Contributions by the employees represent a self-
respecting method through which workers make their
own provision for old age. In addition many workers
themselves on the verge of dependency will benefit
through being relieved of the necessity of supporting de-
pendent parents on reduced incomes, and at the expense
of the health and well-being of their own families.3 2
Of course, if it had been literally feasible for workers to
"make their own provision for old age" in 1935,303 there would
have been little purpose in establishing a public benefit entitle-
ment. Yet the contributory financing structure clearly seemed
necessary to create the entitlement connection even though bene-
fits would be calculated based on earnings.
Under the 1935 Social Security Act that followed the CES's
report, the Old-Age Assistance program, administered by the
states, was intended to provide immediate assistance to the elderly
who were already poor.'" The Old Age Social Insurance (OASI)
contributory program was intended from the start to provide an
earned entitlement and long-term future economic security for the
generations that were still working, while providing some future
the old and the poor.
301. See SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS, supra note 100, at 532-34.
302. See Report, CES 50TH, supra note 79, at 53.
303. Id.
304. See GRAEBNER, supra note 12, at 191-92.
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income redistribution for workers with a lifetime of low earnings."'
A contributory annuity system ... will enable younger
workers, with the aid of their employers, to build up
gradually their rights to annuities in their old age. With-
out such a contributory system the cost of pensions would,
in the future, be overwhelming. Contributory annuities
are unquestionably preferable to noncontributory pen-
sions. They come to the workers as a right, whereas the
noncontributory pensions must be conditioned upon aCmeans' test. Annuities, moreover, can be ample for a
comfortable existence, bearing some relation to custom-
ary wage standards, while gratuitous pensions can provide
only a decent subsistence.
In considering the costs of the contributory system, it
should not be overlooked that old-age annuities are de-
signed to prevent destitution and dependency. Destitu-
tion and dependency are enormously expensive, not only
in the initial cost of necessary assistance but in the disas-
trous psychological effect of relief upon the recipients,
which, in turn, breeds more dependency."'
The benefit structure contemplated by the CES, and ulti-
mately enacted by Congress, was deliberately designed to reflect
the working population's income distribution during the working
lifetime-that is, benefits would be based on lifetime earnings,
thus keeping workers in old age in roughly the same economic po-
sition they were in during their working years. Nonetheless, it was
necessary to supply workers with very low lifetime earnings a
higher level of benefits than strict proportionality would produce.
This effort was necessary to meet the ultimate goals of the pro-
gram-assurance to workers that a long attachment to the work
force would ultimately result in sufficient income to support a vol-
untary exit from the labor force at age sixty-five, regardless of
economic downturns resulting in unemployment or devaluation of
accumulated savings or assets. °8
The original CES plan contemplated a program in which the
benefits in the future would be completely financed by worker and
305. See -QUADAGNO, supra note 100, at 115.
306. See Report, CES 50TH, supra note 79, at 45.
307. Id. at 53.
308. See SYLVESTER SCHIEBER, SOCIAL SECURITY 20-21 (1983).
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employer contributions and earnings thereon, somewhat like a de-
fined benefit private pension plan in which definite levels of bene-
fits are promised and financed by sufficient funds that are set aside
and invested for that purpose. However, because benefits would
begin to be paid out to older workers before benefits were fully
funded in advance, the program would inevitably require either
advance infusion of general revenues, representing a "funding"
contribution for future benefits, or reliance on a "pay as you go"
financing scheme. The latter course was chosen:
[Advance funding] would unfairly burden the younger
part of the present generation, which would not only pay
for the cost of its own annuities but would also pay a large
part of the annuities to the people now middle-aged or
over.... [T]he plan we advocate amounts to having each
generation pay for the support of the people then living
who are old.09
Much of the rhetoric surrounding Social Security from 1935
onward was based on its contributory nature-that is, the idea that
workers become entitled to benefits based on contributions under
the FICA tax system.310 The CES report emphasized the impor-
tance of a self-financed system and of benefits based on contribu-
tions rather than need or "dependency., 31' However, the entitle-
ment to benefits is in fact based on earnings, not contributions.
The contributions are of course also based indirectly on earnings
since FICA taxes are a percentage of wage earnings, but the enti-
tlement to benefits is not, and never has been, dependent on
whether taxes have in fact been paid.1 2
When the original 1935 Act was drafted, the taxation and
benefit provisions were placed in separate titles for fear that the
Act would be found unconstitutional.3 3  Thus, it is not clear
whether there was a conscious decision to create entitlement based
on earnings rather than contributions.1 4 Nonetheless, the empha-
sis placed in the report, and in later discussions of the "actuarial
309. Report, CES 50TH, supra note 79, at 52.
310. See ACHENBAUM, supra note 122, at 35.
311. Id at 29-32.
312. See BROWN, supra note 80, at 71-83. The Social Security Act entitles benefits
to all those meeting insured status requirements through earnings in covered em-
ployment. Collection of Federal Insurance Contribution Act taxes is authorized un-
der §§ 3101-3128 of the Internal Revenue Code.
313. See ACHENBAUM, supra note 122, at'18-37; ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 289.
314. See ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 290-91.
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fairness" of the contribution and benefit system, on the connection
between financing through contributions and benefits ultimately
paid can be seen as a secondary argument about the limits of pub-
lic financing, an argument that obscures the actual structure of
Social Security benefit entitlements. Contributions are the con-
crete representation of the existence of earnings; the employee
share of FICA tax is both a financing mechanism and a symbolic
representation of the link between earnings and benefits.
Perhaps the most significant difference between the plan pro-
posed by the CES in 1934 and the Social Security Act in 1935 was
the expansion of coverage to wages of all workers in covered em-
ployment up to $3000 per year."' The original plan proposed by
the CES was an annuity plan only for very low-wage workers, un-
der which high-wage workers would not have been covered at all
in years during which they had more than $250 per month in
wages.316 Under the original plan, therefore, the only income redis-
tribution would have occurred primarily among low-income work-
ers and their employers, as steady high-wage workers would not
have been participants. The final legislation's expansion of cover-
age, and taxation, to all workers and employers in industrial em-
ployment, while limiting credit in the earnings history to $3000 per
year, meant that the burden of redistribution was spread over all
workers in the economy. The system's benefits, however, would
always be of limited value as retirement income to workers who
317
maintained lifetime high earnings.
More importantly, this change meant that the system became
a true poverty prevention program in that all workers would ac-
cumulate earnings credits towards pensions throughout a working
lifetime that was likely to include both high and low earnings. Un-
der the original CES proposal, poverty would have been treated as
a static condition, assumed to last for the working life of the
worker and thus necessitating a public pension program only for
the working poor.318 The revised benefit and financing formula, in
contrast, can be seen as reflective of liberal democratic assump-
tions about economic opportunity and mobility under industrial
315. See BROWN, supra note 80, at 71-83.
316. See Report, CES 50TrH, supra note 79, at 49.
317. As under current law, benefits were to be calculated only based on covered
earnings. Therefore, workers with earnings above $3000 would get no Social Secu-
rity benefits based on those higher earnings.
318. See generally SCHIEBER, supra note 308, at 20-21 (describing the CES's ap-
proach to the Social Security program's benefit structure).
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capitalism. Since workers with low earnings in one year may well
be workers with high earnings in later years, and vice versa, a true
insurance approach should cover all earnings-with or without a
wage limit-in order to have a large enough pool to properly
spread the risk of low earnings that would be insufficient to secure
an adequate retirement income."9
Under this theory, all workers should participate in order to
properly spread both the risk of poverty at the end of life and the
rights to future benefits over both winners and losers in the eco-
nomic system. The weighting in the benefit formula that paid pro-
portionately higher benefits to those with low lifetime averages re-
sulted in a benefit structure that would still not eliminate poverty
for those who were poor throughout their working lives. Nonethe-
less, the weighting would provide more adequate retirement bene-
fits for such workers than would a strictly proportional formula.
Redistributive benefits were another aspect of the "insurance"
against future economic slippage in retirement and a necessary
part of the invention of retirement as a way of meeting the per-
ceived needs of an industrial economy.
The committee also believed that benefits should be
graduated so that low-wage earners and people who en-
tered the system late in life would receive proportionately
higher benefits. The committee believed that the goal of
preventing dependency dictated that benefits be adjusted
to meet "the relative needs of various classes of benefici-
aries even though need is not a determinant in the indi-
vidual case." 2 '
Managing the work force through inducement of voluntary
retirement at age sixty-five required both advance assurance of
minimally adequate retirement income and the opportunity to ac-
cumulate as much additional income as the worker's circumstances
might allow in the form of private pensions, savings, and accumu-
lated assets.
Under the Social Security benefit formula, while all workers
had an equal opportunity to accumulate unlimited income for re-
tirement, the weighting in the formula ensured a minimally ade-
quate income level for those unfortunate enough never to raise
319. See MARMORETAL,, supra note 3, at 26-28,31-34.
320. SCMEBER, supra note 308, at 21.
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their average earnings to a higher level.32' In fact, the CES report
also recommended establishment of a voluntary additional pension
program, aimed at "restricted groups in the population who do not
customarily purchase annuities from commercial insurance com-
panies," as a way of providing lower- and moderate-income work-
ers an opportunity to acquire additional retirement income rights
to supplement the deliberately modest benefits under the contribu-
tory Social Security program.
The contribution formula, in contrast, remained static-all
workers and their employers were to contribute a fixed percentage
of earnings up to that wage level, regardless of the size of benefit
any particular worker would ultimately receive.32 Thus, the fi-
nancing of the system was based loosely on the group insurance
model-a large pool of insured workers and their employers all
contributing a fixed percentage of wages into the system to pro-
vide financing for all benefits.324 Neither employer nor employee
321. According to Robert Myers, one of the original consulting actuaries of the
Social Security program, the wage replacement rates for single workers resulting
from the original benefit formula ranged from 34% for maximum earners up to 73%
for minimum earners. See id. at 23 (citing Robert J. Myers). This was prior to the
1939 amendments which added family benefits to the program. See id. In the final
version of the Social Security Act of 1935 as in the current version of Social Security,
the critical link between taxes paid into the system and benefits paid out was the tax-
able wage base. See id at 21. The original wage base of $3000--$62,500 for 1996-
established not only the maximum amount of wages subject to the tax but also the
maximum earnings each year which would be credited to the worker's account.
Every qualified individual would receive, beginning on the date he or she attained
age 65 or January 1, 1942, whichever occurred later, and ending at death, a benefit in
equal monthly installments that was based on a two-tiered formula. See id. at 17. If
total wages paid after 1936 were not more than $3000, the benefit would be half of
1% of total wages; if wages were more than $3000, the benefit would be paid at a
monthly rate equal to sum of half of 1% of $3000 plus one-twelfth of 1% of the ex-
cess over $3000 up to $45,000, plus a twenty-fourth of 1% of excess over $45,000.
Benefits could not exceed $85 a month. See The Social Security Act of 1935, re-
printed in 50TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY
OF 1935 AND OTHER BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 77-78 [hereinafter Social Security Act, CES 50TH].
322. See Report, CES 50TH, supra note 79, at 46.
323. The system was financed through taxes imposed on wages-employees were
taxed at 1% of wages while every employer paid an "excise tax with respect to em-
ployees of 1% of wages." See Social Security Act, CES 50TH, supra note 321, at 93.
Wages were defined as remuneration for employment up to $3000 a year, and em-
ployment included any services performed by an employee except agricultural labor;
domestic service; casual labor not in course of employer's trade or business; labor
performed by employees older than sixty-five; or labor performed by sailors, gov-
ernment employees, and nonprofit corporation employees. See id. at 93, 96.
324. See Report, CES 50TH, supra note 79, at 51-53.
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contributions were directly linked to benefits ultimately payable to
individual beneficiaries; FICA taxes were imposed as a financing
mechanism for the system as a whole, not for individual annuities
for each worker. Thus, while the contributory plan underwrote the
earned-right entitlement, taxes paid by any one employer or em-
ployee bore only an indirect relationship to actual benefits paid.
c. The 1939 Act's expansions
One of the most extraordinary aspects of the 1935 Social Se-
curity Act was the inauguration of payroll tax contributions in
1937, five years in advance of the scheduled first payment of bene-
fits and in the midst of a still extremely severe economic depres-
sion.3z Extensive controversy over the conservative character of
Social Security's financing and benefit structure led to the forma-
tion of the first citizens' Advisory Council on Social Security,
jointly appointed by Congress and the administration, and made
up of policy experts and representatives from business and organ-
ized labor. The council was charged with examining several
changes that would substantially expand the income redistribu-
tional aspects of Social Security.
The 1939 report of the Advisory Council led to the 1939 Act,
which did not change the essential Social Security entitlement but
did greatly expand its redistributional effects. The Advisory
Council's report reaffirmed the correctness of a contributory social
insurance approach to old-age income maintenance and urged ex-
pansion of the approach to cover -additional groups and prob-
lems.327 The report recommended broader protection than Con-
325. Indeed, the inauguration of payroll taxes was blamed by some for a recession
that began in June 1937. See ACHENBAUM, supra note 122, at 30.
326. See, Ball, CES 50TH, supra note 283, at 164-65.
Arthur Altmeyer [then chair of the Social Security Board] saw the for-
mation of this council as an opportunity to move ahead with much more
than financing changes.... The council was asked to consider whether it
would be advisable to: begin monthly payments earlier, increase the
amount of the monthly benefits payable in the early years, provide benefits
for the disabled and survivors, and extend coverage to additional groups.
Id. at 165.
327. Report of the 1939 Advisory Council on Social Security, reprinted in 50TH
ANNIVERSARY EDITION REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF
1935 AND OTHER BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 185.
The council believes that [the contributory social insurance program's]
method of encouragement of self-help and self-reliance in securing protec-
tion in old age is essentially in harmony with individual incentive within a
democratic society. It is highly desirable in preserving American institu-
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gress was willing to approve; nonetheless, in the 1939 Act the es-
sential characteristics of the current Social Security family benefit
were established. 3
The overall impact of the 1939 Act was to increase the redis-
tributive impact of Social Security by providing dependents' and
survivors' benefits in addition to workers' benefits, while maintain-
ing the basic earnings-relationship of the entitlement. 29 The 1939
Act also accelerated payment of the first benefits under the system
to 1940, two years earlier than had been planned under the original
legislation, and revised the financing schedule to put the system on
a "pay as you go" rather than advance funding basis.30 The Advi-
sory Council, if not Congress, clearly anticipated that providing for
an older worker and his or her spouse through the advance enti-
tlement of Social Security would eliminate the need for broad an-
tipoverty programs aimed at the elderly, even as the numbers of
tions to remove from as many individuals as possible, in the years to come,
the necessity for dependency relief and to substitute instead protection af-
forded as a matter of right, related to past participation in the productive
processes of the country. It is only through the encouragement of individ-
ual incentive, through the principle of paying benefits in relation to past
wages and employment, that a sound and lasting basis for security can be
afforded.
The council believes that the contributory insurance method safeguards
not only the wage earner but the public as well. By this method benefits
have a reasonable relation to wages previously earned, and costs may be
kept in control relative to tax collections....
Since contributory old-age insurance possesses these advantages over
dependency relief or old-age assistance, it is in the public interest that the
insurance program be improved and extended to cover additional groups.
The council is convinced of the necessity of gradual evolution in the devel-
opment of a broad social program such as this.
Id
328. See Ball, CES 50th, supra note 283, at 166-67.
In 1939, then, based on the recommendations of the council, the pro-
gram was redesigned... Social Security became a program of family pro-
tection, providing not only old-age benefits for workers, but benefits for
wives, widows, and children. The benefits were weighted even more heav-
ily to favor lower-paid workers, and much higher benefits were made pay-
able in the early years .... Workers' benefits were related to average
monthly earnings in covered employment rather than total earnings, and
the total amount of benefits based on a single wage record was subjected to
a maximum.
... '[u]nder the formula adopted in 1939, a worker retiring [in 1986] at 65 af-
ter earning the average wage would receive-in the absence of changes in
wage and price levels-40 percent of his or her pre-retirement earnings.
The average couple's replacement rate would be 60 percent.
Id at 167
329. See id. at 166-67.
330. See id.
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the elderly were expected to increase through the century.331
d. universal coverage and private pensions
Of particular importance to the coordination of Social Secu-
rity with private pensions is the rejection in 1935 and later of sug-
gestions that workers covered by a private pension should be ex-
cluded from Social Security. The original proposal was to cover all
manual and nonmanual laborers earning less than $250 per month,
with the exception of government and railroad employees who had
fairly complete retirement plans already in place.332 Private em-
ployer-provided pensions were not viewed as the equivalent of
federal civil service or railroad pensions, and with good reason.
Both of the latter systems had more or less government-
guaranteed sources of financing, and workers with long service
were virtually assured of receiving their pensions.3  Private plans,
on the other hand, were few in number, and many, if not most, had
failed or gone bankrupt during the economic collapse earlier in the
decade; private plans could not be considered any sort of alterna-
tive to a government-sponsored plan.3 4
Coverage of workers under the 1935 Act was more severely
limited in category although the wages of workers in all categories
of employment covered by the Act were included up to the $3000
contribution and benefit base. Several sets of workers were totally
excluded: farm workers, domestic servants, self-employed work-
ers, employees of nonprofit institutions, and others.335- At the time,
Congress rejected recommendations by the 1939 Advisory Council
to extend coverage to these groups for reasons that have been de-
bated at length by historians.3 6 Nonetheless, coverage under So-
cial Security was gradually expanded from 1935 through the 1983
Social Security Amendments, which covered the last large
331. See generally id. at 165-67 (discussing the recommendations of the 1939 Advi-
sory Council). In fact the Advisory Council's report anticipated growing numbers of
elderly, estimating that by 1980, 14% of the total population would be sixty-five or
older, compared to 6.3% in 1938-under current estimates, the 14.7% probably will
not be reached until about the year 2000. See SCHULZ, supra note 190, at 266-68.
332. See Report, CES 50TH, supra note 79, at 49.
333. See GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 216, at 38-40, 58-59.
334. See GORDON, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND PoLITIcs, supra note 35, at 253-58; see
also ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 277-79 (discussing the inadequacy of private pension
plans in the 1920s and 1930s).
335. See Social Security Act, CES 50TH, supra note 321, at 96.
336. GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED, supra note 23, at 183-207; ORLOFF, su-
pra note 100, at 292-93; QUADAGNO, supra note 100, at 107-12.
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groups-federal and nonprofit sector workers-so that well over
90% of the work force is now covered under the system.337
Most important for understanding the relationship between
Social Security and private pensions, the Roosevelt administration
and the House of Representatives in conference on the 1935 Bill
rejected a Senate amendment that would have exempted from So-
cial Security coverage employees with private pension plans com-
parable to Social Security.338 Throughout the development of So-
cial Security prior to the 1935 Act, various groups pressed for a
voluntary coverage approach similar to the private pension plans
advocated by the "welfare capitalist" group, but were consistently
rejected by the policy group drafting the legislation and by Roose-
velt himself:
Roosevelt's officials did examine the experience of the
welfare capitalist schemes, but they came to the conclu-
sion that this experience demonstrated precisely that vol-
untary schemes were unworkable and that public, com-
pulsory programs were essential. The committee's report
on existing old age provision notes that "the half-century
of experience with voluntary plans has shown that they
have been inefficient and inadequate as sound social in-
surance measures."
339
The consistent emphasis on expanding coverage, and the aspi-
rations for reaching universal coverage under Social Security,
clearly indicate that private pensions were not seen by Social Se-
curity policymakers as either a partial or complete substitute for
Social Security benefits for beneficiaries at any income level. In-
deed, it seems likely that at this juncture private pensions were
discounted as having any major role in the long-term task of pro-
viding for mass old-age retirement.
One question, therefore, is exactly how the benefits provided
under Social Security were viewed in relation to benefits under the
private pension system, which began its expansion roughly at the
same time. If policymakers would not permit employers with pri-
337. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 101-103, 97 Stat.
65, 67-72 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (1994), 42 U.S.C. §§ 409-410, 414,
418 (1994)). These amendments provided mandatory coverage of newly hired fed-
eral employees, coverage of employees of nonprofit organizations, and elimination
of the option to withdraw from Social Security that was previously available to state
and local governments. See id.
338. See MYERS, supra note 34, at 231.
339. ORLOFF, supra note 100, at 292 (citation omitted).
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vate pensions to deprive their employees of Social Security cover-
age, why, in the 1942 Revenue Act, which established the first tax
statutes requiring "nondiscriminatory" private pension plans, did
Congress allow employers to eliminate pension coverage for their
workers covered by Social Security?
V. TAX POLICY AND ENTITLEMENT: INTEGRATION AND
NONDISCRIMINATION
By the beginning of World War II, the United States had in
place a public social insurance system that had the potential, be-
cause of the redistributive elements of its formula, to replace
needs-based public assistance in old age for anyone with a sub-
stantial work history-that is, the population that appeared to
most Americans to be worthy of a nonstigmatized entitlement.
The private employer-provided pension system was concurrently
poised for a new development, with the strength of organized la-
bor behind its postwar expansion, into a substantial source of in-
come for better-off and well-organized industrial workers. The
two systems expanded simultaneously but with little coordination,
except in the integration provisions.
The weighting of the Social Security benefit formula in favor
of low-wage workers, in the context of a program covering all
workers but not all wages, created an entitlement program com-
bining the elements of redistribution and earnings-based entitle-
ment. The result was a prospective antipoverty program designed
to ward off poverty in old age through benefits based on the rela-
tionship between working income and retirement income. Em-
ployers sponsoring private pensions had no such redistributional
ambitions, yet the tax rules that developed from 1942 through 1986
effectively required a degree of redistribution through the nondis-
crimination rules, which required some coverage of low-wage
workers as the price for favorable tax treatment of amounts paid
into pension trusts.w
Why, then, was integration with Social Security allowed as an
exception to nondiscrimination? The answer lies in underlying as-
sumptions about the function of Social Security-assumptions
shared by employers and the IRS and bolstered by the
340. But see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of Qualified Plans: A Clas-
sic Defense of the Status Quo, 66 N.C. L. Rlv. 315 (1988) (arguing that the current
tax treatment of qualified plans constitutes "neutral" tax treatment).
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"contributory" financing structure of the program, which conveyed
the impression that benefits were related to contributions, rather
than to earnings. Social Security was viewed as a substitute for
private pension income by those "welfare capitalists" of the 1930s
who supported Social Security only if it would relieve them of
pension burdens34' From their perspective, Social Security was a
pension program for the low-paid, for which employers provided
half the financing, through their FICA payments, like any other
employee compensation cost.
Of course, the expansion of benefits and coverage under the
program shaped Social Security into far more than a pension of
last resort for low-wage workers. Social Security provided a fed-
eral, mandatory, and public redistributional income base that
made broad, voluntary middle-class retirement possible.- 2 How-
ever, this base was deliberately limited in scope, providing at most
a replacement for 40-50% of pre-retirement earnings and placing
responsibility for the remaining 30-40% of necessary replacement
of earnings on employers and individuals? 43 The opportunity to
add to Social Security benefits characteristic of an opportunity-
based, rather than income-targeted, benefit structure, is at the
heart of the "earned right" concept.
Private resources, including employer-provided pensions, in-
dividual savings, and investments, were apparently expected to
provide part of the opportunity to accumulate retirement income
for most adults who were part of the working population-or were
dependent on someone who had been-for most of their lives.
Means-tested poverty programs would provide subsistence for
those-expected to be very few-who were not primarily or sec-
341. See generally QUADAGNO, supra note 100, at 116-18 (describing employers'
reduction of pensions in response to the Social Security Act of 1935).
342. One indication of the importance of Social Security in underwriting mass re-
tirement is the proportion of total income in retirement consisting of Social Security
benefits. In 1992 elderly married couples age 65 and older received about 22% of
their total income from private pensions, 12.8% from earnings, 40.7% from Social
Security, and 22% from interest and dividends. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESEN-
TATIVES COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, WHERE YOUR MONEY GOES: THE 1994-1995
GREEN BOOK 864 (Brassey's ed. 1994). For poor couples, the percentage from pen-
sions was 4.8%; for nonpoor couples, the percentage was 22.2%. See id. These fig-
ures probably overstate the role of private pensions, since most are not indexed to
inflation, whereas Social Security benefits are increased every year under a cost-of-
living increase provision. Thus, as recipients age, the real dollar value of the pension
decreases while Social Security stays constant, thus becoming a larger percentage of
total income.
343. See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
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ondarily attached to the full-time work force 4 One would expect
that the income tax treatment of private pensions would be consis-
tent with such a policy, whether by actively encouraging employers
to establish pension supplements to Social Security or at least not
discouraging provision of pensions to workers at all earnings lev-
els.
The inception of the income tax followed establishment of the
first private pensions and substantial use of annuities by several
decades,35 and tax treatment of pension payments and trusts posed
special problems for writers and administrators of the Internal
Revenue Code from the beginning. Because private pensions rep-
resent a voluntary deferral of income that might otherwise be paid
to the individual worker, the proper timing of taxation of the
amounts deferred, as well of as any earnings that might accrue on
those amounts, had to be determined. Favorable tax treatment of
private pensions-that is, deferral of taxation for employees com-
bined with a current deduction for employers who contribute to
pension plans-developed into an elaborate incentive system and
a key tool for federal government encouragement of private pen-
sions.
In effect, the Code uses a carrot-and-stick approach to en-
courage employers to set up pension plans for their work forces-
the carrot is the tax benefit of establishing a qualified pension plan
and the stick is the limit on that benefit imposed by the nondis-
crimination rules that require some provision of benefits for low-
wage workers as well as high-wage workers.4 The integration
rules represent the escape hatch out of the nondiscrimination rules
for employers who want to provide higher benefits to high-wage
workers. In an integrated plan, low-wage workers will earn lower
benefits than they would in a nonintegrated plan, while high-wage
workers will be allowed a higher level of benefits than the nondis-
crimination rules generally permit in a nonintegrated plan.
The nondiscrimination rules governing the tax treatment of
344. See HABER & GRATrON, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 100, at 108-10.
An old-age insurance program is not only an improvement upon the
method of [poor] relief, but is also aimed to control and reduce the inevi-
table pressure to divert a larger and larger proportion of public funds in the
form of free pensions to aged persons. The value to society of preventing
dependency in old age, as far as possible, must be weighed against the cost
of the insurance method.
S. REP. No. 76-4, at 12 (1938).
345. See discussion supra Part III.
346. See MUNNELL, supra note 46, at 14-15.
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private pensions were enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1942,
following enactment of both major Social Security Acts by several
years.147 The role of Social Security in conjunction with private
pensions, as part of a system providing for retirement income se-
curity, may have been tangentially considered in the development
of that legislation, but it is clear that neither the redistributive
elements in the Social Security benefit formula nor the role of re-
distribution in making middle-class retirement possible were a fo-
cus for legislators in 1942.
In fact, while the principles underlying the nondiscrimination
rules mirror the benefit structure under Social Security-benefit
amounts reflect wages earned in a roughly proportional structure
insuring only coverage, not minimum benefit levels 8-- integration
can be viewed as reflecting a static, almost class-based approach to
retirement income. Pension integration was based on the assump-
tion that Social Security was sufficient for low-wage workers who
were presumed not to need a supplement, while private pensions
to supplement Social Security were codified as a right only for
high-wage workers. In effect, integration grafted a targeted,
means-tested approach onto the earnings-based entitlements of
Social Security and private pensions, vitiating the essential promise
of opportunity to accumulate without imposition of income tests in
retirement that is embedded in both the public and private enti-
tlements.
While the integration rules can be seen as logical from a cer-
tain perspective, they were not a natural or inescapable part of the
pension regulatory scheme codified in 1942. Rather, they were the
product of a flawed understanding of the function of Social Secu-
rity in conjunction with private pensions and were based on a con-
ception of worker welfare that bifurcated the world into low-wage
Social Security recipients and high-wage private pension recipi-
ents.
A. Tax Treatment of Private Pensions Prior to the 1942 Revenue
Act
Employer-provided pensions in the pre-income tax era gen-
erally were paid out of current operating revenues of the em-
347. See Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798 (codified as




ployer, along with other employee-related obligations. As dis-
cussed in Part IV, since such pensions were generally considered
gratuities rather than enforceable obligations, there was scant in-
centive for any advance financing of future pension payments. In
the event an employer wished to fund pension promises, well-
established common law principles of trusts provided a basis for
setting up trusts of which employees might be the beneficiary. In
the absence of personal or corporate income tax, the main legal
considerations for employers involved common law contract con-
cerns about enforceability of the pension promise itself.34
Once the corporate and individual income tax was in place-
from 1913 on-tax considerations began to play a more important
role in employer decisions to establish pension plans. The Treas-
ury Department decided early on that actual pension payments to
retired employees should be deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses and soon afterward allowed deductions for con-
tributions to pension trusts so long as the trust was organized as an
entity separate and distinct from the corporation?"
The first statutory provision for tax treatment of employer-
sponsored pension plans came in the 1921 Revenue Act,35' which
provided tax-exempt treatment for contributions to and earnings
of stock bonus or profit-sharing trusts established by an employer
"for the exclusive benefit of some or all of his employees., 352 This
provision was later amended in the 1926 Revenue Act353 to include
"pension plan" trusts that were not stock plans.35 The legislative
histories of the 1921 and 1926 provisions reveal little discussion of
retirement income planning for employees; the focus appears to
have been primarily, if not solely, on identification of the proper
taxpayer and proper timing for taxation of contributions to and
payments out of employer stock and profit-sharing plans.3 5
349. See discussion supra Part IV.
350. A 1914 Treasury Department ruling allowed deductions for pensions as paid
to employees. See T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259, 281 (1914). A 1919 ruling
held that employer contributions to a pension fund were deductible provided the
fund was a separate and distinct entity. See O.D. 2-19-165, 1 C.B. 224 (1919).
351. See Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 227, 247
(repealed 1939).
352. Id.
353. Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 219(f), 44 Stat. 9, 33 (repealed
1939).
354. See id.
355. For a discussion of this issue between Senators Reed and Smoot, see 61
CONG. REc. 7113 (1921), and excerpts from Senate Finance Committee and Confer-
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By the late 1920s, therefore, just as employers were shying
away from setting up new pension plans because of the cost of car-
rying through on the retirement promise, the basic elements for
tax treatment of private pensions was in place: immediate deduc-
tions for employers making contributions to pension trusts, in
which earnings on contributions would accumulate without tax, re-
sulting in no taxable income to the participating employee until
payment of benefits in retirement.355 There were clear and obvious
tax advantages in establishing trusts that might have little to do
with actually funding employee retirement income promises, par-
ticularly since the relevant Code provisions used the term
"distributees" rather than employees to identify those benefiting
from the trust and allowed revocable as well as irrevocable
trusts .3
B. Fundamentals of Nondiscrimination: "Taxpayer Abuse" vs.
"Worker Security"?
Until 1942 no legislative restrictions existed to limit employ-
ers' interpretation of the Code language requiring that pension
plan trusts be for exclusive benefit of "some or all employees." '358
The apparent result was that some plan sponsors established plans
heavily favoring highly paid employees and shareholders as insur-
ance companies began marketing plans based on the tax advan-
tages.35 9 While the Treasury Department began challenging these
trusts in the late 1930s for violating the requirement that plans be
for the "exclusive benefit" of employees, no real limits were
placed on amounts contributed to plans favoring highly paid em-
ployees until the Revenue Act of 1942." 0
It has been argued that the nondiscrimination rules of the
1942 Revenue Act were intended to raise revenue by limiting tax-
payer abuse of the tax deferral available to employers establishing
pension plans but not to ensure worker income security in retire-
ment."' "Abuse" in this context is the ability of taxpayers "to take
ence Committee Reports on Revenue Act of 1921, reprinted in JACOB STEWART
SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-
1861, at 851 (1938).
356. See MCGILL, supra note 221, at 23; MUNNELL, supra note 46, at 31-32.
357. See SEIDMAN, supra note 355, at 850-51.
358. See Altman, supra note 86, at 451.
359. See id. at 450-51.
360. See Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good
Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 426-28 (1984).
361. See Altman, supra note 86, at 439-42.
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unintended advantage of imprecise statutory language in order to
reduce their tax liabilities." In the case of pensions, the impre-
cise language in question included "exclusive benefit" and "some
or all employees," phrases that gave considerable latitude to em-
ployers in determining which employees would be credited with
benefit rights under a pension plan.
This analysis holds that the statutory language that addressed
the problem by preventing "discrimination in favor of highly paid
employees" should be viewed as anachronistic in focusing on the
problem of highly paid employees taking advantage of the Code,
rather than on insuring adequate retirement income for most em-
ployees.3 6
[In making proposals in 1937 to make pension trusts ir-
revocable and require coverage of more than a few "key
men,"] [r]ather than seeking either to eliminate the sub-
sidy or to marshall the natural motivation of taxpayers to
reduce their taxes, the Treasury instead seemed to be fo-
cused on differentiating the taxpayers concerned with tax
reduction from those genuinely concerned with retire-
ment planning. In other words, the focus was on taxpayer
abuse, not worker security. Consistent with this perspec-
tive, the Treasury statement concluded: "[I]t will require
very careful study to correct the [some-or-all language] in
such a way as to prevent abuse by the guilty without doing
injury to the innocent."3' 6
The key question is what legislators and employers in 1942
would have defined as "worker security" and "taxpayer abuse." In
light of the evolution of the concept of entitlement in the retire-
ment income context in the years preceding this legislation,
"worker security" in a private pension or Social Security entitle-
ment context was just as likely to mean retirement income benefits
at levels proportionate to pre-retirement income, rather than at a
362. IL at 439.
363. See id at 440-42.
364. Id. at 452 (footnote omitted).
In a written statement [presenting the 1937 proposals to Congress], the
Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue explained "that some taxpayers
are attempting to convert into a tax-avoidance mechanism a statutory pro-
vision designed to encourage pensions" and linked the abuse to the "some
or all" language .... This abuse of the plan for tax avoidance or reduction
we wish to prevent.
I at 451-52 (footnotes omitted).
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level satisfying an outwardly imposed income maintenance target.
Thus, the nondiscrimination rules can be seen as quite consistent
with the historical precedents of the Social Security system-while
the Treasury and employers could not agree on requirements for
minimum vesting and maximum benefits, they could settle on
nondiscrimination rules that were based on the principle of paying
retirement benefits commensurate with the worker's earnings
during the working lifetime.
Employer opposition to Treasury proposals that would have
required full vesting in benefits and payment of minimum benefits,
and employer acceptance of the nondiscrimination approach as a
substitute, have been cited as evidence that the target of the 1942
legislation was tax avoidance rather than worker security."5 How-
ever, if employers were willing to maintain truly irrevocable pen-
sion trusts that were required to provide benefits to more than just
the highly paid owners and executives, which was the aim of the
nondiscrimination proposals, worker security would clearly have
been improved. It can therefore also be argued that the nondis-
crimination approach was accepted precisely because of concerns
about worker security even though it would likely be less effective
in eliminating taxpayer abuse.
While taxpayer abuse was undeniably a strong concern of the
drafters of the original nondiscrimination rules, an examination of
administration and public testimony, and of questions asked by
members of Congress during hearings on the Revenue Act of 1942
reveal equal emphasis on the need to encourage establishment of
private pension plans to provide retirement income to workers.
First, the administration's stated purpose in suggesting the
nondiscrimination principle as a qualification requirement for pri-
365. See id at 453-55.
The two proposals [vesting and maximum benefit limits] were met with vo-
ciferous opposition from the business community which argued that the
proposals were unrelated to tax avoidance. A partner in a leading pension
management firm, for example, testified:
Treasury's suggestions with respect to pension plans and trusts are ad-
vanced at this time in order to prevent the use of such trusts as tax
avoidance devices. This of course, is a desirable objective .[However,] . . some of the standards suggested by [the Special Tax
Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury] have no necessary connection
with tax avoidance. Such standards were obviously conceived to further
certain undisclosed social objectives.
Congress failed to pass even a modified vesting proposal suggested by the
Treasury or the maximum limitation on benefits.
Id at 453 (footnotes omitted).
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vate pension trusts desiring to receive the tax deferral treatment
already in place in the Code was to make sure that the underlying
purpose of the "tax subsidy" was carried out. Randolph Paul's
testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee in 1942
foreshadowed the rationale and result of what Stanley Surrey later
defined as "tax expenditures," "6in suggesting that the tax deferral
available to pension trusts was a subsidy in the form of reduced or
no taxation for specific taxpayer behavior-providing pension
coverage-that is encouraged for essentially nontax purposes.
3 67
Moreover, in response to congressional questioning about the
administration's purpose in proposing not only nondiscrimination,
but extensive vesting for shorter-service workers and a limitation
of $7500 a year on pensions paid from an exempt trust, Paul made
clear that all of the administration's proposals were designed to in-
crease pension protection for lower paid workers:
The next point we made was that there should be rea-
sonable employee coverage.... That requirement has to
do with the fairness of the plan and it also has a great deal
to do with tax avoidance, because it prevents the plan
from getting the subsidy status unless a reasonable num-
ber of employees are covered; the purpose is to prevent
the subsidy from being used only in behalf of the higher
366. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Govern-
ment Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 705,705 (1970).
367. Randolph Paul stated:
The present treatment of pension trusts affords a tax subsidy to those
trusts which meet the requirements set forth in the statute. This subsidy is
at the expense of the general body of taxpayers. It was granted because of
the desire to improve the welfare of employees by encouraging the estab-
lishment of pension trusts for their benefit. Our purpose in presenting our
suggestions was to carry out this objective of the Congress by suggesting
various provisions which would both make the present statute more effec-
tive in promoting the welfare of employees through such trusts and at the
same time prevent utilization of such trusts for tax-avoidance purposes.
Thus, we suggested that only those trusts which are designed to benefit
large numbers of employees should be permitted this favored treatment....
[W]e have [also] suggested that the benefits must be extended in a nondis-
crminatory fashion, so that the higher salaried employees in the trust can-
not be favored at the expense of the lower salaried employees.... These
suggestions at the same time would operate to safeguard the pension pro-
vision against its use as a tax-avoidance device.
Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 77th Cong. 2405-06 (1942) (statement of Randolph Paul, special tax ad-
visor to the Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter Revenue Revision of 1942].
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salaried, key employees.
The next point has to do with the nondiscriminatory
provision; it is somewhat like the requirement in the
[preceding] point. The mere fact that 70 percent of the
employees are covered does not necessarily mean that the
plan is equitable. For example, low-salaried employees
might have a very nominal interest while the high-salaried
officials received the major benefit under the plan.3 6
The thrust of Paul's testimony is to make the case that these pro-
posals do address tax abuse, a reason for legislation that was ac-
ceptable to Congress; as well as providing additional coverage and
benefits for employees. The very definition of tax abuse in the
administration's terms is a pension plan that receives a subsidy
without providing for lower-wage workers. Worker security and
prevention of tax abuse were merged as goals.
In ensuing questioning, and in most of the testimony of em-
ployers opposed to the Treasury's proposals, the nondiscrimina-
tion provisions received less attention than the vesting, the $7500
limit and the requirement for coverage of 70% of all employees,
excluding what Paul terms "casual employees," '369 which were
strongly opposed by employers, and seemed to at least one witness
to represent "social security" legislation rather than tax abuse pre-
vention.370 In fact, the Committee scheduled this day specifically to
hear public testimony and administration "clarifications" of its
pension proposals because of employer, and some organized em-
ployee, outcries over the possibility that pension plans would have
to be terminated because they could not meet the administration's
new requirements. 37'
Nonetheless, the nondiscrimination rules were also attacked
by employers and other witnesses as having nothing to do with
368. Id. at 2407.
369. Il
370. See id. at 2482-83. See also the statement of Arthur Hansen, a consulting ac-
tuary:
Mr. Disney has made the remark in which he said that the committee at
this session was not going to consider any amendments to the Social Secu-
rity Act. You have dispensed with discussion of the Social Security Act,
and I think right along with that, since these proposals of Mr. Paul are of a
social-security nature, they should be deferred along with social-security,
except as it is necessary to take care of the specific problems now existing.
Id. at 2484. For employer reactions to the vesting and other proposals, see generally
id. at 2411-71 (statements by several companies).
371. See id. at 2405 (opening remarks of Chairman Doughton).
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prevention of tax abuse.
This [nondiscrimination requirement] seems to be a re-
statement of [the requirement to cover a reasonable clas-
sification not favoring highly paid employees] .... dis-
crimination can be differentiated from justifiable
increased rewards for greater service but it would be most
difficult to draft a sound retirement trust for which an
employer could adopt with any assurance that it would
meet this requirement.
The suggestions as to maximum pensions and other
benefits would seem to rule out any intent to require
identical treatment of all employees. But if this proposal
does not prohibit trusts which will pay larger benefits to
more highly paid employees, what is its purpose? What
discrimination of importance can there be if payment of
greater benefits be not discrimination?
I am also puzzled as to what possible relation this pro-
posal has to tax avoidance. Certainly a trust does not be-
come a part of a tax avoidance scheme because its crea-
tors believe in providing greater rewards to its executive
staff than to the rank and file of workers. 2
In fact, one witness went so far as to declare, "If Mr. Paul's rec-
ommendations are designed to eliminate tax avoidance, it is my
opinion that only [a proposal on timing of deductions] is neces-
sary. "
373
Finally, the congressional reports accompanying the legisla-
tion echoed the administration's previous emphasis on providing
benefits to lower-paid workers.
While this legislation was tax oriented rather than reform
oriented, the need for the legislation, according to the re-
port on the 1942 bill by the House Ways and Means
Committee, was that the provisions of the tax code which
were intended to encourage the setting up of retirement
plans were being considerably abused by the use of dis-
criminatory plans which either covered only a small per-
372. Id. at 2468 (statement of Richard D. Sturtevant, Assistant Secretary, Jewel
Tea Co.) (emphasis added). For other examples of statements in opposition to the
nondiscrimination provision specifically, see id. at 2478 (statement of Arthur Han-
sen).
373. Id. at 2489 (statement of Nathaniel H. Seefurth, Compensation Research Bu-
reau).
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centage of the employees, or else favored the higher paid
or stockholding employees. It was contended that under
the law then in effect, the officers of a corporation could
set up pension plans for themselves without making any
provision for other employees....
In reporting out the revenue bill of 1942, the House
Ways and Means Committee stated that the amendments
made to the bill (H.R. 7378) by the Committee were in-
tended to remedy the two most serious abuses of the
pension trust provisions-(1) limited coverage, and (2)
discrimination in favor of higher-paid employees.374
The 1942 legislation proposed to address these problems by requir-
ing pension plans to cover a minimum number of employees and
to provide roughly similar benefits to low- and high-paid employ-
ees. The Ways and Means Committee report stated:
"Even such extended coverage would not by itself guar-
antee that the pension plan would be operated for the
welfare of the employees generally, because the scale of
benefits could be manipulated. Therefore, the scale of
benefits must be nondiscriminatory. High-salaried em-
ployees should not be favored at the expense of the low-
paid employees.
... Determination of benefits according to a fixed per-
centage of wages should not be considered discriminatory
even though it results in larger benefits to highly paid
employees. However, the use of one scale for officials
and a less generous scale for other employees would be
discriminatory.... For a plan to qualify... the scale of
contributions and benefits must be nondiscriminatory,
with the exception that larger employer contributions and
benefits may be provided for the lower paid employees.
Contributions or benefits based upon the application of a
fixed rate to compensation paid directly to employees are
not intended to be considered in violation of this provi-
sion." 35
374. SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93D CONG.,
INTEGRATION OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS WITH SOCIAL SECURITY, STUDIES IN
PUBLIC WELFARE, PAPER No. 18, 173, 191 (Comm. Print 1974) (prepared by Ray-
mond Schmitt) [hereinafter PAPER No. 18].
375. Id. (quoting the House Ways and Means Committee report for the Revenue
Act of 1942) (emphasis added).
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Putting aside whatever the parties may have thought their
purpose was, some nonetheless view the very structure of the
nondiscrimination rules as evidence that limits on taxpayer abuse
were the underlying purpose of the legislation because much lower
benefits could still be provided to low-income workers so long as
they were proportionate to earnings.37 6 However, it can also be ar-
gued that the nondiscrimination rules reflect much the same phi-
losophy as the Social Security benefit formula-that is, workers'
income in retirement should reflect their wage levels during their
working lifetime, not their income status once they cease to work.
It is quite likely that without Social Security, strictly proportional
benefits would be insufficient to provide adequate retirement in-
come for low-wage workers. However, earnings-based entitle-
ments are by definition designed to give workers benefits accord-
ing to work histories, not need at the time of retirement.
Business opposition to Treasury Department proposals for
vesting and irrevocability of trusts in 1937 and 19427 reveals the
continuing distaste of employers for undertaking pension obliga-
tions that must be fulfilled, based on the disastrous history of
"welfare capitalism" in the 1920s and 1930s. Therefore, nondis-
crimination rules that required coverage of low-wage as well as
high-wage workers were clearly preferable to iron-clad require-
ments to actually pay retirement benefits. Such a preference need
not have any connection to the relative efficacy of the nondis-
crimination regime in limiting "taxpayer abuse" rather than insur-
ing income security. In the absence of minimum vesting require-
ments, coverage and benefit requirements could be easily
accommodated as part of a highly voluntary private pension sys-
376. See Altman, supra note 86, at 475-76. As Altman indicates, "[flrom a tax-
payer abuse perspective, this rule is sound." Id. at 476. "It is important to note that
proportions that are uniform in relation to salaries nevertheless may, in small plans,
result in the allocation of the bulk of the employer contributions to the high paid
employees." Id. at 476 n.168.
Providing all employees with benefits or contributions that are uniform
proportions of their compensation is not an act of favoritism towards the
prohibited group. Rather, the deferred compensation is an extension of,
and is consistent with, the employer's overall pattern of compensation.
From a worker security perspective, however, the proportionate rule would
be troubling, if it were not for Social Security. Lower income workers gen-
erally need a higher percentage of their final salaries than higher paid
workers to be able to retire without sacrificing their current standards of
living. Moreover, higher salaried people have a greater ability to save for
retirement.
Id. at 476 (footnotes omitted).
377. See id. at 453.
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tem that had never been designed to underwrite mass retirement
on the scale that would develop after World War II.
In summary, the essential elements of nondiscrimination rules
can be explained as well by concern for provision of pension bene-
fits for low-paid workers as by concerns about taxpayer abuse. A
regulatory structure allowing most of the tax subsidy to continue to
flow to high-paid workers at the price of providing some benefits
to low-paid workers hardly seems solely focused on limiting abuse
of the tax system.
C. 1942 Revenue Act: The Role of Integration in the
Nondiscrimination Framework
Even though the 1942 Act did not use the term "integration"
specifically, the concept was an original part of the nondiscrimina-
tion rules. The main thrust of the nondiscrimination rules was to
prevent discrimination in favor of corporate officers, stockholders,
or highly compensated employees with respect to coverage, con-
tributions, and benefits. However, the 1942 Act included what
later became § 401(a)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,378
which, notwithstanding the basic nondiscrimination requirements,
stated that no plan would be considered to be "discriminatory...
merely because (a) it excludes employees the whole of whose re-
muneration consists of taxable wages under Social Security [or] (b)
the contributions or benefits based on ... remuneration ... ex-
cluded from the Social Security tax base differ from contributions
or benefits within this base." '379
In light of the concerns underlying the establishment of a
compulsory and contributory system under Social Security-in
particular the explicit refusal to allow workers covered by private
pensions to elect out of Social Security-the 1942 Revenue Act in-
tegration provision seems to be an anomaly, a kind of reverse vol-
untary coverage under which employers were allowed to elect not
to cover under a pension plan employees whose wages were com-
pletely covered by Social Security.
At the time of the 1942 Act, beneficiaries who had paid vir-
378. Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 1 (superseding the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1939). The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was redesig-
nated the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085
(1986).
379. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, §§ 162, 165(a)(5), 56 Stat. 798, 862
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(5) (1994)).
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tually nothing into the Social Security system were already receiv-
ing benefits, a result of the 1939 revisions intended to address
widespread poverty among the elderly whose savings and pensions
had been wiped out by the Depression.3 0 The advance-funding
feature of Social Security was abandoned in the 1939 revisions in
favor of "pay as you go" financing so-that the link between work-
ers' benefits and their tax payments into the system was minimal in
actuarial as well as statutory terms.3 81
Thus, it is not surprising that employers, and the IRS in con-
sultation with them, would view Social Security as paid for by the
employer and maintain that the employer should not, as a result,
have to duplicate its coverage through a private-pension benefit.
Indeed, employers apparently took for granted that no one would
expect them to provide pension coverage for workers making
$3000 or less, the maximum wages covered by Social Security.
Most of the plans described to members of the Ways and Means
Committee during the hearings on the 1942 Revenue Act provided
either no or lower pension contributions based on earnings below
$3000.3 2
The reasoning of employers was probably typified by the tes-
timony of Robert Gordon of National Dairy Products, describing
how the company came to set up its contributory pension plan in
1941:
The first thing that came to our attention was that only
1,200 of our total number of employees [37,500] received
over $3,000. Among those 1,200 were practically every
employee that had a real influence on how the company
went ahead, how it achieved success over its competitors.
We also knew that the social-security-tax program was
coming along and was going to do a job.
We pay a considerable amount of money in social-
security taxes and all of our employees pay the same
amount on their pay.
380. See discussion supra Part IV.
381. See discussion supra Part IV.
382. See, e.g., Revenue Revision of 1942, supra note 367, at 2414 ("To reflect so-
cial-security taxes and benefits, both contributions and pensions are correspondingly
lower on the first $3,000 of salary than on portions of salary above this figure.")
(statement of James L. O'Neill, Vice President, Guaranty Trust Co.). O'Neill ex-
plained that "[o]ur plan is designed to supplement the Social Security Act. On the
first $3,000 of all salaries less is paid into the pension fund. On the first $3,000 we
provide only 1-percent benefits." Id. at 2416.
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So we decided this... we will have nothing paid into
the plan by either employer or employee on salaries be-
low $3,000, and we will let the social-security-tax program
take care of the salaries under $3,000.
... [W]e think we can achieve retirements under this plan
with the company paying only a part, and the employees,
by forced savings... paying their part, and for all people
under $3,000, we think that with the aid of the Social Se-
curity Act we have no real problem on retirements, and
no real hardship.3
At least two members of the Committee, however, saw inequity in
this plan, if not hardship. Congressman Knutson led the following
exchange:
MR. KNUTSON. If I understand your plan correctly, you
folks have set out a saucer of cream.., for the higher-ups
and the rest get skimmed milk.
MR. GORDON. It is very thin cream.
MR. KNUTSON. And you do not do anything for those
who get less than $3,000 a year. You leave them to the
tender mercies of the Social Security Act.
MR. GORDON. We pay our full tax, in accordance with
their pay, and they pay their full share.
MR. KNUTSON. I do not think much of your plan, be-
cause as to the people in the lower brackets who really
need it, they have no opportunity to lay anything aside for
old age, and they get nothing from your plan. Those
people who get above $3,000 certainly ought to be able to
lay something aside.
MR. GORDON. The people above $3,000 have tax bur-
dens. They live, as you know, in accordance with what
they make, and they do not save money. Maybe they
should save money, but they do not save money.
MR. KNUTSON. You can pay your president $150,000,




but you cannot take care of those below $3,000 in your
pension plan. It looks lopsided to me. I do not think
much of your plan. And I think this is one of the things
that the Treasury is aiming at."
The chairman of the Committee was even more blunt in his as-
sessment of the lack of benefits for workers covered by Social Se-
curity in National Dairy Products' plan. The exchange between
Chairman Doughton and Mr. Gordon is worth reproducing here at
length, as it almost perfectly summarizes employer reasons for
providing pensions as well as the problems with pension integra-
tion even today:
THE CHAIRMAN. How many employees are there in
your company?
MR. GORDON. 37,500.
THE CHAIRMAN. How many are eligible for benefits
under your system?
MR. GORDON. Two thousand get above $3,000.
THE CHAIRMAN. They are the ones that need it less;
they are the highest-paid employees. On the basis of
need, they are the ones that need it least; is that not so?..
MR. GORDON. I would say that a pension plan is not a
charity.... We are not trying to give this money out on
the basis of need. We are trying to provide for orderly
retirement of people, and we say that with the aid of the
social-security payments we can retire at 65 men who
have gotten under $3,000 a year. Their needs are not
large. They are willing to retire, and they do retire, and
are happy.
THE CHAIRMAN. The social-security plan will take care
of those in the lower brackets. Why would it not take
care of all of them?
MR. GORDON. They have geared themselves up to a
higher standard of living.
THE CHAIRMAN. These other people would maintain a
higher standard of living, too, if they had more income.
Now when they are old, you just want to turn them out to
384. Id. at 2428-28 (colloquy between Congressman Knutson and Mr. Robert
Gordon, general counsel, National Dairy Products Corp.).
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graze in an old field, having served all of their usefulness.
MR. GORDON. We are in a competitive society, and the
men that have got the worth are supposed to earn what
they are able.
THE CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that you are giving
to the ones that have plenty and to those that have noth-
ing, you do not even give the opportunity of getting any-
thing.
I never heard of such a thing.
MR. GORDON. In conclusion, I want to say that our
whole plan was not intended to increase the cost to the
corporation of retirements.
THE CHAIRMAN. I can see exactly what it was intended
to do, but it is the worthiness of it that bothers me.
MR. GORDON. It accomplishes the end; it achieves re-
tirement. Our people who have worked beyond the peak
of their efficiency are retired, and we replace them with
younger men. The older people are taken care of and do
not become public charges."5
Nonetheless, despite the concerns expressed in the preceding
exchange, the nondiscrimination in the 1942 legislation allowed
Social Security to provide total pension coverage for low-wage
workers:
Thus, a plan in good faith designed to supplement the
benefits under the Social Security Act... by making eli-
gibility to the benefits of the plan dependent upon an
employee receiving annual compensation in excess of
$3,000 [the taxable wage base at that time], will not be
considered by reason of that fact as based upon favoritism
to highly compensated employees. 86
Legislators apparently saw no contradiction between integra-
tion and Social Security's aspirations of universal coverage. In-
stead, integration was presented as a logical necessity, certainly by
employers, although the Treasury apparently did not publicly
adopt this view. A later pension analyst summarized the result as
385. Id. at 2431 (colloquy between the Chairman and Mr. Robert Gordon, general
counsel, National Dairy Products Corp.).-





The basic idea of integration is simple. Social Security
laws set a ceiling on the amount of wages subject to pay-
roll tax. Since social security benefits are related to cov-
ered earnings, they also have a built-in ceiling. Thus, so-
cial security income replacement rates decrease as pre-
retirement income increases. It was considered logical,
therefore, to permit the private pension system to pick up
where the social security system left off by providing
supplemental benefits based upon earnings above the so-
cial security wage base.
Congress recognized this in 1942, when it first wrote
into the law the proviso that although a tax-qualified plan
could not discriminate in favor of the higher paid workers,
its benefit structure could favor those with earnings above
the social security ceiling provided that when the public
and private benefits were considered together, their
combined benefits did not give preference to the higher
paid. So long as the ratio of combined benefits to earn-
ings is no higher for employees whose wages exceed the
taxable wage base than for those whose wages are fully
taxed by social security, Congress said a plan would be
held to be nondiscriminatory.
So, for example, assume that a worker whose earnings were
less than $3000 per year-the wage base at the time-would re-
ceive Social Security benefits that would replace 40% of earnings.
A worker earning $6000, twice the wage base, would receive a So-
cial Security benefit replacing perhaps only 20% of total earnings.
Under the integration principle, the low-wage worker could re-
ceive no private pension and the higher wage worker could receive
a pension equal to 40% of earnings over $3000 without violating
the principle of nondiscrimination since both workers would re-
ceive the same ratio of benefits to earnings-one from the public
program and one from the private as well as the public.
The end result was a nondiscrimination scheme that at-
tempted to ensure coverage of low-wage workers by tying tax
benefits for high-wage workers to proportional benefits for low-
387. Id. at 175; see also Revenue Revision of 1942, supra note 367, at 2440-41,
2486-87 (discussing the nondiscriminatory provisions and the bases for determining
discrimination).
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wage workers. Yet plans were allowed to essentially eliminate
from coverage all employees with total wages below the Social Se-
curity wage base, on the grounds that such employees would be
provided for under Social Security. This view-that private pen-
sions can be truly "supplementary" to Social Security by giving
benefits only to higher wage workers-logically follows from a
"worker security" perspective as much as from the employer view
that employers were already paying for the low-wage workers'
pension through their FICA contributions.
By imposing a targeted total replacement rate on the combi-
nation of Social Security and the private pension-which is in es-
sence how integration allows discriminatory benefit formulae to
qualify as nondiscriminatory-the nondiscrimination rules can be
said to have embodied one notion of worker security. Integration
is reconciled with the nondiscrimination principle only by assum-
ing that Social Security provides all benefits necessary for those
under the wage base and that pensions are the legitimate way to
increase replacement rates to a constant level for those above the
wage base. Otherwise, Congress's allowance of integration makes
no sense since integration, by definition, ensures that plan benefits
will favor highly compensated employees over low-wage employ-
ees.
This conception of the retirement income system-a combi-
nation of two types of benefits coordinated to produce a combined
target replacement rate for low- and high-wage workers-violates
the entitlement principles of Social Security in two ways. First, in-
herent in the imposition of target replacement rates on the combi-
nation of public and private entitlements is the "top-down" as-
sessment of need in retirement-measured by "adequate" or
"excess" replacement rate-that the evolution of retirement enti-
tlements has consistently resisted.3 Second, the assumption of
economic dynamism and mobility that underlies the "opportunity
to accumulate" principle of retirement entitlements is replaced in
the nondiscrimination rules including integration with an assump-
tion of static economic position. Low-wage workers are assumed
to remain low-wage workers throughout their careers with the
higher replacement rate under Social Security necessitating setting
limits on excess replacement of wages in retirement for low-wage
workers.
388. See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
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D. The First IRS Regulation of Integration: 1943-1979
After passage of the 1942 provisions, the Treasury Depart-
ment began almost immediately to attempt to restrict employer
use of integration to reduce or eliminate pension benefits for
workers covered by Social Security."9 An examination of both
initial and later Treasury guidance shows that the elaborate inte-
gration rules of later years were all derived from three factors:
first, the Treasury's initial effort to determine the portion of Social
Security benefits attributable to employer contributions; second,
assumptions made concerning the value of all Social Security
benefits relative to the primary insurance amount (PIA), which is
the basic Social Security benefit produced by applying the benefit
formula to the worker's lifetime earnings record; and finally, the
amount of pre-retirement income replaced by Social Security for
workers at the wage base.3
The Treasury Department's approach to the integration rules
was based on the fundamentally flawed premise that Social Secu-
rity benefits were tied to FICA tax payments. This premise led di-
rectly to a conclusion that individual workers' benefits could be at-
tributed to specific employer FICA tax contributions and, from
there, to the presumption that employers could be "credited" with
their payments for those benefits. The entire subsequent devel-
opment of the integration structure was based on this mistaken
understanding of the relationship between FICA tax payments and
individual benefit amounts, which confuses the benefit and financ-
ing structures.
In Mimeograph 5539, issued by the IRS in July 1943, the ba-
sics of offset and excess integration formulas were established.39'
In offset formulas, employers would be allowed to subtract 150%
of PIA from a normal retirement benefit, on the grounds that
100% of Social Security benefits were attributable to employer
contributions and that a worker and spouse received 150% of PIA
as a benefit from Social Security.Y2 Excess plans would be allowed
to pay no benefits based on earnings below the "integration
level"-the wage base of $3000-and could pay up to 25% of
389. See generally Altman, supra note 86, at 450-54 (describing the Treasury De-
partment's motives behind integration rules in the Revenue Act of 1942).
390. See generally MuNNELL, supra note 46, at 32-35 (describing integration
guidelines).
391. See Mirm. 5539, 1943 C.B. 500 (explaining Treas. Reg. § 19.165(a)(3)-(1)).
392. See iL
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earnings above the integration level.3 3 3 The 25% figure was to be
increased by .25% each year after 1941. '4 Twenty-five percent ap-
parently "approximated the ratio of employer-sponsored Social
Security benefits to average earnings for workers whose average
earnings were equal to the taxable wage base." 5
In these calculations the IRS made several assumptions that
underlie all subsequent modifications to the integration rules.
First, the offset formula limits established in Mimeograph 5539 re-
veal the IRS's assumption that 100% of Social Security benefits
were attributable to employer contributions even though inte-
grated formulas allowed under the 1942 Act would affect many
younger workers with decades of employment who would contrib-
ute substantial amounts to Social Security. While this attribution
percentage would decline in succeeding years, the initial 100%
baseline meant the IRS accepted the philosophical proposition
that Social Security was in part a type of employer-provided pen-
sion that employers were entitled to setoff against their own bene-
fit promises to employees.
Second, the offset percentage took dependent and survivor
benefits into account, allowing employers to take credit for auxil-
iary Social Security benefits in reducing their private pension plan
commitments even though their plans may not have provided
similar benefits. Moreover, while Social Security family benefits
were provided without any reduction in the initial benefit paid to
the worker-a worker and spouse would receive 150% of the
PIA-private plans typically reduced benefits paid to a retiree if
benefits would be paid to the worker's surviving spouse under a
joint and survivor annuity option.39 Even under the flawed prem-
ise upon which the IRS relied in developing these rules, employers
were given a substantial advantage in being allowed to offset 150%
of the basic Social Security benefit against a private benefit that
would pay only the equivalent of 100% of PIA to a worker and
spouse over their lifetimes.
Finally, by allowing employers to pay nothing in benefits be-
low the wage base while paying benefits equal to 25% of earnings
393. See id
394. See id.
395. See SCHULZ & LEAvrrT, supra note 14, at 21-22.
396. See Mim. 5539, 1943 C.B. 500.
397. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EM-
PLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 39-69 (4th ed. 1990).
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above the wage base, the IRS was acting on the assumption that
25% represented the percentage of earnings at the wage base ac-
tually replaced by Social Security benefits in retirement.9 8 Since
100% of the benefit was already attributed to the employer, pri-
vate pension plans could pay that much more in benefits to em-
ployees with earnings above the wage base. This 25% figure cast a
long shadow, forming the basis for excess plan benefits, as modi-
fied over time, up until the 1986 Tax Reform Act,399 despite major
revisions in the structure and calculation of Social Security benefits
that made it almost irrelevant in replacement rate terms.
Beginning in 1951 the IRS issued regular amendments to the
regulations in an attempt to adjust these initial percentages to take
account of several major expansions in the Social Security pro-
gram, beginning with increases in the taxable wage base and in the
maximum PIA as a percentage of average earnings up to the wage
base.40° The percentage of Social Security benefits-still including
ancillary benefits-attributable to the employer was reduced, pro-
ducing an increase in the 25% excess figure to 37.5%, and a re-
duction in the allowable offset to 140% in 1950.41 During a series
of Social Security amendments that increased the PIA as a per-
centage of the wage base, the IRS steadily reduced the percentage
of benefits attributable to employers, so that the excess percentage
remained at 37.5%, up until 1967.4 At that point, as reflected in
Revenue Ruling 61-75,4 the IRS attributed 78% of the value of
the maximum Social Security benefit package to employer contri-
butions; since Social Security was estimated to replace 47.625% of
employee wages at the maximum level, the employer was consid-
ered to have4yaid" for 37.145% of the benefit, which was rounded
up to 37.5%.
The Treasury Department undertook a comprehensive ex-
amination of pension integration after the President's Committee
on Corporate Pension Funds issued a report in 1965 that criticized
398. See Mim. 5539, 1943 C.B. 500.
399. See 1986 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1106(b), 100 Stat. 2085,
2420-22 (1986) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 415 (1994)).
400. See SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT tbl. A.2
(1987); see also MYERS, supra note 34, at 247-49.
401. See Mim. 6641, 1951-1 C.B. 41.
402- See Rev. Rul. 61-75, 1961-1 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 56-692,1956-2 C.B. 287.; Rev.
Rul. 52-13,1953-1 C.B. 294.




the current integration percentages:
[The current integration formula attributes] to the em-
ployer more benefits than he has paid for with his own
contributions, which in fact are equal to those of his em-
ployees. In fact, [the integration percentage] attributes to
the employer all benefits that the employees have not
paid for by their own contributions.
The Committee... recommends that qualified corpo-
rate plans be permitted to continue to integrate with
OASDI but that, as to benefits earned after the date of
the change, the employer be given credit for no more than
one-half of the social security benefit. This would be
consistent with the financing of OASDI benefits through
equal tax contributions from employers and employees."'
The IRS's review resulted in a new estimate that would reduce
the excess percentage down to 24%, based on the increase in the
taxable wage base since 1961 from $4800 to $6600; after requesting
and receiving public comment on possible reductions in the excess
percentage, the IRS announced interim regulations temporarily
allowing excess percentages up to 27.25% for defined benefit
plans, 6.80% for defined contribution plans, and a new maximum
offset of 85%.4 Two years later, after enactment of the Social Se-
curity Amendments of 1967,4w the IRS effectively accepted the
earlier recommendations of the Presidential Committee48 and
based its integration percentages on the assumption that 50% of
Social Security benefits were attributable to employee contribu-
tions.4
In Revenue Ruling 69-4,4I0 the IRS set new integration limits:
a 30% excess limit-employers could pay benefits that were 30%
of wages above the wage base and zero below; and a 75% offset
limit-employers could reduce private pension benefits by 75% of
PIA.4 1  This bold move did not last long, however, as the Social
405. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER
PRIVATE RETIREMENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMS 63 (1965) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
COMMITTEE].
406. See Rev. Rul. 67-10, 1967-1 C.B. 84.
407. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
408. See PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE, supra note 405, at 62.
409. See Rev. Rul. 69-4, 1969-1 C.B. 122.
410. Id.
411. See id. at 119-21. While the actual calculations of the approach used in
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Security Amendments of 1971412 provided a basis for the IRS to
move the excess percentage back up to 37.5%, in Revenue Ruling
71-446.43 The IRS explained this change as a result of two changes
in its methodology: first, it began considering for the first time
disability benefits as an ancillary benefit, which increased the total
Social Security benefit package from 150% of the PIA to 162% of
the PIA; and second, the basic benefit calculation for the PIA was
increased from 36% of the worker's average monthly wage to
43%.414
The basic outline of the integration rules set in Revenue Rul-
ing 71-4464's did not change substantially for over ten years, and
even then, the Tax Equity and Financial Responsibility Act of
1982 (TEFRA)416 changed the rules mainly for top-heavy plans al-
though the limit for all defined contribution excess plans was re-
duced from 7% to 5.7%. Still, the mechanics of the integration
rules were basically set in Revenue Ruling 71-446, and it remained
the fundamental guideline for employers until after the 1986 Act
changes.417
The IRS's approach to regulation of integration is emblematic
of a technical response to a philosophical dilemma. Clearly inte-
gration inherently contradicted the purpose and spirit of the non-
discrimination rules by allowing employers to pay fewer or no
benefits to low-paid workers than to high-paid workers. If one
views the tax advantages flowing from tax qualification of plans
under these rules as a general taxpayer subsidy for retirement
savings, workers whose benefits were eliminated or substantially
reduced by integration were subsidizing the higher-pension bene-
fits paid to their employers and higher-paid colleagues.418  The
nondiscrimination rules were developed in part to limit this per-
ceived subsidy.
Revenue Ruling 69-4 yielded a 27% integration percentage, the ruling allowed em-
ployers to use a percentage as high as 30% in order to reduce the cost impact on
employers. See id.
412. Social Security Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-5,85 Stat. 5.
413. See Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 C.B. 187.
414. See id
415. Id.
416. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 401 (1994)).
417. See ScHuLz & LEAVrrr, supra note 14, at 3-19 for a detailed outline of the
integration rules in effect up until the 1986 Tax Reform Act, based on Revenue
Ruling 71-446, 1971-2 C.B. 187, as clarified by Revenue Ruling 78-92, 1978-1 C.B.
118, and other IRS rulings.
418. See Altman, supra note 86, at 481,484.
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The IRS was bound, however, by a mistaken assumption em-
bedded in the statutory provision for integration-that Social Se-
curity benefits were part of the employer-employee relationship
upon which private pensions were based; therefore, employers
should be able to treat FICA tax payments as another type of
funding vehicle for employee pensions. Regardless of limits
placed on the amount of the offset, the integration rules inevitably
resulted in reducing the role of higher-paid workers in financing
redistribution under Social Security.419 Since employers could es-
sentially reduce their overall pension obligations to lower-paid
workers while maintaining the high level of benefits needed to at-
tract and retain higher-paid workers, integration ultimately meant
that low-paid workers shouldered a higher tax burden while receiv-
ing less in retirement income, precisely the opposite of the in-
tended result of the Social Security benefit structure.
VI. REFORMING INTEGRATION
As the IRS attempted to delineate the limits of integration
through rulings, various efforts to eliminate or reform integration
were mounted in the legislative arena from at least 1953 through
the 1986 Tax Reform Act.4 z° The remarkable resilience of the in-
tegration provisions, in the face of repeated attacks from pension
advocates, Treasury officials, and members of Congress, is not
solely due to the influence of employers whose benefit costs would
undoubtedly be much higher without integration, although that
influence probably played an important role. Integration at some
level was assumed by both opponents and proponents to be a nec-
essary element of coordinating Social Security and private pen-
sions, and thus attempts at reform inevitably fell short.
The strength of employer opposition to changes in integration
was fueled in part by the employers' view of their FICA tax pay-
ments as being the source of their employees' benefit entitle-
421
ment.4 1 The IRS's technical response to the problem of imple-
menting integration was to determine the "true" portion of benefit
"paid for" by employers, based on the confusion of contributory
financing with earnings-based benefit structure.422 Employers' own
419. See id. at 486.
420. See id. at 479-81.
421. See id. at 478-82.
422. See generally Theodore T. Kurlowicz, FICA-Frustration of Private Sectors
Retirement Planning Initiatives, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 135, 147 (1986) (discussing im-
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views of their payments to Social Security reflect this same per-
spective, thus lending a consistent theoretical basis to the vocifer-
ous business antagonism to any attempts to eliminate integration.
Legislative proposals to reform integration, however, were
also driven by impulses contrary to entitlement principles, inevi-
tably leading to acceptance of the need for some integration. As
discussed below, many analysts rejected, on essentially economic
grounds, the argument that employers should get credit in their
private pension plans for their FICA tax payments to the public
plan. Nonetheless, most pension analysts and reformers were un-
able to advocate outright elimination of integration because of the
possibility of low-wage workers receiving more in retirement in-
come-from the combination of Social Security and nonintegrated
private pensions-than they had earned while working.
421
As a result, reform proposals were based on mistaken as-
sumptions and essentially misguided goals. Legislators and some
reformers assumed that Social Security was interchangeable with
employer-financed private pensions containing an identifiable
"employer-provided" share. All parties to the debate agreed with
the goal of adequate, but not "excessive," income replacement in
retirement for workers at low-wage levels from the combination of
Social Security and private pensions.42 4 Neither proposition is sus-
tainable, however, in light of the entitlement principles upon which
Social Security is based.
Nonetheless, policymakers were apparently unwilling to coun-
tenance the consistent application of entitlement principles if that
resulted in low-income workers receiving more in benefits than
they received in wages while working, even if such a subsidy was
required to prevent recourse to poverty-based programs. The re-
sult was a series of legislative reform attempts that did not address
the central contradiction between integration and entitlement.
A. Extent of the Integration "Problem"
The extreme complexity of the permissible integration meth-
ods under IRS rulings did not discourage employers from taking
advantage of the opportunity these methods presented. While the
pact of FICA provisions on voluntary retirement plans).
423. See PAPER No. 18, supra note 374, at 174; MUNNELL, supra note 46, at 55-59.
424. See generally Alicia H. Munnell, ERISA-The First Decade: Was the Legis-
lation Consistent with Other National Goals?, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 58-60
(1985).
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data are not completely reliable for pre-ERISA years, integration
was apparently a widespread gractice in the years leading up to
enactment of ERISA in 1974. A study conducted by the Con-
gressional Research Service (CRS) after enactment of ERISA,
using data collected prior to ERISA's effective date in 1974, esti-
mated that about 60% of all plans were integrated and that inte-
gration affected 25% to 30% of the 30 million participants in those
plans.426
The CRS study revealed distinct differences between treat-
ment of workers in large plans covered by collective bargaining
agreements, usually not integrated, as opposed to small company
plans, which were more likely to be integrated, particularly plans
covering salaried employees.4 Sixty-four percent of smaller plans
covering twenty-five or fewer employees-accounting for about
10% of all covered workers-were integrated, whereas only 29%
of large plans-covering 90% of workers-were integrated.428
Most integrated plans were not complete offset plans-that is, they
provided some benefits based on earnings below the integration
level.429
Many analysts argued that integration did not result in sub-
stantially lower benefits for most low-wage workers, particularly
since pure offset plans, which would eliminate pension benefits al-
together for some workers, were almost nonexistent.4 Thus, even
though the practice of integration was widespread, its impact on
individual workers could be viewed as not particularly severe since
most employers refrained from the maximum permissible integra-
tion levels.
The data are not conclusive as to the effect of integration on
individual workers in the wide variety of plans using integration;
however, the law clearly allowed for very substantial reductions in
low-wage worker pensions:
Under [pre-1986] law, low-wage and short-service work-
ers sometimes received little or no benefit from an inte-
grated pension plan. Firms could offset as much as 83-1/3
425. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 44 U.S.C.).
426. See PAPER No. 18, supra note 374, at 174.
427. See id. at 175.
428. See iL
429. See id.
430. See SCHULZ & LEAvrrr, supra note 14, at 55-56.
[Vol. 30:1063
EVOLUTION OF ENTITLEMENT
percent of the social security benefit from the pension ac-
crual. Since the replacement rate values of social security
benefits are proportionately higher for lower-wage work-
ers, offsetting a large percentage of the social security
benefit against the pension accrual in some cases wiped
out the entire pension. Simply stated, the social security
offset was larger than the pension accrual. In still other
cases, short-service workers had their entire pension ac-
crual offset by their full-career social security benefit.
This was true even at relatively high earnings levels.431
Analysts might well argue that if most employers did not use
integration to reduce benefits to the maximum level allowed by
the law, then limits that reduced that maximum level should not
present any substantial additional costs for employers. The feroc-
ity of employer opposition to changes in integration is indicative of
a perhaps greater level of savings realized by the practice than can
be surmised simply from the survey data.
B. Attempts to "Reform" Integration
The first attempt to eliminate or substantially amend integra-
tion in the statute came in 1954 when Congress undertook a com-
plete revision and codification of the Internal Revenue Code.432
The House version of that legislation contained a provision that
would have replaced the discretionary language in the statute with
a bright-line rule allowing employers to simply disregard the first
$4000 of employee compensation in benefits provided under a pri-
vate plan.433 The Senate rejected this approach and suggested fur-
ther study because of the impact on many plans.44 While criticism
of integration continued, the next major reform effort did not oc-
cur until almost twenty years later.
The private pension promise remained almost as elusive in the
postwar period as it had been in the early years of the century.
Without requirements for funding and vesting of benefits, employ-
ers in noncollective bargaining situations had great freedom to de-
431. GEOFFREY KOLLMAN ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PUB. No.
94-974 EFFECT OF PENSION INTEGRATION ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS 8-9 (1994).
432. See Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 1 (superseding the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939). The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was redesig-
nated the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by Pub. L. No. 99-514, 52, 100 Stat. 2085).
433. See PAPER No. 18, supra note 374, at 192.
434. See id.
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sign plans that would benefit few rank-and-file workers or those
who left the employer before retirement age. The wholesale re-
view of pension laws undertaken as part of the development of
ERISA legislation in the early 1970s was motivated primarily by
concern for the failure of employers to fulfill the pension promises
made to employees.435
The perception among policymakers that integration was
simply a way of depriving employees of promised pension benefits
led to a concerted effort to eliminate integration as part of ERISA
in 1974.436 A statement in the report of the House Ways and
Means Committee describing the House version of ERISA's pro-
vision on integration accurately summarized the dilemma of law-
makers attempting to ensure that workers received the full benefit
of both Social Security and private pensions in the context of a
voluntary employer-provided system:
On the one hand, the objective of the Congress in in-
creasing social security benefits might be considered to be
frustrated to the extent that individuals with low and
moderate incomes have their private retirement benefits
reduced as a result of the integration procedures. On the
other hand, your committee is very much aware that
many present plans are fully or partly integrated and that
elimination of the integration procedures could substan-
tially increase the cost of financing private plans. Em-
ployees, as a whole, might be injured rather than aided if
such cost increases resulted in slowing down the rate of
growth of private retirement plans.437
As a compromise, the House bill contained a provision to
prohibit integrated pension plans from reducing the pension bene-
fits already being paid based on increases in social security benefit
levels.4 8 In the conference on ERISA, a substitute provision was
435. See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in U.S.
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 6 (1984). In particular, the case of Studebaker
workers who were denied pensions when the company ceased operations, despite
decades of employment and coverage under the plan, provoked widespread public
indignation and subsequent congressional reaction. See id. at 8.
436. See STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974,
at 1715-16 (Comm. Print 1976).





agreed on, which would have frozen the integration level at its
1971 amount until June 30, 1976. This would have essentially for-
bidden plans to increase the integration level based on increases in
Social Security benefits during that period although plans that had
already increased their levels would not have been required to re-
duce them to the 1971 level.439 Even though this provision was
agreed upon in the conference report as approved by both houses,
the outcry from employers created such pressure for repeal that in
an unusual move, a concurrent resolution calling for further study
of integration and deleting the section from the final version of the
legislation was approved before it could take effect. 
4 4
The pressure for reform continued with the Carter admini-
stration's 1978 proposal to overhaul the rules completely. l This
proposal was based on the common criticism that the private pen-
sion system did not adequately provide for lower-paid workers,
partly as a result of the reduction integration allowed in benefits
for those workers and despite the tax subsidy provided to employ-
ers to induce such coverage." 2 The administration's proposal at-
tempted to ensure that low-wage workers would receive at least a
minimal level of benefits by preventing a complete offset of the
private pension benefit. The proposal also attempted to limit the
replacement of earnings above the integration level to 2.1 times
the percentage of earnings replaced below the integration level.443
The effects of the administration's proposal for excess and for
offset plans are demonstrated in the following tables:"4
439. See id. at 174 n.5.
440. See id
[T]he ERISA Conference Committee both subsequently voted a "freeze"
on further integration as a temporary measure prior to full consideration of
the integration question. Employers stressed their fears that the freeze
could result in increased plan costs, because the plans could not increase
their level of integration by taking into account changes in the social secu-
rity wage base, or in social security benefit levels after 1971. Because of last
minute concerns by employers and pension practitioners, the freeze was
deleted by a concurrent resolution of the Congress.
Id.
441. See The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Hearings Be-
fore the Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong. 3 (1978) (testimony from panel of
experts opposing and supporting changes in integration).
442. See MUNNELL, supra note 46, at 56.
443. See id at 58.
444. Tables taken from MUNNELL, supra note 46, at 57-58 (notes to tables omit-
ted). Figures assume the employee retires at age 65 in 1982 with 35 years of service,
in a plan providing 50% of final average pay in the offset plan, 0% of pay below
$11,004, and 36% of pay above $11,004 in the excess plan. See id.
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BENEFITS AS A PERCENTAGE OF EARNINGS AT RETIREMENT
UNDER PRE-1986 LAW AND UNDER THE 1978 PROPOSAL
Statute/Proposal Final Average Pay
Excess Plan $5000 $15,000 $30,000 $50,000 $75,000 $100,000
PRE-1986 LAW
Pension only 0% 10% 23% 28% 31% 32%
Pension and SS 54% 46% 42% 39% 39% 38%
1978 ADMINISTRATION
PROPOSAL
Pension only 20% 24% 30% 32% 34% 34%
Pension and SS 74% 60% 49% 43% 42% 40%
Statute/Proposal FinalAverage Pay
Offset Plan $5000 $15,000 $30,000 $50,000 $75,000 $100,000
PRE-1986 LAW
Pension only 5% 20% 34% 40% 44% 45%
Pension and SS 59% 56% 53% 52% 52% 51%
1978 ADMINISTRATION
PROPOSAL
Pension only 23% 32% 40% 44% 46% 47%
Pension and SS 77% 68% 59% 55% 54% 53%
This proposal would have required employers to pay, in gen-
eral, at least half the amount of benefits to participants with wages
below the integration level as they paid employees with wages
above the integration level."5 While this proposal clearly estab-
lished a precedent for the "permitted disparity" integration rules
later enacted in the 1986 Tax Reform Act,"6 it took a somewhat
445. The proposal would have required that under excess plans, the percentage of
earnings replaced above the integration level could not be higher than 2.1 times the
percentage replaced below the integration level-the original proposal was 1.8, a
figure revised upwards after pressure from employers. Id. at 58 n.42. Under offset
plans, the offset percentage could not exceed the plan's general wage replacement
rate-so that if the plan provided benefits equal to 50% of final pay, the offset per-
centage could not exceed 50%. See id. at 58.
446. See infra Part V.D.
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simpler approach in attempting to provide something like a mini-
mum benefit level from pensions for low-wage employees. This
was an approach essentially designed to produce a specified in-
come result-that is, higher total benefits for low-wage workers
from the combination of pensions and Social Security.
Nonetheless, a substantial reduction in benefits through inte-
gration would still have been permitted under this provision, re-
flecting both employer pressure and the prevailing view-even of
reformers-that integration was necessary to prevent
"overpensioning":447
It is also my opinion that integration with Social Security
as now practiced is inconsistent with the special tax bene-
fits for qualified plans.... It makes no sense to allow in-
tegration if it leads to complete exclusion of the low paid
and limited benefits for the middle income group.
On the other hand, if Social Security could not be taken
into account, it would be impossible for an employer to
provide a pension adequate to replace pre-retirement
earnings for the higher paid without giving the lower paid
a combined annuity, from Social Security and the private
plan, in excess of 100 percent of their income while em-
ployed. Thus, integration does have a proper role.44
C. 1986 Tax Reform Act: "Permitted Disparity"
The 1986 Tax Reform Act,449 following the rejection of the
1978 Carter administration proposals, contained the first substan-
tial revision to the statutory rules governing integration since the
1942 Revenue Act.40 Most critics of integration approached the
tax reform debate from the perspective either of retirement in-
come adequacy needs or simple fairness to low-paid workers.
Most proponents of integration based their arguments on the need
to prevent "excess" replacement rates at low-income levels from
the combined benefits of Social Security and private pensions."'
447. See Altman, supra note 86, at 494-95.
448. Halperin, supra note 86, at 762.
449. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
450. See Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
451. See generally Mary E. O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking the Link Be-
tween Wages and Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1422, 1491 (1993) (arguing that low-wage
workers benefit from a higher Social Security replacement rate).
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The 1986 Act revisions, however, did not satisfy either camp;
as discussed below, the changes fell short of eliminating integra-
tion altogether while still attempting to eliminate or severely limit
the ability of employers to neutralize the effect of income redistri-
bution under Social Security. The errors lay in two areas: first, the
assumption that integration was necessary to prevent "excess" re-
placement rates from the combination of Social Security and pri-
vate pensions; and second, the determination that the best way to
limit integration's effects was to model a solution on the IRS ap-
proach of determining an "employer share" of the Social Security
benefit.
1. Framing the problem: 1986 Senate hearings
The positions of the parties involved-employers, pension ad-
vocates, and organized labor-were clearly articulated in a series
of hearings held by a subcommittee of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee in January 1986.42 While this subcommittee did not have
direct legislative jurisdiction over the tax bills that would inevita-
bly contain any substantive pension reforms, many of the concerns
expressed at this hearing are reflected in the later Senate version
of tax reform which in many aspects prevailed in conference with
the House in the summer of 1986.4"3
The proposed legislation, Senate Bill 1784, 4 would have re-
vised the then-current integration rules by imposing limits on inte-
gration to produce at least one-half of a nonintegrated benefit for
workers in integrated plans, thus focusing on the goal of ensuring
at least some pension benefit for low-income workers. 5 In testi-
mony before the subcommittee, advocates for pension recipients
and workers generally supported the proposed changes on the
grounds that they provided adequate retirement income to low-
wage workers.456
On the other hand, employer representatives generally op-
452. See Hearings on S. 1784 Before the Subcomm. on Savings, Pensions and In-
vestment Policy of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong. 1 (1986) [hereinafter
Hearings on S. 1784].
453. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
454. See Retirement Income Policy Act, S. 1784, 99th Cong. (1985).
455. See Hearings on S. 1784, supra note 452, at 31-36.
456. See id. at 219-21 (statement of Anne Moss, Deputy Director, The Pension
Rights Center); see id. at 234 (statement of Dr. William S. Hoffman, Director, Social
Security Department, United Automobile Workers of America).
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posed additional limits on integration that might result in replace-
ment rates in excess of 100% from a combination of Social Secu-
rity and private pensions for low-wage workers.4' Other industry
representatives, notably those speaking for small business, focused
on the cost to business created by limiting integration:
These limits [in the proposed legislation] simply do not
recognize a corporation's Social Security expense. Bell-
South believes that an integration method based on the
employer's Social Security contribution is a better alter-
native.... In an offset plan, the accrual could be reduced
by the employer's contribution to Social Security or, at a
minimum, by the Old Age Survivor portion of the em-
ployer's contribution.458
S. 1748 seeks to relieve financial pressure on the Social
Security System and so eliminates the ability of an em-
ployer to integrate a qualified pension with social security
for all employees whose earnings fall below the Social Se-
curity wage base.... As a result of the proposed legisla-
tion, an employer may suddenly find that he or she is
paying a substantial amount of money on behalf of each
employee for two mandated retirement systems. The
employer shoulders the burden of funding both systems
while the employee remains free of any responsibility 9
The employer perspective is clearly delineated in this testi-
mony. Social Security was viewed as a substitute for private pen-
sions, one for which employers were already paying, and repre-
sented a cost for which they should be allowed to take credit in
providing benefits in their private plans.
2. 1986 Tax Reform Act: House, Senate, and conference solutions
While the pension and benefit provisions of H.R. 3838-the
House version of the Tax Reform Act of 1986-were a major focus
of staff attention, as well as some members of Congress, the inte-
457. See id. at 141-42 (statement of Edward 0. Handy, Jr., Member, Board of Di-
rectors, ERISA Industry Committee); see id. at 313 (statement of the American
Council of Life Insurance).
458. Id. at 373 (statement of BellSouth Corporation).
459. Id. at 504-05 (statement of the National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness).
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gration rules were not a principal focus of the Bill.' However, in-
tegration provisions were ultimately included in both the House
and Senate Bills, principally a requirement in the House Bill that
the total integration percentage be accrued ratably over forty
years 1 and a more extensive provision in the Senate Bill that
would have: (1) reduced the permissible offset percentage to 50%
of the pension benefit otherwise due-as opposed to setting a per-
centage of PIA to set against the pension benefit; and (2) limited
the step-rate excess percentage above the integration level to two
times the percentage accruals below the integration level.42
The distinctions between the House, Senate, and conference
versions are chiefly technical. While both versions would have re-
tained integration as a permissible exception to the nondiscrimi-
nation rules, both attempted to limit the amount by which a low-
wage or short-term worker's benefits could be reduced. The
House Bill accomplished this by forcing ratable reductions based
on an integrated formula, effectively protecting short-term work-
ers from complete elimination of their pension benefits."' The
Senate Bill took a more direct approach, simply requiring that at
least 50% of the accrued pension benefit must be paid, regardless
of the offset that would otherwise result from an integrated for-
mula. 4'
In the Joint Committee on Taxation report prepared to docu-
ment the final conference agreement reached on August 16, 1986,
only brief descriptions of the agreement reached by the conferees
were included, leaving the details and statutory language for staff
to work out over the congressional recess.465 The entire explana-
tion of the tentative agreement is as follows: "[The] House re-
cedes with simplified rules to limit disparities to levels comparable
460. The major impetus for the specific legislation that became the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, the Treasury Report to the President, Treasury Department's Tax Reform
for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, released November 27, 1984, con-
tained major proposals for revising the nondiscrimination rules for private pensions
but no recommendation concerning integration. H.R. 3838, the House Bill version
of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, did contain a modification to integration, as discussed
below, but the overall thrust of tax reform was generally to broaden the tax base and
dramatically reduce tax rates. See H.R. 3838, 99th Cong. § 101 (1985).
461. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 99-841, pt. 2, at 431 (1986).
462. See id. at 432-35.
463. See id. at 431.
464. See id. at 432-35.
465. See Tax Reform Bill of 1986 Final Conference Committee Decisions, [36
Special 17] Fed. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 45 (Aug. 18, 1986).
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to disparities permitted under present law and with rules providing
for accrual of such disparities.""6
The staff, including the House Ways and Means Committee,
Senate Finance, Joint Committee on Taxation, Treasury, and IRS
staff, proceeded to spend the next month developing the most ex-
tensive change in integration rules since 1942.46 The final confer-
ence report in September described the conference agreement as
generally following both the House Bill and the Senate Bill with
certain modifications. Most importantly,
in order to limit the extent to which an employer may in-
crease, relative to the present law integration rules, the
disparity between benefits accruing with respect to com-
pensation above and below the integration level, addi-
tional limits on such disparity are applied ....
The additional limits.., on the permitted disparity are
a simplified form of the present-law integration rules,
modified to eliminate the need for offset plans to deter-
mine an employee's actual lifetime social security benefit,
provide for parity between offset plans and excess plans..
. and eliminate the adjustments for integrated ancillary
benefits (except for early retirement benefits).46
One principal aim of the staff was to make the integration
rules more consistent with the current social security benefit struc-
ture and
to prevent employers from taking credit for the whole
weighted portion of the social security benefit that goes to
low-income employees. We did this by limiting the re-
duction in employee pensions to an amount equal to the
employer-provided portion (essentially one-half) of the
social security benefit paid to a worker at just below aver-
466. Id
467. As is not uncommon in tax legislation, the Conference Committee members
did not have statutory language before them during the conference deliberations in
August 1986. Personal observation by author of the Conference Committee on
Taxation deliberations, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 1986). The conference agreement
was agreed to by House and Senate conferees late in the evening of August 16, 1986.
The Conference Report and the Statement of Managers was filed on September 18,
1986. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-841 (1986). For a vivid and largely accurate por-
trayal of the genesis and enactment of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, see JEFFREY H.
BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH: LAWMAKERS,
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987).
468. See H.R. CoNF. REP., supra note 461, at 435.
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age wages.469
The legislation substituted the concept of "permitted dispar-
ity" between low- and high-wage workers in a formula taking ac-
count of Social Security benefits or contributions with the older
concept of substituting Social Security benefits for private pension
benefits for low-wage workers.470 In this way the principle was es-
tablished that a 100% offset of pension benefits with Social Secu-
rity benefits was not permissible.
At the same time, the permitted disparity concept further re-
inforced the comparative approach of the nondiscrimination rules
generally by allowing substantial, but not "excessive," differences
between pension benefits based on an "unweighted" Social Secu-
rity benefit.471 In other words, the concept was to allow employers
credit for some portion of the Social Security benefit-that portion
that could be said to be a substitute for what they would have
provided in the pension benefit in the absence of Social Security, a
strictly proportionate benefit. But employers were not to be al-
lowed credit for that part of the Social Security benefit that went
beyond proportionate to redistributive.
In general, then, section 401()472 was based on the same mis-
apprehension about the nature of the relationship between em-
ployer contributions and Social Security as the IRS's long history
of rulings had been based on. In accepting the premise that an
"employer-provided portion" of the Social Security benefit ex-
isted, the legislation inevitably produced a level of integration that
might be lower for some low-wage workers but that nonetheless
perpetuated the violation of entitlement principles inherent in in-
tegration.
D. 1986 Act Analysis: Was the Game Worth the Candle?
Despite the fears expressed at the time of the 1986 Tax Re-
form Act, the death of integration has been greatly exaggerated. 3
469. Confidential memorandum from Patricia Dilley to Rob Leonard, Chief Tax
Counsel, Committee on Ways and Means (Sept. 16, 1986) (on file with the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review).
470. See 26 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
471. See id § 401(l).
472. See id.
473. Industry representatives expressed surprise and even outrage at the new
rules, while commentators immediately began developing technical problems created
by the new statute, most of which surfaced in the process of development of succes-
sive sets of regulations. See infra note 474.
[Vol. 30:1063
EVOLUTION OF ENTITLEMENT
In fact, as more stringent nondiscrimination rules are put in place,
the use of integration to preserve existing benefit and contribution
formulae that would otherwise be discriminatory may have stayed
constant, despite the limits placed on integration itself.
Since the effective date for the provision was repeatedly de-
layed pending development of implementing regulations,4 4 there is
limited data on the actual impact of the new integration regula-
tions. In theory, several problems can be identified, particularly
the extent to which integration can still be used to severely reduce
benefits for low-wage workers.475 Nonetheless, an analysis done by
the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in 1994 concludes that
the 1986 Act modifications accomplished a principal goal: to pre-
vent elimination of private pension benefits for low-wage and
short-service workers.475
While benefits can still be reduced through the use of the
permitted disparity rules, the new law ensures that employees
vested in an employer pension plan will receive at least some pen-
sion benefits.47 Nonetheless, despite the fact that the 1986 Act ap-
peared to have influenced plan sponsors to change their integra-
474. After a series of proposed regulations were raised based on public comment,
final regulations on all the nondiscrimination rules were issued on September 12,
1991, but then were further amended and issued in final form on August 31, 1993.
While the 1986 Tax Reform Act provisions were effective for plan years beginning
after 1988, the final regulations were effective for plan years after 1993. The regula-
tions state that a good faith compliance standard would be applied in the interim.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.401()-6-(a)-(L) (1991).
475. While praising the 1986 rules as simpler and as channeling more pension
benefits to low-paid workers, Altman severely criticizes the legislation for retaining
the basic concept of the integration level and for replacing "the current integration
rules with mechanical rules lacking any conceptual basis." Altman, supra note 86, at
488. She demonstrates that workers just above the integration level may end up with
a lower total replacement rate than workers lower on the income scale and states
that if the employer wishes to raise benefits for the middle-income worker, total re-
placement rates for the low-paid worker would have to approach 100%. See id. at
490-92. While there is substantial merit to Altman's complaints about the 1986 Act,
there are two basic problems with her approach. First, with respect to her critique of
the 1986 Act, much of the disparity in total replacement rates between people very
close on the wage scale appears to be an outgrowth of the integration level itself, as
Altman points out, and not a result of the 1986 Act revisions. See id. at 489. More
importantly, her criticism would have been more telling if she had discussed more
fully the .75% excess allowance percentage, since the basis for it was acceptance of
the proposition-fundamental to integration in general-she so roundly criticizes
elsewhere in the article, namely, that employers pay for half of Social Security bene-
fits and should be given credit for it.
476. See KOLLMANN ET AL., supra note 431, at 15.
477. See id- at 5.
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tion methods from offset to excess, the CRS study also concludes
that as of 1991, 54% of all pension participants were still covered
by integrated plans.48
The CRS study also compares the replacement rates achieved
by long-term workers under nonintegrated plans with the results
under plans integrated under the old law and under the 1986 Act
provision. For workers with thirty-five years of service under a
typical nonintegrated plan allowing accrual of benefits equal to
1% of final average compensation for each year of service, the
combination of Social Security and the private pension benefit re-
sults in total benefits equal to 120% of final earnings of $5000.47"
Given that only 8% of full-time workers earning under $10,000 per
year are covered by a pension plan at all, this replacement rate in
excess of 100% seems unlikely to be a very common phenomenon.
For workers with final years' earnings of at least $7500 or
higher, total income replacement in a nonintegrated plan falls be-
low 100%, equaling around 80% for final earnings of around
$20,000 and gradually declining to 48.4% for final earnings of
$95,000. In comparison, for workers covered by a typical offset in-
tegrated plan-allowing only a partial offset against the Social Se-
curity benefit-the new law would provide slightly higher re-
placement rates than the old law would have for workers earning
less than $10,000. In other words, the new law would have no ef-
fect at higher earnings levels under offset plans. However, for
plans taking maximum advantage of the integration formulae al-
lowed under both old and new law, the new law could result in
substantially higher replacement rates particularly for low-paid
workers but also potentially for high-wage workers."'
In summary, the permitted disparity rules may reduce the
maximum benefit reductions allowed by pension integration, but it
seems unlikely that the new formula will affect most workers at
average wage levels under more typical integrated plans. None-
theless, the most serious problem with the approach of the 1986
Act lay not in its technical details but in its fundamental assump-
tions. The stated aim of the staff in developing the 1986 Act ap-
proach of "permitted disparity" was based on the idea that an ac-
curate measure of the portion of the Social Security benefit that
employers "paid" for, apart from the social benefit of redistribu-
478. See id. at 7.
479. See id. at 8.
480. See id. at 9.
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tion, could be determined.
As discussed above, however, the financing of Social Security
is functionally unrelated to benefits paid under the system, and
thus the technical structure of the permitted disparity rules is built
on a serious theoretical misapprehension. While the new rules
probably improve the end result for lower-paid workers in com-
parison with pre-1986 law, the premise is no less flawed than the
basis for the original integration provisions.
In addition, as shown by the CRS data, so few workers at the
lowest wage levels are likely be covered by private pensions that
the goal of preventing excess replacement rates from the combi-
nation of Social Security and private pensions seems hardly worth
pursuing even if one accepts the premise that a final replacement
rate percentage should be imposed on that combination. More
importantly, integration, even as modified by the 1986 Tax Reform
Act, presents an inescapable contradiction to the principle of enti-
tlement by allowing a loophole out of the nondiscrimination rules
that would otherwise guarantee workers a full pension benefit in
addition to their Social Security benefit.
VII. CRITIQUE OF INTEGRATION: ENTITLEMENT PRINCIPLES,
POOR RELIEF RESULT
After over fifty years of debate and attempts at repeal, the in-
tegration rules are still a widely used feature of the nondiscrimina-
tion regime. The critiques of integration tend to fall into two cate-
gories: those based on adequacy of retirement income and those
attacking the argument that employers "pay" for Social Security.
While both types of criticisms are valid, there are counter argu-
ments to each that are relied on by employers and many pension
analysts to preserve integration in the face of legislative change.
Both critics and defenders have based their arguments essentially
on the results of integration; neither side has focused on the essen-
tial entitlement principles of Social Security with which integration
is fundamentally inconsistent.
Some pension experts have continued to call for revision of
the integration provisions for a variety of reasons summed up by
the CRS study of integration:
While integration reflects the employer's cost of social
security and serves to minimize the cost of providing a
voluntary private pension, it also has the practical effect
of partially or totally denying private pension benefits for
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individuals whose earnings are below the social security
wage base.
... [T]he concept of integration raises questions of equity
toward the lower and moderate wage earner.
The view that social security benefits attributable to
employer taxes are, in effect, part of the employer's pri-
vate pension plan can be questioned. Yet, this is the ra-
tionale behind the Internal Revenue Service's derivation
of the integration guidelines. Indeed, many economists
state that workers as a class bear the ultimate cost of so-
cial security contributions (and even the cost of private
pensions, for that matter).
To the extent that integration procedures reduce private
pensions of individuals with low and moderate incomes,
these procedures may be deemed to frustrate the intent of
social security increases provided by Congress.48'
Yet even critics of integration concede that a problem of
"excess replacement rates" from the combination of Social Secu-
rity and private pensions still exists: "However, if social security
benefits were not considered in establishing private plan benefit
formulas, the income replacement rate from combined public and
private benefits might exceed 100 percent for certain lower wage
earners.'4 ' The solution supported in the CRS paper logically re-
sults from focusing on income targets with a view to assuring ade-
quate but not excessive income in retirement:
[T]he integration guidelines could be based upon some
congressionally approved income replacement objectives,
that (a) would assume a Federal responsibility to provide
a certain standard of income replacement at various in-
come levels through a public system, and (b) would offer
tax incentives for the private pension system to supple-
ment the public system up to certain maximum levels.
Low-wage earners may be found to need practically 100
percent income replacement, with the rate gradually de-
creasing as income increases. Higher income individuals
who wish to make up the difference between their pre-
retirement income and the congressionally defined stan-




dard of combined public and private income replacement
could do so through voluntary saving!"
This proposal, like most other reform proposals, focuses on
providing some measure of "adequate" income for all workers
from the combination of Social Security and private pensions.
Such a focus tends to downplay Social Security's role in redistrib-
uting income, apart from assuming that private pensions have a
smaller part to play in achieving an adequate replacement rate for
low-income workers.
Nonetheless, if the role of redistribution is important to the
success of Social Security in assuring, and perhaps inducing, mass
retirement and maintenance of above-poverty level consumption
in retirement, any integration "solution" must preserve it. Thus,
before addressing the shortcomings of the various standard cri-
tiques of integration, it is necessary to turn to the question of redis-
tribution itself and whether Social Security's redistributive effect is
significant enough to be concerned with.
A. The Problem of Integration and Social Security Redistribution
During the postwar period Social Security was greatly ex-
panded in coverage, as described above, and benefit levels contin-
ued to increase. By the 1960s retirement was firmly entrenched
in the working life-cycle, and most Americans expected and
planned to retire by age sixty-five, if not earlier.40 In fact, labor
force participation rates of men over age sixty continued to decline
into the 1990s to the point that age sixty-five was only a theoretical
retirement age for most workers who preferred to retire at age
sixty-two or even earlier. The end result of the expansion of Social
Security was a greatly enlarged role for the program in assuring
retirement income for almost all workers at all points of the wage
scale, except for the highest paid whose Social Security benefits
would continue to be quite small in comparison with their earn-
ings.
The redistribution in the Social Security benefit formula can
be demonstrated by looking at the initial benefits payable to
workers at various income levels. The following table compares
the Social Security PIA, which is the basic age sixty-five retirement
483. IL at 188.
484. See MYERS, supra note 34, at 229-371.
485. See, e.g., ACHENBAUM, supra note 122, at 105-08 (discussing the establish-
ment of 65 as the benchmark retirement age by 1960).
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benefit for workers at low, average, and maximum lifetime earn-
ings, and the replacement rates for each.
Retirees in January 1994 January 1994 PIA Replacement
Rate
Low earner (45% of $ 505.30 57.4%
average earnings)
Average earner $ 829.80 42.4%
($23,532 in 1993)
Maximum earner $ 1147.50 24.0%
($57,600 in 1993)
These figures show the theoretical degree of redistribution in
the Social Security benefit formula-obviously the lower the aver-
age wage, the higher the replacement rate. If the effect of family
benefits is added in, replacement rates for the low-wage earner can
approach 90%, while the maximum earner's rate increases only to
about 35%. Thus, low-wage workers clearly receive more than a
strictly proportional benefit, and high-wage earners receive a less
than proportional benefit. Even for low-wage earners, however,
Social Security provides only a base of income with a substantial
role left for private pensions and savings to play in assuring ade-
quate income in retirement, except in the case of a lifetime, ex-
treme low-wage worker with dependents receiving benefits; such a
family might receive close to 100% replacement of pre-retirement
earnings from Social Security alone.
Recent economic studies have focused on the reality of this
theoretical redistribution, questioning whether the earnings basis
of the system has undercut redistributive goals. One such recent
study, for example, proposes to analyze how Social Security redis-
tributes income by focusing on the "return" to workers of the
FICA tax contributions made to Social Security by them and their
employers in order to determine how much redistribution occurs
from a "lifetime" perspective:
A more thorough understanding of Social Security's re-
distributive nature requires moving to a lifetime perspec-
tive, that is, examiniing how Social Security benefits ac-
tually compare in value with tax contributions over a
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lifetime for people of different generations, income levels,
and family types .... Our approach... involves using
standard actuarial procedures to compare the value of the
annuity provided by Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
with the value of a private annuity or pension that could
be purchased with a worker's lifetime OASI contribu-
tions.46
This approach is based on the premise that the most accurate
measure of redistribution is the "net-transfer"-which compares
taxes paid into the system with benefits paid out over a lifetime to
each beneficiary:
A positive net-transfer-the difference between lifetime
benefits and taxes-means that an individual or family re-
ceives a subsidy above and beyond the fair annuity value
of contributions, whereas a negative net transfer indicates
that benefits are worth less than contributions. Those
with positive net transfers have lifetime income redistrib-
uted toward them, while those with negative net transfers
have lifetime income redistributed away from them.4
The conclusion reached by most analysts using this definition
of redistribution is that Social Security is most "redistributive" for
the generation currently receiving benefits since their contribu-
tions into the system-plus earnings on those contributions-could
not have provided an annuity equivalent to their current bene-
fits.4
This analysis maintains that Social Security has been
"regressive" in distribution of income within generations of work-
ers: "within a given cohort of retirees, net transfers have been in-
versely related to need: people with the highest lifetime incomes
have tended to receive the largest absolute transfers above and be-
yond what they contributed."' 9 While the author concedes that
the progressive benefit formula does provide a "higher rate of re-
turn on contributions"49° for low-wage earners, he points out that
because benefit levels rose so substantially through 1977, and are
indexed for inflation, the benefits accruing to high-wage workers
are in absolute dollar terms much higher than a progressive benefit
486. Steuerle & Bakija, supra note 15, at 1766.
487. Id. at 1767.
488. See iL at 1767-69.
489. Id. at 1768.
490. Id.
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structure should be expected to provide.491' The comparative level
of redistribution to low-wage workers is counterbalanced by the
sheer size of benefits received by high-wage workers under the
proportional formula.49
The essential flaw in this "return on investment" analysis is
the supposition that a public entitlement system should be evalu-
ated just as a private pension system might be-by comparing tax
payments to benefit returns. In such an analytical framework, an
earnings-based entitlement is recast into a contribution-based en-
titlement, and is evaluated according to its ability to fulfill what-
ever objective is most important to the analyst. A benefit struc-
ture tied to earnings levels will necessarily produce higher benefits
for high-wage workers even though it might pay higher than
strictly proportional benefits to low-wage workers. Thus, any
earnings-based benefit system must inevitably fall short when
viewed in such a framework, whether the goal is redistributing in-
come to the low-wage workers or providing an adequate "rate of
return" on contributions by high-wage workers.
This framework, however, misses the essential point of earn-
ings-based public entitlements, which is to provide the assurance
of minimally adequate benefit payments in order to induce retire-
ment, an assurance which, given the history of the American re-
tirement income system, 4 3 can only be based on a right that is
earned, regardless of how it is paid for. Again, the "money's
worth" analysis confuses the contributory financing system with
the earnings basis for benefit payments, mistaking the symbolic
function of FICA tax contributions as a representation of the work
by which a beneficiary earns his or her entitlement for a literally
contributory pension scheme.
As discussed above, the contributory financing structure was
intended in large part to limit funds available to spend on Social
Security benefits in order to stave off successive increases in bene-
fits such as had been enacted for the Civil War pension system.494
However, FICA tax contributions by workers represent more than
a limited source of revenue for benefits-the payroll tax system
serves as a tangible representation of earnings upon which enti-
tlement to benefits is found, performing a dual function of financ-
491. See id.
492 See id at 1768-69.
493. See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
494. See discussion supra Part IV.
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ing benefits while also communicating worthiness.
The proper measure of redistribution is not how contributions
compare to benefits but instead how the benefits paid out to low-
wage workers compare to the level of income needed to maintain
an independent life in retirement, at an income level comparable
to-or even improving on for those at the bottom of the wage
scale-the income level while working. This is, after all, the point
of redistribution to begin with. Under this measure, as well, the
redistribution of the Social Security benefit formula may fall short
of some standard of adequacy, indicating that perhaps some in-
crease in the progressivity of the benefit structure is in order.
However, given the fundamental point of Social Security and
private pension entitlement-which is that individually earned
rights are the only legitimate basis for entitlement-insufficiency
or surplus of income in retirement is generally a consequence that
must be addressed through programs outside the entitlement sys-
tem-needs-based benefits to supplement insufficient income or
higher progressive tax rates to reduce surplus income. Pension in-
tegration, in contrast, seeks to address one possible consequence
of redistribution-surplus income in retirement from the combi-
nation of pensions and Social Security-through a consequence-
based system without regard for entitlement principles.
B. Integration and Adequacy of Retirement Income
Critics of integration have frequently proceeded from the ba-
sic precept that private pensions should be combined with Social
Security to produce adequate total retirement income and that in-
tegration undercuts that goal.495 The prospective redistribution of
the Social Security benefit formula provides a cushion to make up
for deficiencies that are likely to exist upon retirement because of
low wages, low pension amounts among them. Therefore, redistri-
bution cannot be considered a substitute for pensions for low-wage
workers-the weighting in the benefit formula barely serves to
compensate for lack of personal savings because of lack of surplus
income.
While the adequacy concern is important and these arguments
are valid, they are usually countered fairly easily by the argument
that private pensions are not designed to be antipoverty programs
495. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1784, supra note 452, at 219-21 (testimony of Anne
Moss, deputy director, Pension Rights Center).
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and that the task of ensuring adequacy is better met by needs-
based programs. The more compelling critique of integration lies
in its origin rather than its consequences.
Pension integration undercuts a principal goal of social insur-
ance, which is to provide a predictable benefit amount based on
past earnings, not current need, in order to assure workers even at
lower income levels that they will have an income cushion if they
voluntarily retire. This scheme is essential to the labor manage-
ment function of social insurance-providing assurance to workers
that work even at low wages will have its reward in adequate re-
tirement income.
More broadly, redistribution itself becomes a kind of second
level of social insurance-insuring against long periods of unem-
ployment or years out of the work force for child rearing or edu-
cation by giving higher proportional benefits to all those with low
average lifetime wages. The prophylactic antipoverty elements of
Social Security, as discussed above, were inextricably linked from
the beginning of the program to its "earned right" status: entitle-
ment and earnings, retirement and redistribution, were all part of
one package.
C. Integration and the "Employer Share" of Social Security
Proponents of integration argue that employers should be able
to treat their contributions to Social Security as part of their em-
ployees' overall retirement income package, thus reducing private
pension benefits to take account of Social Security, which they
have "paid for" through FICA taxes.496 Of course, this view is
questionable in light of the commonly accepted economic view
that private pensions represent a trade-off made by current work-
ers in the form of lower current pay in exchange for pension bene-
fits upon retirement.47 More importantly, this "employer credit"
rationale is based on the premise that Social Security is another
type of employer-provided, or at least partly employer-provided,
pension that private employers are fully justified in taking account
of in providing for their employees.
The response to this claim is usually that since current FICA
taxes pay for current retiree benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis,
employers cannot claim they are paying for part of their current
496. See MUNNELL, supra note 46, at 14-15.
497. See id. at 7-29.
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work force's retirement income.498 Moreover, in the markedly less
stable working environment today in which employees move from
job to job over their lifetimes, the relationship between any one
employer's FICA tax payments and a particular worker's ultimate
Social Security benefit is tenuous at best.
While both of these arguments are valid, they are vulnerable
to the counter argument that since intergenerational shifts of pro-
ductivity from the working to the nonworking are inherent in any
retirement income system, public or private, employer FICA con-
tributions today are simply a proxy for the FICA contributions of
tomorrow that will actually fund employee retirement benefits.
From that perspective, each cohort of employers is paying for the
last cohort of workers-and since the payments would be similar in
present value terms, the employer might still have a valid argu-
ment in favor of integration.
The real problem with this argument, however, is that the in-
dividual relationship upon which private pensions are based cre-
ates a very different type of entitlement than that created by the
"social compact" on which Social Security is based. Private pen-
sion benefits are grounded in the relationships and promises made
between employer and employee-a one-to-one relationship. In
contrast, Social Security benefits are grounded on the relationship
between the working and the nonworking and on promises of so-
cial support based on a past history of productive employment-a
"many-to-many" relationship.
Moreover, employee entitlement in Social Security benefits is
not based on contributions but on eamings.49 Employee contribu-
tions serve as a visible metaphor for earnings upon which benefits
are based, but both employees and employers finance the system
through FICA tax contributions that are not directly related to any
individual benefit amount. ° Thus, the presumption underlying
pension integration-that employers should get "credit" in their
private pension relationship for contributions to the public pro-
gram-is per se invalid. In financing the Social Security system,
employers are not paying for specific benefit amounts for any spe-
cific set of employees. They are in reality paying for redistribution
generally."'
498. See, e.g., ScHULz, supra note 190, at 157-62.
499. See discussion supra Part VI.
500. See discussion supra Part VI.C.2.
501. If one assumes the employee bears the entire FICA tax burden, employers
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D. Integration and "Overpensioning"
A final argument in defense of integration is that integration is
a necessary mechanism to ensure that low-wage workers do not re-
ceive "excessive" retirement income from the combination of So-
cial Security and private pensions' 2  This offshoot of the
"adequacy" rationale essentially argues against "overpensioning"
on the assumption that the goal of the retirement income system-
Social Security and private pensions together-should be to pro-
vide a relatively uniform level of retirement benefit, expressed as a
percentage of the worker's earnings level while employed to work-
ers at all wage levels, albeit with somewhat higher benefits going
to low-wage workers. 3
Such a view rests on the notion of fixed replacement rates.
Pension analysts usually assume that workers need to receive re-
tirement income equal to a fixed percentage of pre-retirement
earnings-frequently set at 80%. 5° Therefore, integration is seen
as a way to arrive at the proper replacement rate by a combination
of Social Security and private pension benefits, resulting in largely
public entitlement income for the low-paid and largely private en-
titlement income for the more highly paid.
From this perspective the redistributive features of Social Se-
curity are viewed as permitting employers to provide lower or no
pension benefits to low-paid workers on the grounds that these
workers are taken care of by the public system. Thus, in this
framework, the overall retirement income security system is ap-
propriately tiered: (1) Social Security provides total or a higher
portion of retirement income for the worker below the wage base;
(2) private pensions provide most income for the highest-wage
workers whose Social Security benefits make up an insignificant
portion of total retirement income; and (3) middle income workers
receive a more equal mix of Social Security and private benefits.
One problem with the overpensioning argument is that very
few workers run much of a risk of excess retirement income from
the combination of Social Security and private pensions, and those
that do are likely to be extremely poor, as the CRS study discussed
are administering the redistribution of their employees' income. This view may also
cast some doubt on the rationale for deducting the employer's FICA tax payments
under § 162 of the Code, but that inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article.
502. See MUNNELL, supra note 46, at 14-15.
503. Altman's "worker security proposal" is essentially based on this premise.
504. See SCHULZ, supra note 190, at 95-97.
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above demonstrates. The prospect of replacing more than 100%
of pre-retirement income of such workers with a combination of
Social Security and private pensions is hardly alarming. Those few
full time workers for whom such replacement would be possible
would necessarily have lifetime earnings so far below the poverty
level that some sort of subsidy in retirement, either through Social
Security or a direct means-tested program, would be inevitable.5
Perhaps more importantly, there is another possible view of
the proper relationship between Social Security and private pen-
sion entitlements that produces a different conclusion about the
function of redistribution in Social Security. After fifty years of
expansion to nearly universal coverage of the work force, Social
Security should more accurately be seen as a universal entitlement
for all workers in an economy built around the expectation of re-
tirement. From this perspective, the system's redistributive func-
tion becomes more important, insuring workers in retirement
against not just inability to work in old age but also against the
hazards of periodic unemployment or underemployment, inade-
quate education, and a host of other circumstances throughout
their lifetimes that may result in inadequate income in old age.
Under this view, the private pension system's role is to pro-
vide additional retirement income to all employees-in essence,
preserving the redistribution inherent in the Social Security benefit
formula and allowing workers to add whatever additional amounts
they can through private pensions and savings. The prospective
nature of Social Security's redistribution combined with the enti-
tlement character of the benefit means that even the poorest
workers with an excess replacement rate would have a claim on
retirement income relatively free of state intrusion into their cur-
rent economic state. This preservation of autonomy and control,
even in the context of a government subsidy, is what Social Secu-
rity redistribution was intended to provide and what pension inte-
gration undermines.
Pension reformers have been primarily concerned with design-
ing a public-private retirement income combination that would en-
sure provision of adequate but not excessive replacement rates.
5°6
505. See discussion supra Part VI.
506. See discussion supra Part VI. Prior to the extensions of Social Security Cov-
erage in the 1983 Social Security Amendments, many analysts viewed overpension-
ing as a legitimate problem, because workers earning a government pension de-
signed to serve as a combination Social Security/private pension could work a
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As a result, their suggested integration reforms were necessarily
based on indirect means-testing, just as integration itself is through
the use of targeted replacement rates. Such an approach violates
the essential principles of entitlement and freedom to accumulate
represented by both Social Security and private pensions. A
"worker security" goal of insuring that low-wage workers have
sufficient retirement income appears to be inevitably accompanied
by a corresponding concern that such workers not receive "too
much." Yet it is precisely this need assessment and income control
that old-age entitlements, from Civil War pensions to Social Secu-
rity, were intended to avoid.5 °
One alternative integration scheme, from a worker security
perspective, is to pick a target replacement rate for income at re-
tirement and allow employers to integrate plans with Social Secu-
rity only by subtracting the Social Security PIA from the target
replacement rate, with the private pension making up the differ-
ence! °" Such an approach would eliminate the notion of employer-
provided portions of Social Security from integration and would
focus the retirement system on combined income replacement
from both private and public systems. "The law should permit
qualified private pension arrangements to be integrated with So-
cial Security in only one situation. That situation is when, without
coordination, benefits from Social Security and qualified retire-
ment plans in combination will result in overpensioning a segment
of the work force."5 9
Thus, even this "worker security" framework would involve
some form of integration to prevent "excess" earnings replace-
ment consistent with most analyses of integration emphasizing
economic results, rather than principles of rights or entitlements
that workers earn under both public and private systems.510 Such
proposals have typically been based on a well-meaning but ulti-
mately manipulative concern for assuring sufficient, but not
"excessive," income maintenance for poor and middle-class work-
ers. The question, of course, is why the possibility of excess re-
relatively short time in Social Security-covered employment and receive the full
benefit of the redistributive benefit formula, despite lifetime high earnings in non-
covered employment. See, e.g., SCHULZ & LEAVnT, supra note 14, at 45-46. Such
"double-dipping" is less likely in light of the 1983 Act changes.
507. See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
508. See Altman, supra note 86, at 496-97.
509. Id. at 495.
510. See discussion supra Part V.
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placement rates has overridden fundamental entitlement princi-
ples as the primary policy concern.
Excess replacement rates for workers with lifetime minimum-
wage earnings appear to present an essentially moral problem.
Some analysts believe that the work disincentives inherent in re-
ceiving retirement income that exceeds working income require
some level of integration to reduce the excess total, despite the
probability that workers meeting this profile most likely had in-
adequate wages throughout their working life.51 ' However, even
when the focus is on results rather than basic principles, it is not at
all clear why excess replacement rates should be considered a
problem for the low-wage Social Security beneficiaries who might
receive them.
Without other sources of income, workers who could achieve
these excess replacement rates most likely required poverty-based
assistance even while working and could certainly be expected to
require it in old age. In 1939 the lifetime low-wage worker, in fact,
could have been predicted to be the intended maximum benefici-
ary of Social Security's redistributive benefit formula in order to
eliminate the need to turn to means-tested, poverty-based benefits
in old age.
The key element on which broad-based American retirement
income entitlements historically have been founded are worthiness
based on service-expanded in Social Security to include work in
covered employment-and predictability of receipt in old age. In-
come targets, whether indirectly through means-tested poverty
programs or total replacement rate targets to be met by a combi-
nation of Social Security and pension benefits, contradict this fun-
damental goal.
A "worker security" standard requires imposition of a retire-
ment income target based on some measure that is simply a syno-
nym for need. In contrast, both private and public earnings-based
retirement entitlements, consistent with their roots in American
poor law principles, reject the notion of needs-based targets in fa-
vor of opportunistic anarchy. A worker security integration plan
based on income targets does little or nothing to restore redistri-
bution since the target replacement rate would be set generally at
80% for all income levels, and Social Security and private pensions
would simply divvy up the total depending on whether the worker
511. See discussion supra Part VI.
April 1997] 1191
1192 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
is high-paid or low-paid. The notion of lifting up low-wage work-
ers through the progressive benefit formula to a level upon which
they would build pension and savings income is lost in a total re-
placement rate analysis.
Any worker security approach to integration that concentrates
on providing total replacement rates by combining Social Security
and private pensions is fundamentally inconsistent with the basic
"opportunity to accumulate" entitlement embedded in the Social
Security benefit formula. Moreover, allowing employers to elimi-
nate or reduce pensions to which their low-wage workers would
otherwise be entitled is a violation of the private entitlement guar-
anteed those workers by the nondiscrimination rules. Suggestions
based on a targeted replacement rate for retirement income are
inherently antithetical to the fundamental principle of Social Se-
curity: earned entitlement without the imposition of income stan-
dards from above.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The history of retirement income entitlements demonstrates
that economic rights have historically only achieved political and
public legitimacy in the American context when the right in ques-
tion is created through individual effort. Retirement entitlements
are qualitatively distinct precisely because they are completely
prospective-the very prospectiveness of the right to consumption
in retirement requires an absolute entitlement to be effective. The
integration rules developed by the IRS and the changes enacted in
1986 were a technical response to the political and philosophical
problem at the heart of retirement: how best to assure the pro-
spective income support for mass retirement for a population with
increasing life spans in a dynamic capitalist economy.
Social Security was the embodiment of the American tradition
of income support for the deserving elderly in which individual
autonomy and freedom from control by poor relief authorities was
earned by certain, but not all, categories of the elderly. This effort
to preserve the worthy from poor relief had its roots in English
Poor Laws, developing most clearly in the Civil War pensioh sys-
tem for veterans and their families.51 2 The perception of who was
deserving-that is, who had "earned" a right to income that would
prevent poverty in old-age-gradually broadened from needy and
512. See discussion supra Part III.
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disabled veterans to aged veterans to those who had worked for at
least a substantial part of a lifetime.
513
The prophylactic function of earned-ight pensions-to pre-
vent reliance on poor relief or the almshouse-can be clearly dis-
cerned in the line of public pension programs that began with
Revolutionary War pensions.5 4 The real distinction between So-
cial Security and its predecessors was its role in institutionalizing
retirement, along with the expectation of income support in old
age, in order to meet the needs of an advanced industrial economy
that was perceived to have more economic output than jobs.
Social Security represents a recognition of a social responsibil-
ity to ensure mass retirement in light of the social and economic
role that retirement came to play by the mid-twentieth century in
labor force management. While individuals were always assumed
to have principal responsibility for providing for themselves, Social
Security was a way of mediating that responsibility to take account
of economic cycles that might render individual effort meaningless
or inadequate as had occurred in the Great Depression.
All retirement income entitlements, private or public, are es-
sentially designed to assure workers that they can stop working
without fear of destitution. Antipoverty programs aimed at the
elderly poor have little or nothing to do with the phenomenon of
retirement. Social Security and employer-provided private pen-
sions, on the other hand, were developed in order to support and
encourage the decision to retire on a mass scale for workers at all
income levels. Social Security was not intended to change the dis-
tribution of wealth in American society generally but rather to
preserve it.515 The low level of benefits ensured a continued large
role for individual arrangements and opportunity to augment in-
come in retirement. Nonetheless, redistributive elements of Social
Security-the weighted benefit structure and the family benefit
payments-were a necessary part of the assurance that at least
minimally adequate income would be available in retirement with-
out reliance on poor relief.
However, given the deliberately low level of benefits provided
under Social Security, the retirement inducement could only be ef-
fective if workers expected to be able to add to their public bene-
fits through pensions, savings, and investments to whatever extent
513. See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
514. See discussion supra Part III.B.
515. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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chance or effort would permit. The entitlement structure of Social
Security embodies widely held liberal, democratic capitalist beliefs
in economic opportunity and individual responsibility in the con-
text of shared risk. The entitlement to Social Security benefits is
not an entitlement to a specific level of income in retirement but
rather entitlement to a predictable base of income plus the oppor-
tunity to accumulate.
The antipoverty aspects of Social Security are essentially an
informed gamble. Because redistribution in the benefit formula is
based on earnings while working, not on income in retirement,
there is a high probability, but not a certainty, that the benefits of
redistribution will accrue to workers who will be poor in retire-
ment as they were in their working lives. However, in keeping
with American faith in opportunity and distaste for poor relief,
workers at all earnings levels are free to better their income posi-
tions in retirement because they have the ability to accumulate
outside the Social Security system as much or as little additional
income or assets that chance or effort affords.
In contrast, targeted income assistance programs are inevita-
bly class-based, static, and manipulative-poor people must be
categorized as poor before they can receive assistance, and they
are subject to continual control and eligibility determinations from
authorities dispensing the aid so that the public can be assured that
only the deserving needy receive public relief. This approach to
poverty is not a twentieth or even nineteenth century phenome-
non; from the English Poor Law to Aid to Families with Depend-
ent Children (AFDC),16 American public welfare for the poor has
centered on determinations of worthiness as well as of destitu-
tion. 7 The American retirement income system, public and pri-
vate, developed out of a tradition of saving the most worthy eld-
erly-first veterans, then workers-from recourse to poor relief in
old age, based on the notion of earned entitlement to benefits that
once "earned" would not be subject to judgment or control from
authorities 8
When mass retirement became a perceived necessity of indus-
trial capitalism in the twentieth century, earned entitlement com-
bined with some redistribution became the natural basis for the
retirement expectation. The ideological force behind the Social
516. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1994).
517. See GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED, supra note 23, at 37.
518. See discussion supra Parts II-111.
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Security entitlement is the American belief in capitalism itself-
that effort should and will be rewarded by the marketplace. The
innovation of Social Security was to provide a mechanism for some
sharing of the risks of that marketplace, a mechanism that was
only politically acceptable because its entitlement structure was
consistent with the core belief in economic and social mobility.
The private pension system in the United States, on the other
hand, developed in the pre-income tax years primarily as a source
of capital formation and as a cheap labor tool-a way for employ-
ers to encourage stability in their labor forces without actually be-
ing obligated to expend much in the way of pensions. Once the in-
come tax was enacted and the tax benefits of private pension trusts
began to play a role in employer decisions to establish plans, Con-
gress and the IRS were compelled to address the question of the
proper tax treatment for pension plans and of whether employers
should be able to get a deduction for funds set aside in a trust that
would eventually benefit only the employer or a few highly paid
executives. Far from narrowly focusing on tax avoidance, the
nondiscrimination rules for private pensions mirrored the values
embedded in the Social Security system-that is, if retirement is an
expectation of workers at all levels, private pensions should bear
some of the burden of that expectation by providing some benefits
to low-wage workers.
Pension integration represents an exception that in some cases
swallowed the rule of nondiscrimination, based on the fundamen-
tally mistaken premise that Social Security is simply a part of the
employer's pension provision for employees and that the employer
has in some way "paid" for all or a portion of employee benefits
and therefore should be given "credit" in the nondiscrimination
scheme for that payment. The contributory financing structure of
Social Security is best viewed in relation to benefits as a represen-
tation of earnings that are the real basis for entitlement. Yet the
emphasis placed on contributory financing, intended to solidify
public recognition of the legitimacy of the Social Security entitle-
ment based on individual effort, led to the illusion that the system
was really a contributory pension plan in the private pension sense.
The entire technical structure of the integration rules is based on
this fundamentally flawed perception of the basis of the Social Se-
curity entitlement.
Even those who have rejected the "employer share" argument
for integration have nonetheless continued to support the notion
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that there is some need to coordinate the results of public with pri-
vate entitlements. The focus of integration critics and supporters
alike on providing level replacement rates for retirement income
for workers at all levels reveals an unwillingness to live with the
consequences of entitlement-that some people may receive more
in retirement than they earned while they were working while oth-
ers might not have enough to maintain their pre-retirement stan-
dard of living.
Yet the entire point of entitlement in this context is the free-
dom of individuals to earn or not earn what they will. Again, it is
the faith in economic democracy and opportunity to accumulate
that necessitates earnings as a basis for entitlement. The fact that
this entitlement is tied to retirement makes the social mechanism
of Social Security and the redistribution benefit formula necessary.
Social Security redistribution is essential to the public goal of un-
derwriting retirement for low- and middle-income workers, but the
right to the benefit must be inviolable and unrelated to income
goals if retirement is to occur.
Thus, if both private and public benefit entitlements are re-
spected, there can be no final income goal imposed; target re-
placement rates for low-wage workers that might justify integra-
tion serve as a substitute for the old English Poor Law in the
modern setting. Suggestions to base a new coordination of private
pensions with Social Security on level replacement rates miss the
point of Social Security. As the first tier of broad-based retire-
ment income support for almost all citizens, its benefits are a uni-
versally accessible entitlement earned by participation in the labor
force, that can only be effective in assuring prospective consump-
tion if it has the same inviolability as private rights.
The effect of Social Security's redistribution for the lowest-
income workers is perhaps to improve their retirement income
position in order to induce retirement, while allowing further im-
provement through additional effort that might result in private
pensions and savings. Integration contravenes this prophylactic
approach to- old-age poverty by lowering pension benefits avail-
able from one or more of an employee's pension plans. Thus, the
entitlement popularly presented as an inviolable and purely pri-
vate entitlement-the private pension-emerges under examina-
tion as an equally mediated right, affected by public policy per-




What, then, would be the result of living with the conse-
quences of rigorously respected retirement entitlement rights, a
framework in which pension integration were abolished? One re-
sult might be that some low-wage workers would receive more in
pension benefits than they earned while they were working. The
other result might be the elimination of private pension plans by
employers, as has been the perennial threat in face of efforts to
limit integration, because of the increased costs of providing the
desired level of benefits to high-wage workers while still providing
the required comparable benefits to low-wage workers.5 9
With respect to the first result, it is unclear why such excess
replacement of earnings presents a problem. Workers whose
earnings were so low throughout life that they would receive such
excess retirement income are clearly still at an income level at or
near the poverty level and would require public support from some
source in any event. One of the major purposes of the Social Se-
curity entitlement since its inception has been to prevent the need
for poor relief for those elderly who had worked throughout their
lives but still did not have sufficient retirement income because of
low wages, bad fortune, ill health, periodic unemployment, or
other circumstances unrelated to lack of personal effort-
worthiness.520 It is difficult to see why it is preferable to force this
group of the elderly poor to seek the modem equivalent of poor
relief instead of receiving both of their earned entitlements-their
pensions and Social Security.
With respect to the possible diminution of private pensions, at
least a couple of responses are possible. First, we might begin to
reexamine the concept of retirement itself as the nature of work
continues to radically change and the employer-employee relation-
ship begins to erode. Public retirement entitlements were viewed
as necessary to provoke retirement at age sixty-five for a host of
economic reasons including labor force management in an indus-
trial capitalist economy, stimulation of consumption, and preser-
vation of social stability in an economy that was not producing
employment at levels sufficient to prevent poverty in old age.
While these propositions may still be valid, the wholesale expecta-
tion of ceasing work at age sixty-five or even seventy may no
519. See, e.g., Revenue Revision of 1942, supra note 367, at 2488 (commenting that
the proposal would eliminate all plans except purely savings plans).
520. See discussion supra Part IV.
521. See discussion supra Part IV.
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longer be appropriate-a more flexible approach to work force
participation may need to be developed.
Second, we might shift more of the responsibility for providing
retirement income to the public entitlement sphere if private enti-
tlements are not available. Private effort alone has never under-
written mass retirement, which is essentially a phenomenon of the
last forty years, coinciding with the expansion of Social Security. If
employers find the costs of individually established retirement en-
titlements too high to bear, it may be appropriate to revisit the
Social Security benefit structure to increase redistribution to better
insure low-wage worker retirement and to raise replacement rates
at the middle-income level in recognition of diminished private
pension opportunities.
Retirement savings are now a major source of investment
capital, so much so that many are calling for transformation of at
least part of the Social Security entitlement to benefits into some-
thing more like an IRA. The trend toward employer-provided de-
ferred compensation and investment plans such as 401(k) cash or
deferred arrangements, which are essentially incentive savings
plans, is already evidence that employers continue to view pension
plans most favorably as a source of capital formation best designed
to leave most of the risk of economic cycles with the individual
worker.
Elimination of integration could have the effect of accelerat-
ing these trends reducing worker retirement entitlements to the
status of private stock portfolios, which might not prove adequate
to fund a long life after work. Yet the lessons of the 1930s are still
relevant even into the twenty-first century-capitalist economies
by their very nature produce both winners and losers with little re-
gard to socially recognized interests of economic and political
stability. The evolution of the American idea of entitlement shows
that socially mediated responsibility for economic support of the
nonworking elderly is neither a new nor an outmoded concept.
In fact, in the face of an increasing elderly population that will
reach its zenith in the first decades of the next century as the baby
boom generation attains old age, the need for social income re-
sponsibility most likely will increase, not diminish. In the Ameri-
can tradition of recognized economic rights earned through per-
sonal effort, pension integration is a truly outmoded concept, and
discarding it may be a first step toward true retirement income se-
curity for the next generation of workers and retirees.
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